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ABSTRACT 
 
The goal is to explore the construction of the Public Inquiry image and its “persona” via judicial 
decision-making and legal discourses that are utilized to justify the final product of an inquiry. 
For instance, while the commissioner is generally equipped with extensive coercive and 
discretionary powers, there is scarcely any research on why these powers are exercised the way 
that they are and how (or if) the decisions that are made condition the public image of the inquiry 
and their ultimate impact on the survival of the institution. Specifically, it will be argued that 
despite the fact that a judge-commissioner is generally imbued with broad discretionary powers 
and given (in theory) access to flexible, independent and virtually unrestrained process, the 
discourses utilized around and inside the inquiry construct and reinforce a specific image of the 
process (and the commissioner), one that upholds the paradigm of  the traditional 
(adversarial/adjudicative) legal culture while endangering the unique nature of the public inquiry 
and what it originally was designed to achieve.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Public Inquiry (or Commission of Inquiry)
1
 as an institution has expanded in recent 
years as both the government and public have come to rely on its policy-creating and fact-finding 
potential. To date, there has been extensive research into the role and function of public inquiries 
in uncovering the truth, resolving disputes, encouraging policy changes, and “restor[ing] public 
confidence in the industry or process being reviewed.”2 In fact, a significant amount of this 
research focuses on the issues of why inquiries work, how they function, their utility and the 
guidelines that could be set out to ensure the proper functioning of this institution in the future.
3
 
In other words, the bulk of academic literature on the subject of Public Inquiries addresses 
mainly the external aspects of the institution – the process, function, and the overall premise for 
its existence. However, this same literature often ignores the very process of conceptualizing, 
discussing, and evaluating those external aspects that ultimately dictates what the Public Inquiry 
is imagined to be, its “proper” function and whether it achieved its institutional objective.  
                                                          
1
 While the reference to “Public Inquiries” or “Commissions of Inquiry” (used interchangeably throughout this 
paper) encompasses a variety of instruments, such as “government-appointed commissions, task-forces, 
parliamentary committees, statutory investigative and advisory agencies, and departmental studies”, this paper is 
concerned solely with inquiries that are appointed by the executive government and have a member of the judiciary 
serving as the inquiry chair. See Jeffrey R. Stutz, “What Gets Done and Why: Implementing the Recommendations 
of Public Inquiries” (2008) 51:3 Canadian Public Administration 501 [Stutz] at 501. For a more detailed definition 
of the “Commission of Inquiry” see Allan Manson & David Mullan, “Introduction” in Allan Manson & David 
Mullan, eds., Commissions of Inquiry: Praise or Reappraise? (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2003) 1 at 3-4 [Manson & 
Mullan, “Introduction”]. 
2
 Justice John H. Gomery, “The Pros and Cons of Commissions of Inquiry” (2006) 51 McGill L.J. 783 [Gomery] at 
783. See also: Allan Manson & David Mullan, eds., Commissions of Inquiry: Praise or Reappraise? (Toronto: Irwin 
Law, 2003) [Manson & Mullan, Commissions of Inquiry]; Neil Bradford, “Writing Public Philosophy: Canada’s 
Royal Commissions on Everything” (1999) 34:4 Journal of Canadian Studies 136 [Bradford]; Robert Centa & 
Patrick Macklem, “Securing Accountability Through Commissions of Inquiry: The Role of the Law Commission of 
Canada” (2001) 39:1 Osgoode Hall L.J. 118 [Centa & Macklem]; Peter J. Carver, “Getting the Story Out: 
Accountability and the Law of Public Inquiries” in Coleen M. Flood & Lorne Sossin, eds., Administrative Law in 
Context, 2
nd
 ed. (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2013) 541 [Carver]; and A. Paul Pross, Christie Innis & John A. 
Yogis, eds., Commissions of Inquiry (Toronto: Carswell Publications, 1990) [Pross, Innis & Yogis, Commissions of 
Inquiry] . 
3
 See e.g., Stutz, supra note 1; Gus Van Harten, “Truth Before Punishment: A Defence of Public Inquiries” (2003) 
29 Queen’s L.J. 242 [Van Harten, “Truth Before Punishment”]; Pross, Innis & Yogis, Commissions of Inquiry, 
supra note 2; Jasminka Kalajdzic, “Outsiders: The Sources and Impact of Secrecy at the Iacobucci Inquiry” (2010) 
36 Queen’s L.J. 161 [Kalajdzic]. 
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Given this gap in research and analysis, it is not surprising that when it came to 
evaluating the Public Inquiry’s efficacy, the institution did not fare well.4 In fact, the inquiry has 
endured criticism from all sides - the academia, legal professionals and the public at large. 
Interestingly, most of the concern is directed at either the inquiry becoming too adversarial and 
adjudicative in nature or not enough. For instance, MacKay & McQueen addressed some of the 
issues surrounding Public Inquiries, namely the individual rights claims and division of powers 
challenges, both focusing on the justiciability of the inquiry process rather than its truth-seeking 
potential.
5
 More importantly, while addressing these issues, MacKay & McQueen saw fit to 
compare the Public Inquiry to the adversarial process in order to ascertain “if public inquiries are 
the best mechanism available to achieve the desired goals.”6 However, despite recognizing that 
the unique context of an inquiry needs to be accounted for, by pitting the inquiry against the 
adjudicative model, MacKay & McQueen inadvertently imposed conflicting standards on the 
conduct of an inquiry and the role of its commissioner thereby distorting the unique Public 
Inquiry image. Specifically, they separated truth from fairness making it questionable whether 
truth-seeking could ever come before justice even within an institution that makes truth its 
ultimate objective and foundation for the inquiry’s very existence.  
MacKay & McQueen were not the only ones to question legitimacy of the current inquiry 
model especially as it was being measured against the adjudicative standard. While Centa & 
Macklem summarized some of the start-up issues involved in calling a Public Inquiry, 
specifically as they relate to the inquiry becoming more adversarial in nature and less efficient as 
                                                          
4
 See generally Manson & Mullan, Commissions of Inquiry, supra note 2; Pross, Innis & Yogis, Commissions of 
Inquiry, supra note 2; Kalajdzic, supra note 3; Gordon F. Henderson, “Abuse of Power by Royal Commissions” 493 
in Law Society of Upper Canada, The Abuse of Power and the Role of an Independent Judicial System in Its 
Regulation and Control (Toronto: R. De Boo, 1979) [Henderson]; and J.E. Hodgetts, “Should Canada be De-
Commissioned? A Commoner’s View of Royal Commissions” (1964) 70:4 Queen’s Quarterly 483. 
5
 A. Wayne MacKay & Monica G. McQueen, “Public Inquiries and the Legality of Blaming: Truth, Justice, and the 
Canadian Way” 249 in Manson & Mullan, Commissions of Inquiry, supra note 2 at 252 [MacKay & McQueen]. 
6
 Ibid. at 253. 
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a mechanism for generating public policy,
7
 Schwartz called on the inquiry to “act more 
judiciously”, emphasizing the need to correct the inefficiency of the process and the institution’s 
inadequate civil liberties safeguards.
8
 Describing himself as “being an early and tough critic of 
the way we conduct public inquiries in Canada,” Schwartz warned that “[t]he dilatory, 
inconclusive or heavy-handed character of a number of recent public inquiries and Royal 
Commissions may produce a public backlash…”9 Moreover, he urged that “[i]t would be better 
to find ways to make our inquiries more efficient, productive and respectful of civil liberties” and 
proposed a list of solutions geared towards making inquiries more “judicious” and compliant 
with the adjudicative standards of “justice”.10 In other words, while being held-up to the 
traditional, adversarial standards of practice and procedure, in recent years the inquiry has been 
criticized for being an inefficient and even futile alternative to the adjudicative investigation 
model.
11
 
Nevertheless, it is important to highlight at the outset that these contradictory 
expectations were not unnoticed and the unique nature of the Public Inquiry institution has its 
own defenders. For instance, unlike Schwartz, Van Harten recognized that expecting the Public 
Inquiry to comply with the adversarial values and standards will only undermine the institution’s 
social function and truth-seeking potential, not to mention the public’s confidence in its utility as 
it was never meant to resemble the adjudicative model against which it is measured.
12
 
Specifically, Van Harten sets out to determine how to balance the search for the truth and the 
protection of individual rights; he examines the circumstances when a public interest can be 
                                                          
7
 Centa & Macklem, supra note 2 at 123-140. 
8
 Bryan Schwartz, “Public Inquiries” 443 in Manson & Mullan, Commissions of Inquiry, supra note 2 at 457 and 
454-455 [Schwartz]. 
9
 Ibid. at 455. 
10
 Ibid. at 455-456. 
11
 See Innis Christie & A. Paul Pross, “Introduction” 1 in Pross, Innis & Yogis, Commissions of Inquiry, supra note 
2 at 1-2 [Christie & Pross, “Introduction”]. 
12
 Van Harten, “Truth Before Punishment”, supra note 3. 
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prioritized over individual rights issues and the principle of inquiry efficiency can trump that of 
adjudicative fairness.
13
 However, although Van Harten argued that“[t]here is a legitimate 
expectation that the commissioner will use his or her powers to ensure that an inquiry is both 
thorough and independent,”14 he did not consider how the commissioner managed his/her 
controversial position as the head of a Public Inquiry where he/she is often obliged to choose 
between the principles of efficiency over those of fairness and vice versa. In other words, while 
Van Harten was aware of these conflicting expectations he did not investigate their source or the 
extent to which they compromised commissioner’s role and distorted Public Inquiry’s identity.  
Furthermore, given these conflicting expectations, it is no wonder that the Public Inquiry 
has been struggling to maintain its efficiency and effectiveness as a truth-seeking public 
institution operating within the confines of adjudicative norms. The tendency to appoint 
members of the judiciary to commission inquiries has made the struggle twofold. Not only is 
there a general inclination to measure the inquiry process against the standards of the 
adjudicative system, but there is also pressure on the judge as commissioner to uphold not only 
the fundamental principles of Public Inquiries but also the judicial values for which he/she has 
been prized by the government that appointed him/her and the public that trust him/her to act 
judiciously. In fact, this pressure is so obvious that some academics began questioning the very 
propriety of judicial involvement – both, in the sense of individual engagement and as part of the 
institutional discourse - in commissions of inquiry. For instance, according to Dodek, “[t]he 
current political culture of independence and accountability has made judicial independence a 
                                                          
13
 Van Harten, supra note 3. 
14
 Ibid. at 246. 
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highly valued political commodity that is frequently in demand by government officials.”15 
However, such widespread use of the judiciary for extra-judicial functions has “the potential to 
undermine the bedrock principle of judicial independence.”16 Specifically, if the concept of 
adjudicative independence is imported into the inquiry context without a properly “constructed 
and proffered” argument for its applicability, not only will the judge-commissioner be at risk of 
having his/her impartiality questioned, not to mention his/her legitimacy as a commissioner, but 
the credibility of the Public Inquiry itself will suffer.
17
  
Similarly, speaking in relation to the British experience with judicially run Public 
Inquiries, Beatson insisted that “one should be more cautious about the use of judges for this 
extra-judicial task.”18 Although it may be instinctual to believe that, because of his/her 
experience and position, a judge is well suited for the role of the commissioner, conducting an 
inquiry is not a judicial function and given a judge’s obligation to uphold the standards and 
values of his/her profession, a judge-commissioner is naturally placed in a very delicate 
situation.
19
 For one, as commissioner, a judge is required to uphold fundamental principles of the 
Public Inquiry in pursuit of his/her mandate while engaging the very qualities for which he/she 
was chosen fill the role of commissioner in the first place. However, an inquiry’s fundamental 
principles are not always in congruence with judicial qualities as both are defined by two very 
different systems of justice. Accordingly, it is no wonder that Beatson and others like him are 
worried about potentially compromising reputation of the judiciary.
20
  
                                                          
15
 Adam Dodek, “Judicial Independence as a Public Policy Instrument” in Adam Dodek & Lorne Sossin, eds., 
Judicial Independence in Context (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc., 2010) 295 [Dodek, “Judicial Independence as a Public 
Policy Instrument”] at 295. 
16
 Ibid. at 298. 
17
 Ibid. at 332 and 298. 
18
 Jack Beatson, “Should Judges Conduct Public Inquiries?” (2003-2004) 37:2-3 Isr. L. Rev. 238 at 239 [Beatson]. 
19
 Ibid. at 241 and 250-251. 
20
 Ibid. at 256-264. 
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Others still are worried about the future of the Public Inquiry itself. Why? Because the 
fact that there is a tendency to resort to judicial values and adjudicative standards in an inquiry 
setting is often unaddressed by the judge-commissioner – no less those writing on the subject of 
Public Inquiries – as his/her professional ties to the judicial culture and tradition overshadow the 
discourse of truth that inquiries were originally designed to employ. Given that the judge-
commissioner is the embodiment of the inquiry and all the principles for which it stands, in order 
to determine the future of the Public Inquiry institution, it is imperative to analyze the use of 
judicial discourse and its role in shaping the institution’s character, function, and image. 
Precisely this is the goal of the paper. After all, it is up to the commissioner to utilize appropriate 
discourses in support of an inquiry’s public purpose and social functions. It is the way in which 
the commissioner construes his role and the function of an inquiry that influences the structure of 
the process and the exercise of discretionary powers, which in turn dictate how the inquiry will 
be perceived by the public.  
Perhaps Pross, Innis, & Yogis have come closest to hinting at a need for such analysis of 
judicial discourse and its role in shaping the Public Inquiry image. According to them, “in recent 
years the usefulness of commissions of inquiry has been called into question” and it may have 
something to do with the fact that “both in assessing the functioning of inquiries and within 
inquiries themselves, an important value conflict between what we have called lawyers’ values 
and policy makers’ values has served to render commissions more complex, time-consuming and 
expensive.”21 Not surprisingly, a conference on commissions of inquiry “was called to discuss 
the extent to which this conflict of values has changed – or perhaps even undermined - the work 
of modern commissions.”22 Most importantly, the conference asked whether these conflicting 
                                                          
21
 Christie & Pross, “Introduction”, supra note 11 at 1-2. 
22
 Ibid. at 2. 
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values “have dictated so many changes in the procedures used by inquiries” consequently 
compromising their utility and “[t]o what extent do lawyers’ concerns inhibit the proper 
discussion of public business by narrowly restricting the scope of a commission’s inquiry and by 
hemming the public input with elaborate procedural requirements?”23 Both questions are 
important to the analysis of the Public Inquiry’s future. The very fact that these are the types of 
questions that precipitated the need for a conference on commissions of inquiry highlights the 
inquiry’s current identity crisis and an impending deterioration of the very foundation on which 
the Public Inquiry had originally been built.   
These are also the types of questions that form the basis for this paper and the analysis to 
follow. After all, the truth of the matter is that the Public Inquiry, as a free-standing and unique 
public institution, is an endangered species and it is imperative that we investigate the likely 
sources of its demise if only to understand where the future of the institution is headed. As it 
currently stands, the circumstances are bleak as the inquiry is faced with a gradual deterioration 
of its public image, founding principles, functions, and character. Bringing fuel to the fire of an 
already growing skepticism of inquiry’s legitimacy as an effective and efficient institution is the 
escalating recourse to judicial discourse by both external and internal factions responsible for 
defining parameters of the inquiry’s very existence. It is precisely this discourse that serves as 
the backbone for this paper’s analysis, informing my argument as to the institution’s dire future 
as a “Public Inquiry”. 
Because the Public Inquiry is often analyzed and discussed in terms of the judicial 
discourse that is part and parcel of the adjudicative system, its true character is often 
misconstrued resulting in it being criticized as inefficient and ineffective and described as a 
                                                          
23
 Ibid. 
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“controversial public vehicle”.24 Thus, in order to even begin understanding why there is such a 
high level of dissatisfaction with the Public Inquiry, we need to first become accustomed to 
detecting the incongruous expectations that are imposed on the institution, its persona, and 
commissioner in the form of judicial discourse. As such, unlike most of the preceding work on 
the subject matter, the focus of my research will be primarily on the internal aspects of the 
inquiry process. Rather than analyzing and evaluating the process itself (or what the public 
comes to expect from it), I intend to examine how the process – and thereby its image - is created 
in the first place: what role do judges as commissioners play in the construction of the process; 
how does their “judicial” position and/or legal culture influence their decision-making; do 
concerns for public expectation/perception of the process (and commissioner) have any impact 
on the discourses that are utilized during the inquiry; and lastly,what do these discourses suggest 
about the process and the ultimate image of the inquiry?  
In other words, my goal is to explore the construction of the inquiry image and its 
“persona” via judicial decision-making and legal discourses that are utilized to justify the final 
product of an inquiry. For instance, while the commissioner is generally equipped with extensive 
coercive powers
25
 (not to mention the wide discretionary powers provided under the inquiry 
mandate), there is scarcely any research on why these powers are exercised the way that they are 
and how (or if) the decisions that are made condition the public image of the inquiry and their 
ultimate impact on the survival of the institution. Specifically, it will be argued that despite the 
fact that a judge-commissioner is generally imbued with broad discretionary powers and given 
(in theory) access to flexible, independent and virtually unrestrained process, the discourses 
                                                          
24
 Manson & Mullan, “Introduction”, supra note 1 at 10. 
25
 For example, pursuant to the Public Inquiries Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P-41, the commissioner may require witnesses 
to testify under oath or affirmation and can call for production of documents. The commission also has quasi-
criminal powers of detention and search and seizure – just to name a few. 
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utilized around and inside the inquiry construct and reinforce a specific image of the process 
(and the commissioner), one that upholds the paradigm of  the traditional 
(adversarial/adjudicative) legal culture while endangering the unique nature of the public inquiry 
and what it originally was designed to achieve.  
The paper is divided in to four parts. Part I discusses the analytical approach to the 
research for this paper, specifically the use of discourse analysis as a mechanism for describing 
the construction process of the Public Inquiry persona (both the institution and its 
commissioner). Part II situates the discourse analysis that follows in Parts III and IV of the paper 
in the context of the general discussion of Public Inquiries. In particular, while Section A of Part 
II looks at how the institutional ideal is conceptualized in the academic and legal literature, 
Section B zeroes in on the role of the judge-commissioner in shaping that ideal and contributing 
to a new, potentially adverse, inquiry persona via judicial discourse. Section C goes one step 
further to isolate truth and justice as the discourses at the forefront of any discussion about the 
inquiry, its process, commissioner’s role, and its general utility as a public institution. Following 
this literature review, Part III of the paper examines precisely how these discourses are utilized 
by deconstructing each and analysing their most common applications. Lastly, Part IV engages 
in the analysis of two judicial inquiries, the Arar Commission and the Iacobucci Inquiry, in order 
to illustrate the role of judicial discourse in distorting the idealized character and image of the 
Public Inquiry and thereby threatening the future survival of the institution.  
 
 
 10 
 
PART I: METHODOLOGY& STATEMENT OF ANALYTICAL APPROACH 
As mentioned above, the goal of this paper is to engage in discourse analysis in order to 
facilitate the current academic discussion on the future of the Public Inquiry. But first, it is 
important to be clear about what the concept “Public Inquiry” means within the context of this 
paper. According to Salter, “[a]n inquiry is any body that is formally mandated by a government, 
either on an ad hoc basis or with reference to a specific problem, to conduct its process of fact-
finding and to arrive at a body of recommendations.”26 Although there are a myriad of inquiries 
in Canada that fall within the scope of this definition, be they public or private,
27
 advisory or 
investigatory, provincial or federal,
28
 this paper is concerned solely with inquiries that are 
chaired by a member of the judiciary, currently serving or already retired.
29
 Accordingly, unless 
specifically stated otherwise, the terms public inquiry, commissions, and/or inquiries may be 
used interchangeably in this paper, but will always denote those commissions of inquiry that are 
appointed by the executive government (federal or provincial) and have a member of the judiciary 
serving as the inquiry chair. 
This is not to discount the importance of other public inquiries, hearings, and tribunals. 
Rather, this limited focus is intended to facilitate a discussion of the unique role of the judge-
                                                          
26
 Liora Salter, “The Two Contradictions in Public Inquiries” 173 in Pross, Innis & Yogis, Commissions of Inquiry, 
supra note 2 at 175 [Salter, “The Two Contradictions in Public Inquiries”]. 
27
 Interestingly, according to Robardet, “[a] public inquiry will be thought of as being more formal and legal in 
nature than an informal and private investigative inquiry. This is not due to the formalities that can be implied, but to 
the consequences generally associated with public inquiries, that is, prejudice, prosecution or deprivation. Clearly, 
therefore, patterns of attitudes about the process are engaged by definitions of the types of inquiry.” See Patrick 
Robardet, “Should We Abandon the Adversarial Model in Favour of the Inquisitorial Model in Commissions of 
Inquiry?” 111 in Pross, Innis & Yogis, Commissions of Inquiry, supra note 3 at 115 [Robardet]. 
28
 Sometimes commissions of inquiry are referred to as “Royal Commissions” but “[p]rerogative or true ‘royal 
commissions’ are no longer utilized. The basic structure of federal commissions of inquiry is established by Part I of 
the Inquiries Act although such inquiries are still often referred to as Royal Commissions. Legislative provision is 
now made for such inquiries in the provinces as well.” See Frank Iacobucci, Q.C., “Commissions of Inquiry and 
Public Policy in Canada” 21 in Pross, Innis & Yogis, Commissions of Inquiry, supra note 3 at 23 [Iacobucci, 
“Commissions of Inquiry and Public Policy in Canada”]. See also Carver, supra note 2 at 544 for another 
examination of the differentiation between a “royal commission,” “judicial inquiry,” and “public inquiry”, which are 
very often used interchangeably. 
29
 Please see supra note 1 for a definition of “Public Inquiry” and what it may encompass in other contexts and 
academic literature. 
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commissioner and the effects of his/her professional upbringing, as well as the obligations 
imposed on him/her by the academic community by virtue of his/her judicial status, on the nature 
of the discourse ultimately utilized within the inquiry setting. More importantly, because 
judicially lead inquiries are almost certain to engage in the discourses of justice that are native to 
the adjudicative/adversarial system, limiting the analysis to only the judicial inquiries will give a 
better idea of the extent and nature of the effects of judicial discourse on the Public Inquiry and 
its future identity.  
Although a judge-commissioner’s decision-making is subject to a variety of legal and 
institutional constrains – including those imposed by the jurisprudence, the Inquiries Act30 and 
the inquiry’s mandate itself - as will be argued throughout the paper, it is the judicial discourse 
that presents the biggest challenge and obstacle to how a commissioner exercises his/her power, 
no matter its legally or institutionally mandated scope. And it is this very discourse that imposes 
a particular framework of thought and practice which in effect structures what the Public Inquiry 
can or cannot accomplish, its public utility, and more importantly, its institutional image and 
reputation. Accordingly, the intention here is to identify and analyze discursive patterns as they 
dictate what ultimately becomes of the Public Inquiry.  
After all, the power of discourse should never be underestimated. In fact, our external 
reality – a “particular way of organizing thinking, talking and doing about some selected topic” – 
is mediated through discourse/language.
31
 According to Lugosi, discourse is “a universe or 
framework of ideas, with particular terms, concepts, language and practices used for making 
                                                          
30
 R.S.C. 1985, Chap. I-11, s. 2. 
31
 Alan Hunt & Gary Wickham, Foucault and Law: Towards a Sociology of Law as Governance (London: Pluto 
Press, 1994) [Hunt & Wickham] at 7 (emphasis added). 
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sense of the world. From each discourse, different truths and facts are derived.”32 Moreover, 
Hunt & Wickham specified that: 
[d]iscourse provides a means of designating the different forms of communication, but also 
reminding us of the institutional, cultural or constitutive place of language. The term 
remind us that words work for us because they are part of some wider phenomenon. While 
the more important forms of discourses are speech or writing (text), discourse can also be 
non-verbal, physical acts (shaking hands) or visual symbols… 
 
What the concept captures is that people live and experience within discourse in the sense 
that discourses impose frameworks which structure what can be experienced or the 
meaning that experience can encompass, and thereby influence what can be said, thought 
and done. Each discourse allows certain things to be said, though and done and impedes 
or prevents other things from being said, thought and done.
 33
 
 
It is this discursive process of structuring meaning, experience, thought and deeds that this paper 
intends to study. By dismantling the discursive patterns it is possible to identify the framework 
that a particular set of thoughts, words or practices relies on for its meaning and relevance and 
ultimately, the institution to which that framework belongs. For instance, as will be argued 
throughout this paper, a judge-commissioner’s thought process is structured by the 
adjudicative/adversarial discursive framework that draws its authority and meaning from the 
legal/judicial institution and culture. This legal culture encompassed how a judge experienced 
and reacted to his/her surroundings (and in the process defined those very surroundings 
according to his/her experience of those surroundings) prior to his/her role as commissioner. The 
effect of this legal discourse does not disappear by virtue of simply a judge assuming the role of 
a commissioner because a judge is him/herself is part and parcel of that legal discourse and 
culture. Specifically, a judge is a visual representation of the legal/judicial discourse affecting 
not only how he/she experiences or reacts to a particular context but also how others engaged in 
that context define their experience, practice and most importantly, their surroundings.  
                                                          
32
 Nicole V.T. Lugosi, “‘Truth-telling’ and Legal Discourse: A Critical Analysis of the Neil Stonechild Inquiry” 
(2011) 44:2 Canadian Journal of Political Science 299 at 302 [Lugosi]. 
33
 Hunt & Wickham, supra note 31 at 8. 
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As will be argued below, when it comes to the context of Pubic Inquiries the effects of 
judicial discourse can be far reaching on how the values, principles, foundation, and practices of 
this particular institution are structured and defined. After all,  
[d]iscourses have real effects; they are not just the way that social issues get talked and 
thought about. They structure the possibility of what gets included and excluded and of 
what gets done or remain undone….In its most obvious sense discourse authorizes some to 
speak, some views to be taken seriously, while others are marginalized, derided, excluded 
and even prohibited. Discourses impose themselves upon social life, indeed they produce 
what it is possible to think, speak and do.
34
  
 
In other words, discourse dictates how a Public Inquiry is experienced, thought and talked about. 
Moreover, a commission of inquiry presents a judge with different notions of truth and justice 
than he/she is traditionally informed by. This poses a challenge for a judge-commissioner as it 
goes against his/her own current understanding and experience of truth and justice.  
According to Foucault, “[d]iscourses must be treated as discontinuous practices, which 
cross each other, are sometimes juxtaposed with one another, but can just as well exclude or be 
aware of each other.”35 A judicial member at the head of a Public Inquiry creates an environment 
for the proliferation of such discursive competition and clash, which in effect poses as a threat to 
the stability and continuity of Public Inquiry’s own original discursive practices as the preferred 
form of discourse takes over defining the practices, principles, and narratives/truths that matter. 
For instance, focusing on the notion of law as a hegemonic form of truth-telling, Lugosi applied 
discourse analysis to Justice Wright’s final report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Matters 
Relating to the death of Neil Stonechild to show “how, in such a judicial forum, specific 
narratives were framed as more legitimate than others.”36 He also recognized “law’s privileged 
                                                          
34
 Ibid. at 8-9. 
35
 Michel Foucault, “The Order of Discourse” in Robert Young, ed. Untying the Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader 
(Boston: Routledge & K. Paul, 1981) at 67 cited in Hunt & Wickham, supra note 29 at 9. 
36
 Lugosi, supra note 32 at 301.  
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position as the dominant, most competent discourse by which to determine truths and facts”37 
thereby legitimizing specific practices that make it difficult to imagine another way of seeing and 
doing things.
38Accordingly, Lugosi insists that inquiries “warrant critical examination because, 
as illustrated with the Stonechild case, a great deal can be missed.”39 The goal of this paper is to 
conduct a similar discourse analysis “paying particular attention to what is being said in what 
way and what is omitted”40 in order to understand the impact of judicial discourses on the type of 
values, narratives, and functions deemed legitimate for Public Inquiries to assume and 
ultimately, the type of institution that the inquiry is allowed to become.  
To be more precise, the discourse analysis that follows will look at patterns of thought, 
language use, and behaviour of judge-commissioners and the academia as they pertain to the 
(study of) internal workings of a Public Inquiry. After all, judges and legal scholars are active 
members of a “community of legal discourse”;41 its creators and enforcers. This community is 
comprised of legal language, style, and argumentation, which “are not just a matter of form, they 
hide concepts and world views.”42  More importantly, this legal discourse “functions as an 
important legitimating forum for judicial decisions,”43 including those that are made within the 
realm of Public Inquiries. As such, judicial discourse is bound to influence how a Public Inquiry 
is perceived, experienced, and defined. According to Van Hoecke,  
[o]ne should not underestimate the importance of such shared understandings. It is mainly 
these paradigmatic theories that strongly limit the number of interpretation problems, 
interpretation discussions and possible alternatives for the meaning and the scope of the 
law. Explicitly or implicitly, it is to an important extent legal doctrine that co-determines, 
refines and structures these theories and their mutual coherence.
44
 
                                                          
37
 Ibid. at 307. 
38
 Ibid. at 302. 
39
 Ibid. at 312. 
40
 Ibid. at 304. 
41
 Mark Van Hoecke, Law as Communication (Portland: Hart Publishing, 2002) at 46. 
42
 Ibid. 
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 Ibid. at 189. 
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 Ibid. at 185. 
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In other words, the normative discourse that the judge-commissioner and/or legal scholars 
engage in order to describe the inquiry process and its functions imposes limitations on the 
original discursive practices relating to the Public Inquiry institution, thereby threatening the 
stability of its paradigmatic framework and identity. This is precisely why the paper will attempt 
to disentangle discursive patterns utilized within the inquiry context by judges and academics as 
a means for making sense of the institution, its fundamental principles and functions.  
In order to study these patterns and thus, understand how the commissioner structures and 
shapes the public inquiry image, the analysis will focus on what Foucault called “discursive 
formation” – a system for describing a group of verbal performances and patterns of concepts 
and themes such as in the discourse of law - and “epistemes” – that give rise to the discursive 
forms of thought and “impose a framework of categories and classifications within which 
thought, communication and action can occur.”45 Specifically, the paper will examine two 
“broad constellations or patterns of thought,”46 their coexistence and effect on one another: the 
justice-centered adjudicative framework informing adversarial proceedings and the truth-
centered inquisitorial framework according to which the Public Inquiry was modeled.  
Before going any further, it is important to clarify that this paper does not argue that there 
is or must be a strict dichotomy between the adversarial and the inquisitorial models and the 
discursive formation attached to each. As implied above, the two systems coexist and interact 
within the same realm and as concerns the function of a Public Inquiry, flexibility is its 
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 Hunt & Wickham, supra note 31 at 9. 
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hallmark
47
 and as such, it is only fitting that it “favour a spectrum of procedural requirements 
rather than a series of procedural dichotomies.”48 According to Robardet,  
[b]ecause inquiries are able to perform tasks which are unsuitable for either the courts or 
the adjudicative model, there is a case against the judicialization of certain types of 
inquiries….some would argue that the multitude of functions for which inquiries are used 
puts in question the appropriateness of the adversarial, adjudicative model for all of them. 
Although it can be said that an inquiry ‘necessitates a major issue of considerable 
contentiousness for its establishment’, it does not follow that the inquiry thereby 
established must be adversarial and adjudicative….Furthermore, a given inquiry does not 
have to adopt a single procedural model.
49
 
 
Although, from time to time an inquiry (especially one concerned primarily with fact-finding) 
may need to employ practices and/or processes that are adversarial in nature, that does not and 
should not mean that the inquiry ought to adopt the value preferences and discourses of the 
adjudicative model to which those practices relate. However, it is often very difficult to separate 
a particular process model/system from the values, standards, preferences and expectations 
attached to that model. In other words, they are value laden and anything but neutral and should 
be treated as such. Even Robardet recognized as much when he insisted that one must consider:  
[f]irst, there is the absence of a common understanding of inquiry, both formally and 
functionally. Second, there is the issue of whether we can dispense with definitions of the 
terms and techniques used in relation to these models and simply content ourselves with 
their assumed common notions of the adversarial and the inquisitorial models, these 
notions are probably assumed to be understood more than they are actually understood. 
Finally, we must take into account the value preferences and the images we hold of social 
processes and institutions associated with these different models.
50
 
  
Therefore, it is important to examine where on the continuum between the adversarial system on 
the one end and the inquisitorial model on the other the Public Inquiry is being situated as it will 
enable a better understanding of the current legal and academic discourse practices and their role 
in shaping the institution’s public image. To do otherwise is to perpetuate the “absence of a 
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common understanding” of what an inquiry is, to ignore its essential nature and function, and to 
compromise its true identity. 
As such, this paper will focus on analyzing discourse use and its effect on the function 
and character that the Public Inquiry ultimately assumes. In order to ascertain which discourses 
are at the forefront of any discussion about the inquiry, this paper will first look at the relevant 
academic literature and analyze the terminology, concepts and descriptors commonly utilized by 
the academia in studies, research and debates on the topic of Public Inquiries. After all, the 
academia has a significant influence on how authorities, professionals, and consequently the 
general public view and discuss the role of public institutions. In addition to examining academic 
commentary, relevant jurisprudence and legislation (e.g., Inquiries Act), this analysis includes 
two case studies: the Arar Commission,
51
 and the Iacobucci Inquiry
52
. Specifically, this paper 
will look at commission reports, commentary, and rulings made by the commissioner with the 
goal of extracting discourses that drive inquiry processes (the decision-making, deliberations, 
justifications, explanations, and definitions, etc.) These documents will facilitate an 
understanding of how the commissioner defines his/her role and the role of the commission, 
his/her justifications for specific decisions and use of discretion, as well as his/her priorities and 
preferences for specific narratives, ideas, issues and assumptions. In other words, the case studies 
offer a glimpse not only into the commissioner’s thought process, views and interpretations, but 
also into the intricate process behind the construction of an inquiry’s public image. 
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 Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relations to Maher Arar (5 February 2004), 
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PART II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Before moving onto the discourse analysis, it is important to examine why there is such 
public demand for and reliance on commissions of inquiry in the first place. More specifically, 
which norms, values, processes, and language are often associated with a Public Inquiry and 
make it a unique public institution for which there is a public need and demand?  In other words, 
what are the ideal characteristics of a Public Inquiry?    
 
A. Ground Zero - Conceptualization of the Ideal “Public” Inquiry 
 
Although it is arguable whether the true (organic and unbiased) nature of a Public Inquiry 
as a separate institutional entity, uncontaminated by external normative assumptions and 
expectations can ever be discerned, it is worth the attempt nonetheless if only to provide a 
starting point for the analysis of the role of judicial discourses. As such, it is important to begin 
this paper with a closer look at the very basic functions of an inquiry and slowly progress 
towards an examination of the ideal inquiry process as it is conceptualized within academic 
literature. Only after such analysis will it be easier to grasp the full extent of the effects that 
external discourses have on the construction of the Public Inquiry “persona” that is currently 
generating significant government, academic, media and public attention.  
 
(1) The “Public” Essence of an Inquiry   
 
Accordingly, it is interesting to note at the outset that on the surface, the functions of a 
Public Inquiry seem to be very basic and unassuming. In other words, there seem to be no hidden 
agendas or qualifiers behind the true purpose of an inquiry. For instance, virtually every time an 
inquiry is created it is described as either a government’s response to a public controversy, 
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educating the public, serving a policy advisory function or a fact-finding and investigative role, 
and/or as assisting the government in taking remedial action and restoring public confidence in 
the institution or events under investigation.
53
 According to Salter, an inquiry: 
…offers the public an unlimited opportunity for experiencing direct democracy, that is, 
widespread political participation in the formulation of specific policies. It offers an 
opportunity to define public issues, in the public view, with the participation of the clients 
of those policies. It provides an avenue for a public investigation of public and private 
conduct, far in excess of that conducted by the ombudsmen.
54
 
 
Justice Gomery summarized these public functions into three categories: “…to investigate, to 
educate and to inform”.55 So far, the conceptualization of an inquiry performing at its optimum 
as well as its quintessential constituents is simple enough to grasp. 
The essence of an inquiry can be further narrowed down to its “public” components. For 
instance, notice that all of the above references to the primary functions of an inquiry have the 
term “public” as either a joint descriptor or an underlying facet. In addition, one should not 
overlook the significance of the fact that most, if not all judicially-led inquiries place an 
emphasis on the public nature of their proceedings – either via the title “Public Inquiry” or 
specifically underscoring the social functions of their mandate/agenda.
56
 Even truth-generating 
or fact-finding and policy-creating aspects of an inquiry investigation are public in nature. As 
such, it should not come as a surprise that out of all of the inquiry functions, getting to the truth 
of the matter via open, transparent and public forum and restoring public confidence - at least on 
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the surface - are considered an inquiry’s core obligations with all other functions being 
subsidiary to its social/public obligations.
57
 
Viewed from this perspective, any discussion of the organic and true nature of an inquiry 
should begin from the analysis of its public qualities and virtues. Similarly, any assessment or 
evaluation of an inquiry’s efficacy and efficiency in dealing with matters under its mandate 
should first and foremost focus on the degree to which the process caters to the needs of the 
society/public. For instance, Justice Cory of the Supreme Court of Canada summarizes the 
centrality of the “public” concept in an ideal inquiry process as follows:  
One of the primary functions of public inquiries is fact-finding. They are often 
convened, in the wake of public shock, horror, disillusionment, or scepticism, 
in order to uncover "the truth"….Yet, these inquiries can and do fulfill an 
important function in Canadian society. In times of public questioning, stress 
and concern they provide the means for Canadians to be apprised of the 
conditions pertaining to a worrisome community problem and to be a part of 
the recommendations that are aimed at resolving the problem. Both the status 
and high public respect for the commissioner and the open and public nature of 
the hearing help to restore public confidence not only in the institution or 
situation investigated but also in the process of government as a whole. They 
are an excellent means of informing and educating concerned members of the 
public.
58
 
 
In other words, an inquiry is not true to its nature if it does not perform for and with the public in 
the exercise of its mandate. According to Cory J., even the fact-finding function of an inquiry 
begins and should end not only with the public in mind but also with its collaboration; an inquiry 
begins with an event concerning majority of the citizens and should ideally conclude only when 
those citizens’ needs (i.e., information, resolution, reform, etc.) have been addressed.   
Similarly, when evaluating the effectiveness of a commission, Justice Iacobucci posed 
this series of questions: “Did it get the facts and get them straight? Did it raise consciousness 
                                                          
57
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about and understanding of the issue? Was the public consulted and was the best information 
obtained?”59 In addition, Manson & Mullan, citing Justice O’Connor in the Walkerton 
Commission of Inquiry, emphasized that the backbone of the foundational principles of an 
inquiry are its public aspects – thoroughness, expedition (making public engagement more 
likely), openness to the public, and fairness.
60
 Simply put, all of the judicial members cited above 
recognized public accessibility, comprehensibility and inclusiveness of an inquiry as being 
essential to its organic nature. It seems fair to deduce from the above that if any of these qualities 
are absent or where other concerns (e.g., such as those prevalent in the adversarial system) take 
precedence over the public aspects, the inquiry will not function at its full potential, neither will 
it produce satisfactory results. If such is the case, an inquiry would be no different than the 
criminal or civil trials that it was originally meant to replace; it will lose its unique character and 
place in Canadian society. 
Before going any further, it is important to address the fact that not everyone would agree 
with the proposition that the “public” is an essential characteristic of an inquiry. For instance, 
according to Robardet, “[o]ne strength of a public inquiry is its open and democratic character; 
however, publicity cannot be said to be a fundamental basic characteristic of the inquiry process 
since statutory regimes generally provide for inquiries to be in camera. Public inquiries are then 
the exception and not the rule.”61 While it is true that the legislation provides for in camera 
hearings, it does not follow that the inquiry thereby relinquishes its “public” essence or character. 
In fact, as will be argued bellow, even in the context of a private hearing, the inquiry could and 
should be guided by its publicly oriented virtues, values and standards.  
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Moreover, although it is “useful to note”, as Salter does, that inquiries “have both a 
public and a private process”, it is the public aspect that enables the inquiry to achieve its 
“radical potential.” 62  In other words, an inquiry has the potential for being an “exceptionally 
public process….used to solicit new kinds of public participation in public life and to debate 
issues in greater detail than is possible in parliament…”63 On the other hand, the private 
component of the inquiry process has a constraining effect on the commissioner’s/inquiry’s 
scope, focus and its ultimate contribution to the “public” issue(s) under investigation.64 First, the 
“private component of the inquiry process resembles a negotiation more than an assessment”; 
second, the government to whom the report is addressed serves to limit the contents and scope of 
the final recommendations; third, public submissions are under a threat of being lifted out of 
context; and lastly, “the capacity of any individual to negotiate for a particular objective is 
diminished considerably.”65 Thus, it comes to the public aspect to mediate against the restrictive 
and censoring effects of the private component. Even Robardet recognized the significance of 
“public” inquiries when he stated that they “exhibit a high degree of flexibility in their 
methodology and are conducive to in-depth analysis.”66 However, the public aspects of an 
inquiry are much more than mere exposure to publicity or public participation – although both 
are significant and should be advanced whenever possible. The “public” of a Public Inquiry, 
provides the institution with its foundation and value system, defines its function, and is that with 
respect to which the inquiry builds its character and identity.  
 Accordingly, it is important to emphasize that the unique nature of an inquiry is directly 
related to its social function. The significance of this social function should not be 
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underestimated either; it serves as a precondition for understanding how the public/society 
perceives the role and purpose of an inquiry and hence how the inquiry is ultimately 
conceptualized as an institution. This is ground zero. Understanding the backbone of the Public 
Inquiry institution will in effect expose the discourses that should properly be within its domain 
and consequently allow for drawing a distinction between discourses that reinforce and those that 
threaten the unique nature of an inquiry.  
 According to the Ontario Law Reform Commission, the “social function” of inquiries is 
its symbolic value and should not be ignored.
67
 The Commission defined the “social function” in 
the following terms:  
[A] commission…has certain things to say to government but it also has an effect on 
perceptions, attitudes and behaviour. Its general way of looking at things is probably more 
important in the long run than its specific recommendations. It is the general approach 
towards a social problem that determines the way in which a society responds to it. There 
is much more than law and government action involved in the social response to a 
problem. The attitudes and responses of individuals at the various places at which they can 
effect the problem are of profound importance. 
 
What gives an inquiry of this kind its social function is that it becomes, whether it likes it 
or not, part of this ongoing social process. There is action and interaction….The decision 
to institute an inquiry of this kind is a decision not only to release an investigative 
technique but a form of social influence as well.
68
 
 
What is important to take away from this definition is that an inquiry is first and foremost a 
social process; it has an impact on social “perceptions, attitudes and behaviour”.69 More 
significantly, the inquiry shapes these social responses more so by how it conducts its 
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proceedings rather than by what it discovers and reports. For instance, Salter used the concept of 
“deliberative democracy” when discussing the “public” aspect of Public Inquiries in order to 
emphasize the “ways that members of the public become part of the policy process” of an 
inquiry.
70
 She argued that:  
…inquiries are exemplars of deliberative democracy; they are the public sphere in 
action….Their primary function is to get issues out into the open, to bring evidence to light 
in a very public domain. They encourage participation from a broadly interested public, 
stimulate free flowing discussion among people whom they treat (at least in theory) as 
equals, and they provide informed recommendations to government.
71
 
 
Thus, there is no question that the social process rather than the outcome dictates how an inquiry 
is ultimately perceived and received by the public.
72
 
Furthermore, Salter’s detailed examination of “how various conceptions of the public 
affect what inquiries do and say” is indispensable to a meaningful analysis of the discourses that 
surround and permeate an inquiry - ultimately shaping the interpretation and conceptualization of 
an inquiry’s social/public functions - by addressing the unspoken assumptions that guide each 
and every inquiry.
73
 For instance, according to Salter, “[i]nquiries orient themselves around their 
own particular conceptions of the public. They encourage the kind of participation that matches 
their conception of the public’s role. They seek out some kinds of public input, while barely 
acknowledging others.”74 In other words, the notion of “public” in a public inquiry may take on a 
different shade depending on the inquiry, its goals, and the norms and principles it subscribes to. 
Thus the importance of conducting discourse analysis, if only to understand how the inquiry 
“persona” is currently conceptualized and the degree to which it conforms to the unique public 
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character of the Public Inquiry institution. While a full discussion of such discourses and their 
underpinning assumptions will be undertaken in Section 1.3 below, for now, it suffices to say 
that the public aspects or the social processes of an inquiry are its essence. As such, in order to 
stay true to its “public” nature and thus function at its full potential, an inquiry should be 
conceptualized in terms of its capacities for truth-seeking, accessibility, comprehensibility, and 
transparency rather than its compliance with external, adjudicative norms and standards.   
 
(2) Signs of External Threats to the Inquiry Ideal – Symptoms and Causes 
 
According to Salter, an inquiry is fully capable of incorporating radical alternatives and 
debate and more importantly, encouraging “genuinely democratic participation.”75 However, as 
the circumstances currently stand, an inquiry achieving its full potential is easier said than done. 
Consider for instance, Salter’s argument above that each and every inquiry is guided by its own 
“ideas, values and philosophies”76 and thus have different conceptions of their essential nature 
and function. Although, at least in theory, an inquiry should be guided by its social/public 
functions (that are in turn governed by the discourses internal to the inquiry’s inquisitorial 
character), the unique nature and function of an inquiry gets muddied and infected by external 
threats. One of the most predominant threats to the institution is the flagrant preference for 
judicial leadership and discourses that come attached. This is not to suggest that judges make a 
poor choice for a commissioner - although such argument has been made on multiple occasions 
elsewhere in the academic literature.
77
 The attempt here is to merely point out that there are 
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certain risks involved when those from a different institutional culture are asked to guide the 
proceeding of another institution.  
As will be argued in Part II, Section B of this paper, members of the judiciary are often 
shrouded in an aura of adversarial and adjudicative values, practices and discourses (i.e., 
independence, impartiality, individual rights protections, etc…) even when performing extra-
judicial functions, such as that of a commissioner. Thus, although procedural simplicity, 
expediency, transparency and flexibility – all necessary for the fulfillment of the public aspects 
of an inquiry - are some of the primary reasons why governments (and the public) call for an 
inquiry rather than a criminal or civil trial,
78
 all of these aspects are under the threat of extinction 
in the presence of external judicial discourses. The likely result of this is an inquiry with a vastly 
different persona than originally intended and conceptualized.   
 This threat to the unique character of an inquiry is not a secret. In fact, many have 
attempted to distinguish and separate inquiry processes from those common to the 
adversarial/adjudicative system. For instance, Cory J. has emphasised that “[a]s ad hoc bodies, 
commissions of inquiry are free of many of the institutional impediments which at times 
constrain the operation of the various branches of government” and that “[i]nquiries are, like the 
judiciary, independent; unlike the judiciary, they are often endowed with wide-ranging 
investigative powers.”79 Similarly, Salter also described that “[a]n important reason why 
inquiries are commissioned is that they permit investigation of problems in a more informal, less 
legalistic setting than the courts.”80 Ideally, they also have recourse to broader truth-seeking 
functions and, unlike in the adversarial system, the pursuit of truth takes centre stage. For 
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instance, according to Van Harten unlike with the inquiry proceedings, a criminal process has 
“…narrow and retrospective orientation….”81 In other words, it is generally expected that the 
inquiry setting is more conducive to the process of truth-seeking. It is envisioned as being 
flexible, accessible, broad in its perspective, and unconstrained by evidentiary procedures. In 
contrast, Hughes argued that in an adversarial setting, “…our rules of evidence and trial 
procedure aim at a fact-finding process that constructs truth as the absence of things that are 
untrue rather than attempting to capture the richness of augmenting, mutually informing and 
mutually challenging narratives.”82 
Perhaps Iacobucci J. captured the essential character of an inquiry best by stating that:  
A real assessment of whether the commission was effective will require not only an 
appreciation of the flexible nature of its role and attention to its objectives, but also some 
assessment of how it interacted with its environment. Central to any evaluation of the 
activities of a commission are issues of procedure. This requires an awareness of the fact 
that, functionally, the basic nature of the inquiry is generally inquisitorial and not 
adversarial and that the basic focus must be the search for truth and not the defeat or 
subjection of opposed interests.”83 
 
Thus, important to the effective and efficient function of an inquiry is being free of impediments 
that often constrain adversarial proceedings. According to Centa & Macklem, “[w]hile 
appropriate to traditional forms of private and public litigation, adversarial stances will only 
frustrate the work of an inquiry.”84 They argue further that:  
A commission of inquiry can exercise wide-ranging investigative authority to uncover 
facts concerning matters of substantial public importance….At their best, commissions of 
inquiry generate ‘innovative discourses of development that merge public philosophy 
with pragmatic ideas unlike those attempted, much less produced, by any other institution 
or organization in the Canadian political system.’”85 
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As will be shown in greater detail in Section C of this paper, this potential for generating 
“innovative discourses” is becoming a relic due to gradual seeping of adversarial and judicial 
discourses into the very roots of the Public Inquiry ideal.  
The symptoms of such infiltration are not a secret either. For instance, although Salter 
acknowledged the unique nature and function of an inquiry (see above), she argued, nevertheless, 
that “…inquiries are themselves ‘trials’ and that their legal substratum shapes both their 
participation and their capacity to inform and stimulate debate.”86 Even the Ontario Law Reform 
Commission warned that “…the inquiry process can fall prey to the assignment of fault based on 
pre-existing standards” such as the tendency of the judicial process to “…fragment issues into a 
limited set of categories established by existing norms.”87 
These arguments are substantiated by comments such as that made by Cory J. who after 
praising the inquiry institution for its unique social function went to say that: [there] is the risk 
that commissions of inquiry, released from many of the institutional constraints placed upon the 
various branches of government, are also able to operate free from the safeguards which 
ordinarily protect individual rights in the face of government action.”88 In other words, it is all 
nice and well that inquiries have such flexible and “wide-ranging investigative powers”, but it 
must still remain within the bounds prescribed by the traditional normative approaches to 
conflict resolution. Traversing beyond the boundary that separates the virtually unconstrained 
inquiry processes from those of the highly structured adversarial, pushes at the comfort level of 
persons cultured, trained and socialized to perceive adversarial as the norm (i.e., the legal 
community, government members and even the media). Consequently, although considered 
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unique and separate from judicial processes, inquiries are still expected to comply with the 
adversarial procedural, evidentiary and conceptual standards. Thus, it should not come as a 
surprise that the ultimate threat to the inquiry as a distinct and unique institution is the increasing 
reliance on legalistic and “judicialized” discourses.  
 
B. The Inquiry “Persona” – The Role of Judge-Commissioner in Shaping and Framing 
the Public Image of an Inquiry  
 
(1) The Alter Ego and Driving Force behind the Commission of Inquiry 
 
Having identified the symptoms and causes of the threat to the Public Inquiry ideal, 
it is important to now discuss how this threat infiltrates and ultimately defines the public 
image of the institution. In order to do that, we need to first identify the driving force 
behind the inquiry process. There is no need to look far. Aside from the influence of social 
(and media) perceptions – which are shaped by how the institution conceptualizes and 
presents itself to the public in the first place – the prime agent responsible for setting the 
tone and character of an inquiry is the judge-commissioner.  
For instance, it is the commissioner who ultimately sets the tone for the operation 
of an inquiry and thus, the process of truth-seeking that is so essential to the functioning of 
an inquiry.
89
 While the courts have given commissioners “considerable leeway in 
determining their own procedures”,90 the government has granted them wide powers of 
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discretion in relation to the interpretation of an inquiry’s terms of reference.91 In other 
words, the commissioner has full control over the shape and structure of an inquiry. 
Moreover, according to Manson & Mullan, “[w]hen it comes to inquiries, ‘one size 
fits all’ does not apply. The commissioner must shape the inquiry to fit the mandate.”92 
Right from the get go, the assumption is that the commissioner is responsible for shaping 
and molding the inquiry to fit the intended outcome. However, Manson & Mullan do not 
indicate how the commissioner is to go about it nor do they raise any concerns about the 
commissioner’s capacity to ensure that the character and essential nature of the Public 
Inquiry be preserved in the process of fulfilling the mandate or the terms of reference. 
Other than the fact that the investigative/fact-finding process must ultimately fit the 
dictates of the mandate, there is no road map for doing so within the inquiry paradigm.  
More importantly, the academic literature is generally silent about the fact that the 
commissioner does not merely shape the inquiry process within the bounds of its stated 
mandate, but that he/she also has the capacity to shift the focus of the terms of reference 
themselves. As Carver indicated, “[t]he commissioner of an inquiry has an important role 
in interpreting the terms of reference. The more brief or general the wording of the terms, 
the more interpretive work is necessary.”93 Similarly, Schwartz argued that “[a]s policy-
making involves value judgments, the choice of commissioner can be tantamount to the 
choice of outcome.”94 Consequently, the implication is that the commissioner has power to 
shape the ins and outs of an inquiry – its structure, process, functions, objectives and goals 
(mandate and terms of reference), achievements, and ultimately its persona.  By affecting a 
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shift in the guiding paradigm of a Public Inquiry, the commissioner impacts the viability of 
the institution by shaping its public image.  
Before discussing how the commissioner is able to have such a colossal effect, it is 
important to highlight the qualities that make a member of the judiciary so attractive to the 
executive government in its selection of a commissioner; these qualities ultimately guide how the 
judge-commissioner defines and shapes the process of an inquiry and thus, its public image. It is 
well know that the public generally has high regard for the judicial office
95
 by virtue of it being 
associated with judicial independence,
96
 impartiality, responsible decision-making and 
accountability to the public through positive laws and evolving norms.
97
 Consequently, judges 
are typically chosen to head commissions of inquiry due largely to (the public perception of) 
their experience and position:  
…Lord Scarman argued that a judge had special qualifications for investigating 
social disorder and inner city problems: “He is a trained adjudicator between 
differing parties. He is a trained investigator of fact. He is by office, and should be 
by nature, impartial and detached.” He also argued that judges would have “an 
instinctive understanding of the causes and consequences of injustice. Above all, a 
judge has a passion for righting injustice.”98 
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Similarly, the past President of the Supreme Court of Israel, Barak, listed the three preconditions 
for realizing the judicial role as: (1) judicial independence; (2) objectivity; and (3) public 
confidence in “judicial independence, fairness, and impartiality”.99 Witelson went even further 
by arguing that “[p]ublic acceptance of and support for court decisions depends upon public 
confidence in the integrity and independence of the bench.”100 All of these preconditions are at 
the very core of what makes a judge the prime candidate for the role of commissioner. Clearly, 
these qualities of the judicial position lend an aura of independence and impartiality to the 
commissioner/commission; they assist in creating a perception of a “just” investigation in the 
public eye (or so the government hopes). Important to notice here is that the key to maintaining 
credibility and public acceptance is either the pursuit of justice or ensuring that the process is 
seen to be just (via the focus on independence and impartiality of the judiciary) rather than truth-
seeking and getting the facts out to the public. 
 
(2) Infiltrating the System: The Role of Commissioners in the Conception of Inquiry Persona   
 
Although there is nothing wrong with having a “just” inquiry process given that the 
pursuit of justice as well as the other complementary qualities inherent to the judicial office play 
an arguably important part in encouraging public confidence in the inquiry,
101
 the fact that they 
come to epitomize the virtue of an inquiry should be disconcerting. Why should it matter if this 
trend enhances credibility and encourages public confidence in the inquiry system? Because in 
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the long run it also increases the likelihood of public disappointment and disillusionment when 
the system fails to first, achieve the social functions (i.e., the pursuit of truth) pertinent to its 
design and vitality and second, to fully live up to the public’s expectation of justice and 
accountability. In order to stop this cycle and prevent the demise of the Public Inquiry, it is 
important to examine how the concept of “justice” infiltrates the inquiry process thereby 
changing its character and operational paradigm. 
To begin with, it should be clear from the outset that the judge-commissioner does not 
simply utilize the qualities of independence, impartiality, and fairness – the essence of justice - 
for the sake of substantiating the social/public functions essential to an inquiry’s optimum 
performance. The commissioner does more than that; he/she internalizes them. For instance, 
according to Barak, the influence of the judicial culture is such that “…the legal system limits 
the scope of the judge’s considerations….Even when the judge is ‘with himself,’ he is within the 
framework of society, the legal system, and judicial tradition.”102 As such, a judge will scarcely 
be able to fully distance him/herself from the norms and values of an adversarial system given 
that they inform and shape a judge’s own norms, values, outlook, decision-making and 
ultimately, the very qualities for which judges are so often chosen for the role of commissioner. 
In other words, a judge is part of a system – a judicial tradition if you will - and his/her acts will 
reflect the values of that system.  
However, what is most disconcerting about this is that the public’s perception (and 
expectation) of the "judicial" function influences judicial activity, no matter the context in which 
it takes place. In return, this judicial function shapes the public’s perception of the process in the 
course of which it is implemented.
103
 Accordingly, the image of a judge and his/her role that the 
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public is conditioned to expect on the daily basis is the very same image they anticipate to see in 
action during an inquiry as well. As MacDonald argued, “[n]o doubt, the general view of 
governance and law that is dominant in any society will influence how inquiries are 
understood.”104 . In fact, as Shetreet & Turenne point out, “[i]t is, in practice, difficult to 
dissociate the figure of the appointed judge in the exercise of his judicial functions from the 
figure of the judge acting as a fact finder for the purpose of a public inquiry.”105 Because this is 
the general expectation (from the society, the government appointing the commissioner, and the 
judicial office itself), the judge-commissioner seemingly has no choice but to fall back onto the 
traditional adversarial standards during his/her decision-making, thereby affecting the public 
image of the inquiry process itself.  
Although referring specifically to the adversarial context, Soeharno emphasized that a 
judge's allegiance is first and foremost to the values of the state - the rule of law, individual 
rights, and justice. He argued that "[a]s a judge, he must enact values such as impartiality, 
independence and propriety - not the values of a private citizen, but the values of the state, which 
should give room to the rights of all citizens."
106
 Notice that consideration for all other values 
should not even come within the scope of judicial decision-making. As mentioned above, this 
mentality is expected of a judge no matter the context in which he/she operates. Thus, a judge-
commissioner will always bring along these external values to an inquiry and may even refer to 
them during the decision-making. However, this is just the beginning; the inquiry is yet at the 
point of infiltration. The full take-over occurs at the point when the judge subsumes the identity 
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of the inquiry which according to Soeharno is very likely given that one of the functions of a 
judge is "...to 'personalize' the institution, to give the institution a ‘human face’."107 
To summarize, it is this closed cycle that first acts to constrain a judge's decision-making 
as a commissioner, in effect limiting his/her ability to undertake and carryout the social functions 
that uphold the very essence of what makes an inquiry a unique and legitimate public institution. 
Having set the wheels in motion, the cycle then utilizes the judge-commissioner as the 
personification of the inquiry process in general. Thus, adversarial (preoccupation with) justice, 
rather than the inquisitorial pursuit of truth, becomes the image that the public associates with the 
inquiry while the judge-commissioner comes to personify the institution itself. 
This is not to suggest that all hope is lost and that the Public Inquiry will soon become 
just another subset of the criminal and/or civil trial processes. Although the inquiry is slowly 
diluted by external standards, practices, and expectations, there is no reason why this course 
cannot be reversed. According to MacDonald: 
What really matters to the character and conduct of any particular inquiry can be found in 
two other places. Formally, the key issue is the content of the Order in Council by which 
an inquiry is initiated, its terms of reference set out, and its specific powers established. 
Who is appointed? What powers are given? For what purposes? And what procedures is 
the inquiry authorized to deploy? Substantively, the key issue is the decisions that 
commissioners make about how they actually intend to go about doing their job. What 
conception of their role do they have? To whom (to what audience) do they believe their 
final report should ultimately be addressed? And what conception of the objectives of their 
recommendations drives their day-to-day activities?
108
 
 
In other words, as the saying goes, the ball is in the commissioner’s court: any possibility of 
reform to the character and conduct of an inquiry shall begin with the commissioner. The 
commissioner is the persona of the inquiry and as such, his/her actions (or inactions) dictate the 
image of the inquiry and how the public should assess its accomplishments and/or failures. 
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Jamisch summarized the impact that a commissioner can have on the likely success/failure of an 
inquiry in the following terms:  
…I have to admit that the relative success or failure of a public inquiry does seem to turn 
to a considerable extent on the personal attributes of the individual appointed. This is not to 
suggest that institutional design is of no importance, but only that a good appointee may be 
able to make a silk purse out of a procedural sow’s ear and that a bad appointee will be 
likely to botch even a well-designed process.
109
 
 
Consequently, the current skepticism as to the utility of commissions
110
 could potentially be 
avoided with the employment of discourses – referred to by MacDonald above as a 
commissioner’s decisions, conceptions of his/her role and objectives, and regard for the 
appropriate audience – that are conducive and complimentary to the inquisitorial, inquiry 
paradigm.
111
 After all, as MacDonald put it: “[i]nquiries, in other words, are instruments and 
processes that can (and should) be understood by reference to what they do and how they operate 
– not just by reference to who establishes them [or who leads them for that matter].”112 But the 
problem is that not all commissioners may be aware of the extent to which they affect the 
internal workings of an inquiry and that they must be responsive not only to external pressures 
(and expectations) but also to what the inquiry was designed to do and how it was meant to 
operate in the first place. Thus, the commissioner must at all times be conscious of the context in 
which he/she operates and most importantly, the governing institutional paradigm.  On the one 
hand there is the adversarial system that the commissioner has been cultured into. On the other 
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hand, the inquiry system to which the commissioner is expected to apply his/her accumulated 
experience and expertise that were developed in a completely different context. However, this is 
not as easy as it seems; especially when the judge-commissioner continues to operate within a 
discursive system that prioritizes “justice” over “truth”.  
For instance, according to O’Connor & Kristjanson, public inquiries play a significant 
role in the delivery of justice to a community.
113
 However, there are alternative models of justice 
that can be generally categorized into two categories: (1) following the traditional adversarial 
trial format; and (2) inquisitorial model (according to which the inquiry is modeled in theory).
114
 
Each model has a different conceptualization of “justice” and its relationship to truth-seeking. 
While the search for “truth” is just a means for attaining justice during an adversarial process, 
truth-seeking should be the ultimate goal of an inquiry. Although, theoretically speaking, the 
inquisitorial model and the preference for truth-seeking functions should shape and define the 
inquiry process, the confusion arises in the public eye and, perhaps less obviously, the judges 
chairing an inquiry, over which process is to dominate during an inquiry. This potential for 
confusion has been summarized by Gomery J. in the following statement:  
The confusion exists in the mind of the public, but there wasn’t any confusion 
in my mind. But I can’t see any alternative to having a judge preside over a 
commission of inquiry. First of all, he comes cloaked with a certain expected 
autonomy, independence, impartiality, and these things all go together….So 
judges are ideally suited to fulfill this role. But the trouble is that even if a 
judge is acting as a commissioner, people say, ‘gee that guy’s a judge’ and 
they think of judges as dispensing judgments and frankly in  commission of 
inquiry you’re not dispensing justice, you’re doing an investigative role and 
then making some recommendations. So, I guess the confusion is inevitable 
and all that you can do, all that I can do, is to keep on emphasizing that my 
reports are not judgements, my reports are not findings of fault, well, not civil 
fault, they may be findings of blameworthy conduct, but it’s not fault in the 
sense that the word fault is used in our Civil Code or in the Criminal Code.
115
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 Although Gomery J. indicates that there was no confusion in his mind as to his proper 
role as a commissioner or the process to follow, most judge-commissioners are, at least 
inadvertently, susceptible to the norms and practices of a tradition that has become second nature 
for them. For instance, a former Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada and a commissioner in 
the Air Canada, Steel Industry, and Western Banks Inquiries, Estey took for granted that an 
inquiry ought be conducted in two stages. The first stage consists of  “an in camera review of the 
evidence….to clean up the evidence before it goes out; not to censor it, but to protect the public, 
protect individual members of the public” while the second stage is a hearing in the open 
forum.
116
 As such, even in a setting devoid of actual concerns for national security or rights 
protection, right off the bet truth-seeking becomes a highly structured and controlled process 
occurring behind closed doors whereby information is “cleaned up” for public’s consideration 
and acceptance (or rejection) as the truth. Right from the start the pursuit of truth is in 
competition with a commissioner’s notions of justice/fairness; the pursuit of truth already taking 
a second seat to justice.
117
 
 Ironically, in the same breath Estey realized the potential for "abuse of a judge" - 
including the qualities that were instrumental to his/her appointment as a commissioner in the 
first place - by placing him/her in the position of a commissioner. According to Estey, judges 
"cannot stand the perception the public will have any more than the institution of the inquiry can 
withstand the terrible perception which has come out of some inquiries, which are essentially 
criminal investigations running an end run around the Criminal Code's protective processes. The 
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public, looking at it on television, thinks it is a trial, and a criminal trial at that."
118
 This, in other 
words, is the spitting image of "judicialization" of the inquiry process referred to above. 
O’Connor & Kristjanson similarly observe that inquiries:  
…tended to overuse the evidentiary, adversarial type of hearing process suited 
for legal trials to gather information. I think that we have yet to take full 
advantage of the possibilities for different processes that can be tailored to 
meet the need of investigating and reporting on the various types of matters set 
out in inquiry mandates. I believe that greater creativity and flexibility in fact-
determining processes will ultimately improve the inquiry process from the 
perspective of all participants, increasing responsiveness, decreasing cost, and 
ultimately improving the process and results of public inquiries.  In my view, 
there is a real advantage to directly involving groups and individuals in the 
inquiry process, rather than having them participate only through lawyers.
119
  
 
Thus, the tendency has been to pit the adversarial notions of truth and justice against those 
expected to guide the inquiry, consequently “judicializing” the process, preventing full public 
participation, precluding thorough truth-seeking and foreclosing justice in an inquisitorial setting. 
In other words, the trend is to convert the inquiry into yet another form of the adversarial 
apparatus thus leading to the eventual demise of an inquiry as a unique public process. 
But as argued above, the commissioner has ultimate power – as an insider and leader of 
the process - to influence how the public perceives and receives an inquiry. To do so, he/she does 
not need to apply “greater creativity and flexibility in fact-determining processes” as O’Connor 
& Kristjanson suggest above. All that is needed is an awareness of the social functions essential 
to an inquiry’s survival as a separate and unique public institution and that means a conscious 
refrain from defining the inquiry according to discourses that pit “justice” against truth.  
 According to Soeharno, it is the judge "...who decides how the implementation of rituals 
serves to communicate the ideals expressed in the institution. In his conduct, he makes these 
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values concrete."
120
 More importantly, however, he noted that "...public trust is directed at 
institutional values before it is directed at the office holder...."
121
 Thus, it is really crucial that the 
judge-commissioner conduct the inquiry "in line with the values that the institution 
symbolizes..."
122
 and because judicial conduct "...becomes in itself the symbol for the values of 
the institution. It differs according to the situation as to whether this means that judges are to be 
extra careful in displaying these values or that they can be more relaxed."
123
 In other words, the 
judge-commissioner is the persona of an inquiry and plays a primary role in building and 
depicting the values, essence, virtue and identity of an inquiry. As the creator of the public 
inquiry image, the commissioner needs to be conscious of the discourses underpinning his/her 
decision-making so as to avoid presenting the inquiry as something other than it is (i.e., as an 
adjudicative “justice” seeking rather than a truth-oriented institution) and thereby undermining 
public trust when the institutional values conflict with the outcome and vice versa.  
 
C. Identity Crisis: Discourse Use and Abuse in the Creation of the Public Inquiry Image 
 
 Having identified the qualities and values that make an inquiry tick and the role of judge-
commissioner in creating the inquiry persona, it is now only fitting to isolate and discuss the 
discourses at play during an inquiry in order to fully grasp the effects of judicial decision-making 
on the inquiry image that is catered to the public. Prior to looking at concrete examples of 
discourse use by commissioners, it is first essential to ascertain which discourses are at the 
forefront of any discussion about the inquiry, its process, commissioner’s role, and its general 
utility as a public institution. To that effect, this section of the paper will focus on academic 
                                                          
120
 Soeharno, supra note 106 at 90. 
121
 Ibid. at 74. 
122
 Ibid. at 83. 
123
 Ibid. at 90. 
 41 
 
literature regarding commissions of inquiry to identify the discourses commonly used in 
reference to the institution’s role, objectives, functions and results.  
Aside from the mass media (a topic that would require a paper of its own), the academia 
has a significant influence on how authorities, professionals, and consequently the general public 
view and discuss the role of public institutions. As such, in order to explore how a commission 
of inquiry acquires its public image, it is necessary to analyze the terminology, concepts and 
descriptors commonly utilized by the academia in studies, research and debates on the topic of 
public inquiries. In other words, as will be argued below, the preferred discourses of those 
considered to be authorities on the subject matter in question (i.e., academics, judges and other 
legal professionals, government, etc.) ultimately shape and define the type of inquiry that is 
presented and promoted to the public, which may not always be in the best interest of the Public 
Inquiry itself. 
But before going any further, it is important to emphasize that the focus of the discussion 
at hand is discourse use (and abuse) and that the power of discourse should not be 
underestimated under any circumstances as it infiltrates every facet of the inquiry life cycle, from 
its inception to its final report. The effects of discourse use can be inconspicuous and fleeting or 
obvious and prevalent. Either way, what is crucial to take away is that the power to alter and/or 
shape public perception is inherent to any discourse and it is the goal of this paper to analyze 
discourse patterns and preferences to understand in which direction the Public Inquiry is taken.  
Consider for instance Ratushny’s summary of the “basic functions” of an inquiry:  
In many respects, the journey of a commission of inquiry is as important as the destination. 
The commissioner becomes the face, and often the name, of the inquiry as its hearings 
proceed with public visibility and scrutiny. The hearings should represent only a relatively 
small part of the work of a commission. Yet they are of crucial importance as an 
opportunity for those most directly affected, and for the general public, to become 
educated. In this respect, the hearings should also enhance public confidence in the ability 
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and integrity of the commissioner to come to the correct conclusions in her final report. An 
important element of such confidence will be the fairness of the manner in which the 
commissioner proceeds.
124
 
 
This paragraph is a prime example of the extensive role of discourse by simply highlighting to 
the reader the qualities that an ideal inquiry should possess. Moreover, it is illustrative of the 
inquiry process and imbued with value judgments. For example, the reader is told that the basic 
function of an inquiry is to educate the public and instrumental to that is a commissioner’s ability 
to come to a “correct conclusion”. As discussed previously in Section 1.1 above, the search for 
the truth is one of the basic and essential characteristics of a Public Inquiry, so it is only fitting 
that the public is made aware of this virtue. However, Ratushny qualifies this virtue by 
redirecting the reader’s attention to the values of integrity and procedural fairness as anchors 
grounding the potentially limitless search for the truth. This is an example of what Lugosi called 
the law’s privileged position in guiding which discourses resonate as truth.125 According to 
Lugosi, “[b]ecause law as a set of institutions, ideas and actors employs a special legal method, 
language and school of thought to approach problems, this sets law apart from and above 
competing discourses. The law also maintains and reproduces such power through its basis in 
liberal values of neutrality and fairness.”126 Lugosi further argued that the preference for law 
infused discourses is in part due to it being “(mis)understood as objective and neutral, and 
therefore the most logical and capable.”127 This discursive preference is prevalent in other studies 
and in fact, as will be argued bellow, the tendency has been to place justice (i.e., fairness, 
impartiality and integrity, etc.) as a first order value, demoting the pursuit of truth and related 
social functions of an inquiry to at best the runner-up position.  
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(1) Justice versus Truth 
 
Virtually any discussion on the topic of inquiries comes down to a show-down between 
discourses of justice and truth. The extent to which one discourse takes precedence over the 
other, when used in reference to a commission of inquiry, has a significant impact on how close 
on a continuum the said inquiry comes to resemble a true Public Inquiry versus another version 
of the adversarial system. This is important because in a process obsessed with truth-seeking, 
commissioners are placed in a position where they are torn between a pull from “justice” and a 
push towards the “truth”; balancing the public interest in a thorough and open inquiry against the 
rules of fairness and the dictates of justice.
128
 This contradiction has been summarized by Salter 
in the following terms: “[i]nquiries are, at once, freed from the constraints of legal proceedings 
to conduct their investigations in as wide-ranging and open matter as their commissioners deem 
advisable. At the same time, inquiries are legal proceedings and at least some of their 
participants act accordingly.”129 Thus, at the very least, it seems that both truth-seeking and 
justice-seeking operate simultaneously; both exerting conflicting pressures on the judge-
commissioner and thereby pulling an inquiry in different directions.
130
  
Consequently, it is difficult to predict whether truth or justice will take precedence during 
an inquiry. As argued above, although the commissioner’s role is primarily to get to the truth, 
judges serving as commissioners continue to rely upon traditional disciplinary norms and are 
thus likely to reflect paradigms of the system they are accustomed to. Their predicament is real 
and affects not only the conduct of an inquiry but ultimately the public perception of both the 
inquiry process and the judiciary in general. 
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Moreover, both truth and justice are arguably the building blocks of how the Public 
Inquiry is conceptualized and perceived; both are important to the viability of the Public Inquiry 
as an institution but can also be detrimental to its legitimacy when essential virtues of an inquiry 
are depicted via adjudicative notions of justice. Thus, broadly speaking, an inquiry is a site of 
discursive struggle between the virtues of justice and truth, both of which are instrumental in 
discourse construction processes that ultimately influence paradigm shifts in public perceptions 
of the inquiry image.  
Accordingly, the analysis of judicial discourse and its impact on the Public Inquiry image 
would not be complete without a discussion on how truth and justice are utilized by the academia 
to justify its functions and procedures, as well as the very existence of an inquiry. Take for 
instance Schwartz’ summary of what should be the expected conduct from an inquiry (and the 
commissioner, being the persona of the institution):  
But even if it is right to carry out policy-making in a judicial mode — issuing 
definitive pronouncements — we should at least expect Royal Commissions to 
act more judiciously. That means keeping an open mind; it means suspending 
judgment until all the evidence is in; it means inviting those with differing 
opinions to present their viewers, rather than having the judges create the 
information base according to a preconceived agenda. Too often, Royal 
Commissions are not even judicious in their assembling of evidence and 
argument. Their research directors have a good idea of what result is required, 
and the experts who are consulted, and research reports that are commissioned, 
reflect that preconceived notion.”131 
 
The language used is saturated with legalistic notions and judicialized conceptions of the inquiry 
persona. In fact, Schwartz made it clear that an inquiry should be conducted judiciously. As 
such, right off the bet he prioritized adversarial notions of justice against the truth-seeking 
virtues of a Public Inquiry. What is even more intriguing is that this particular use of the word 
“judicious” colours the rest of the paragraph and how it is registered by the reader. For example, 
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taking the word “judicious” as a prime descriptor for all inquiry conduct, the continued reading 
of the paragraph automatically brings to the foreground images of the adversarial trial and its 
procedures. In other words, the reader is subconsciously led to accept the adversarial paradigm as 
the measuring stick for how an inquiry should proceed. As such, although the above paragraph 
literally states that the inquiry (via its commissioner) is to have an “open mind”, suspend 
“judgment until all the evidence is in” and act judiciously in its “assembling of evidence and 
argument”, the discourse use conjures up an image of an impartial and independent judge (rather 
than a commissioner) presiding over a trial (rather than leading an inquiry), overseeing the 
collection of evidence (rather than information and truths) and presentation of opposing 
arguments (rather than a discussion ), and dispensing judgment (rather than findings and 
recommendations).   
In the above example, Schwartz adopted the discourse of justice in order to describe the 
proper conduct of an inquiry. Because zero emphasis was placed on the truth-seeking functions 
of an inquiry, the reader is lead to believe (or at the very least consider) that adherence to 
adversarial notions of justice and fairness should be determinative of an inquiry’s success and 
utility. Given this preference for the adversarial paradigm, it is no wonder that the judge-
commissioner often finds him/herself in an environment where he/she seemingly has no choice 
but to fall back onto the traditional adversarial standards during decision-making, thereby further 
affecting the public image of an inquiry.
132
 The commissioners are obliged to uncover the truth 
by hearing all viewpoints while simultaneously judiciously guarding against any unfairness or 
injustice. It is this expected, and often conflicting, obedience to “judiciousness” that hinders the 
pursuit of truth for the purpose of which an inquiry is created in the first place. 
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For instance, because “justice” is prioritized, certain narratives are framed as more 
legitimate than others depending on how well they fit within the discourse of “justice” and the 
adversarial conceptions of truth. According to Lugosi, “[i]n Canada, law (as a whole set of rules, 
institutions and actors, such as police officers, lawyers and judges) plays a key role in formally 
translating narratives and influencing which stories and discourses resonate as truth.”133 Most 
conceptions of truth are derived via highly judicialized and adjudicative processes of discourse 
generation that the commissioner ultimately puts forth as the truth. This “truth-seeking” process 
limits diversity of perspectives, prevents meaningful dialogue, and stalls the pursuit of truth all 
the while effectively undermining the legitimacy of a commission and the reliability of the fact-
finding process.
134
  
Moreover, according to Salter,  
[w]hat makes an inquiry unique is that it combines all four elements [policy, truth-seeking, 
justice-seeking and value debates], and that none is more important than the other. That is, 
while, for example, legal deliberations often combine science and law, efforts are made to 
restrict value debates (not always successfully) and rarely are policy recommendations 
included in legal judgments. This would be enough to distinguish inquiries from court, but 
there is more. In the courts, it is clear to all which element (justice-seeking) should prevail 
in the final judgment. It is never so clear in the case of inquiries, which are simultaneously 
legal proceedings, quasi-scientific enterprises, value and political debates, and instruments 
for creating public policy.
135
 
 
Although the presence of this “amalgam” of elements, as Salter calls it, is what ultimately makes 
an inquiry a unique public institution, I would argue that given the current, predominantly 
legalistic pattern of discourse used in the academia to discuss commissions of inquiry, justice-
seeking functions of an inquiry seem to prevail. For instance, as argued throughout the paper, 
even the “truth” discourses are under a threat of judicialization, whereby the inquisitorial 
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paradigm is turned on its head and continuously overwhelmed by a stubborn adherence of the 
authorities to the norms and principles of the adversarial culture. According to Henderson, “[i]t 
proceeds from the assumption, valid for judicial proceedings, that facts will better emerge from 
adversarial contest, by counsel and their witnesses than from the diligence and imagination of the 
commission.”136 Therefore, although inquiries “…have an enormous scope of action….[and] 
access to a wide range of procedures – some drawn from law, some from science, and others yet 
from politics – precisely so they can address the complicated relationship involved in the 
amalgam”,137 the full potential of an inquiry is rarely realized. As Henderson argued, the reliance 
on adversarial and judicialized procedures during an inquiry “has created a barrier between the 
commissioners and the people from whom it expects to collect its facts, data, information and 
opinion.”138 In other words, its truth seeking functions and virtues are seldom applied or accessed 
to address broad public issues and complex concerns relating to justice, thereby precluding “open 
public scrutiny” and “new voices” from entering into the inquiry dialogue, in other words, all 
qualities that justify an inquiry’s existence in the first place.139  
Furthermore, the over-reliance on legalistic and judicialized discourses is further 
exacerbated by the fact that the academic literature on public inquiries is lacking in the 
discourses of truth, at least when it comes to evaluating the success of the process and findings of 
an inquiry. Sure, there is a lot of reference to truth-seeking being an essential quality and 
function of an inquiry. However, there is barely any discussion of the nature, source and value of 
the information (or truth) gathered by an inquiry. Truth is spoken of most often as an abstract 
concept – an ideal – rather than a guiding principle for how to conduct an inquiry.  In other 
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words, the focus is primarily on the process of getting to the truth versus the quality of the truth 
itself and how it fulfills the social function of an inquiry, contributing to its success or failure.
140
 
But the truth discourses are as important if not more so than the justice discourses to the 
optimal functioning of the Public Inquiry and more importantly to its survival as a unique 
institution. Therefore, it is crucial to differentiate at the outset between truth and justice 
discourses. Of assistance here is Salter’s description of truth-seeking and justice-seeking 
processes during an inquiry. Her discussion sheds light into an inquiry’s deliberation processes 
thereby defining the points of discursive struggle between truth and justice. According to Salter,  
Truth-seeking in a policy inquiry is something other than fact-finding in a court case. It is 
more akin to science (social, technical, and natural science) inasmuch as information 
facilitates a better understanding of complex issues….Very little of this information lends 
itself directly to recommendations, although some may be included in a final report. 
Rather, the inquiry uses truth-seeking to prepare itself for the tasks of assessment, 
evaluation, and recommendations. Establishing a knowledge base is crucial to a policy 
inquiry. Justice-seeking is more akin to what occurs in a court of law. It refers to 
resolution of disputes between parties, to interest group conflicts and, in many inquiries, it 
also pertains to questions about wrongdoing and possible compensation.
141
 
 
In other words, while truth-seeking prioritizes the gathered information itself, justice-seeking 
focuses on the processes involved in gathering this information. Thus, information or truth plays 
a different role (and is of a different value) depending on the process utilized by an inquiry. More 
importantly, citing Thibault & Walker, Salter points out that:  
[they] had no question that inquiries could be both truth-seeking and justice-seeking 
simultaneously. They argued that it would be very difficult to disentangle one function from 
the other. Advocate groups today are equally adamant that all truth-seeking (indeed, all 
science) is value-laden, and that the situation could not be otherwise. Inquiries do seem to 
provide a solid amalgam of truth, justice, values, and policy-seeking, such that it is hard to 
imagine how to separate science from values, or assessment from evaluation.  
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Thibault and Walker were equally persuaded, however, that it was important to perform an 
analytical exercise, looking at truth-seeking and justice-seeking independently. They saw 
each function as pulling an inquiry in different directions. However theoretical the 
exercise, it would be useful to follow their example in order to understand the conflicting 
pressures placed on inquiries as they go about their deliberations.
142
 
 
This statement further reinforces this paper’s attempt to distinguish between truth and justice 
discourses surrounding and permeating proceedings of the Public Inquiry. In other words, despite 
the fact that truth-seeking and justice-seeking functions (and discourses) are most likely 
intertwined in any given inquiry, it is important to differentiate between the two and, at the very 
least, endeavor to describe their divergent roles in structuring how the Public Inquiry is 
ultimately received and perceived by the public.  
This is precisely what the paper has attempted to do thus far. However, the ultimate goal 
is to go one step further and disentangle truth discourses from those of justice in order to 
comprehend the full extent of the hold that the adversarial/adjudicative conceptions of truth and 
justice have on the way that the Public Inquiry is conducted, justified, and evaluated. Thus, 
having identified the discursive struggle between truth and justice within the context of an 
inquiry, it is now important to examine precisely how these discourses are utilized by 
deconstructing each and analysing their common application. Only then will we come one step 
closer to comprehending the totality of the judicial discourses’ impact on the construction of the 
Public Inquiry image.  
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PART III: IDENTIFYING JUDICIAL DISCOURSE USES 
 
A. The Discourses of Justice  
 
 As argued above, the commission of inquiry has been increasingly scrutinized through 
the adversarial prism and especially the application of legalistic and judicialized discourses. 
What are the identifying aspects of these discourses? What form do they take and how are they 
transmitted? Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to delineate all discourses of justice
143
 
pertaining to commissions of inquiry, it is important to identify how they are predominantly 
utilized by looking at discourse patterns, the massage that they generate and the image that they 
incite. To that effect, the paper will proceed by first examining the use of judicial independence 
and impartiality discourses to describe and assess commissioner’s conduct.  
(1) Judicial (Commissioner) Independence and Impartiality 
 
Independence and impartiality go hand in hand
144
 and are among the most referenced 
concepts in academic literature on commissions of inquiry. Specifically, the language of 
independence (and by inference and association, impartiality) is most often used to evaluate a 
commissioner’s role and stipulate what his/her conduct should aspire to. According to Ruel, “[a] 
good measure of impartiality should be expected from commissioners of inquiry. Keeping an 
open mind will not be sufficient. However, commissioners should not be expected to be as 
impartial as judges.”145 Despite making the last point, Ruel does go on to suggest that the 
                                                          
143
 It is also debatable whether there is a limit to the various uses of justice for structuring the conversation about 
public inquiries.  
144
 Although judicial independence is considered merely a “second order constitutional and political value” or an 
underlying condition of judicial impartiality, both independence and impartiality are essential to the credibility of 
the judiciary and thereby, the legitimacy of the legal system. See Dodek, “Judicial Independence as a Public Policy 
Instrument”, supra note 15 at 300-301. Also see R. v. Valente, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673 at 685 for a discussion of the 
distinction between independence and impartiality. 
145
 Simon Ruel, “The Rules of Fairness and Public Inquiries” 131 in The Law of Public Inquiries in Canada 
(Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2010) at 139 [Ruel, “The Rules of Fairness and Public Inquiries”]. 
 51 
 
credibility of an inquiry hinges on something more than a mere “open mind”. Rather “a 
significant standard of impartiality will be required on the part of commissioners”.146 What that 
standard should be is left to the imagination of the reader. However, as will be shown below, that 
imagination is often steered towards adjudicative norms and practices by utilizing discourses of 
judicial independence and impartiality as a measuring rod against which all inquiry conduct is 
scrutinized. 
For instance, as a cornerstone of the public’s perception of impartiality, independence is 
by far the most discussed and referred to virtue of the judicial office. According to Justice Cory 
in Phillips v. Nova Scotia, “[i]t is crucial that an inquiry both be and appear to be independent 
and impartial in order to satisfy the public desire to learn the truth.”147 More importantly, judicial 
independence is often used to justify the appointment of judges to the position of a commissioner 
and “to provide greater credibility for both the process and the outcome of various non-judicial 
endeavors” despite it being an unwritten constitutional principle that attaches to judges in 
courts.
148
 As O’Connor & Kristjanson observed:  
Interestingly, however, in Canada the most common practice has been to 
appoint sitting judges as commissioners.  The reason for this, I think, is 
obvious.  The need to hold an inquiry arises because of the need to have an 
independent, credible assessment of whatever the particular problem happens 
to be.  Judges are seen by the public as having the necessary independence 
from government and bring with them the credibility of the judicial office.
149
 
 
The rationale for this general presumption of judicial “credibility” was summarized by the 
Federal Court of Appeal Chief Justice Richard, who traced public trust to judicial independence 
and impartiality:  
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Public acceptance of, and support for, court decisions depends upon public confidence in 
the integrity and independence of the bench. Judicial independence, which is the very 
essence of judicial function, is a means toward the far more important goal of maintaining 
public trust in the legal system and in the judiciary. It is society’s confidence in the 
impartiality of individual decisions that forms the core strength of the judiciary as an 
institution.
150
 
 
Hence the attempt by the Executive government to commodify judicial functions (especially 
independence) by appointing judges to head commissions of inquiry. The hope is that a judge-
commissioner’s aura of “judicial independence” will automatically secure public trust and 
confidence in the inquiry process and outcomes.
151
 Although this may seem like an efficient and 
effective use of judges, it precludes the Public Inquiry from establishing its own conceptions and 
standards of independence and impartiality and thereby securing public confidence in the 
credibility of its own unique system.  
Despite the irony of being a detriment to the very stability and credibility of the Public 
Inquiry institution, judicial notions of independence and impartiality continue to dominate and 
inform the discourse on inquiry practices. This was recognized in the iconic statement by Justice 
Marceau of the Federal Court of Appeal discussing the nature of the administrative and 
investigative independence of an inquiry:  
It has often been suggested, expressly or impliedly, especially in the media but 
also elsewhere, that commissions of inquiry were meant to operate and act as 
fully independent adjudicative bodies, akin to the Judiciary and completely 
separate and apart from the Executive by whom they were created…No one 
disputes the necessity of preserving the independence of commissions of 
inquiry as to the manner in which they may exercise their powers, conduct 
their investigations, organize their deliberations and prepare their reports.
152
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Although a high standard of independence, akin to that of the judiciary, is generally 
expected of an inquiry, Marceau J. also underscored the unique nature of an inquiry in 
relation to courtroom proceedings in the following manner: 
As investigative bodies, they, of course, are called upon to seek the truth, and 
no doubt they are ideally suited for uncovering facts that could not be 
discovered otherwise (precisely because they have broad investigative powers, 
they are inquisitorial, and they are not subject to the strict rules of evidence 
that apply to a court of law). Hence, their prestige. But, nowhere do we find 
the imposition upon them of a duty to conclude. On the contrary, their 
purpose, which is primarily to advise and to help the government in the proper 
execution of its duties, is not conducive to settling issues and drawing definitive 
conclusions. It is the legal duty of the commissioners to report, but that report 
is limited to explaining what they have done, what they were able to draw from 
their investigations (in terms of findings of fact) and what advice they are in a 
position to give to the Executive in light of those findings.
153
 
 
Accordingly, although commissions of inquiry are unique and separate institutions, they are 
nevertheless likened to and measured against the standards of the Judiciary in that they are meant 
to be fully independent in the exercise of their powers and deliberation. In other words, both 
independence and credibility are tied to the judicial office and the judge-commissioner is an 
extension of that office. It follows that for an inquiry and, by extension, the commissioner to be 
credible (and make credible assessments) its procedures and conduct must conform to the 
adversarial standards observed by the judicial office no matter the actual scope of their powers 
under the Inquiries Act. In other words, it is inferred that the inquiry is merely a subset of the 
traditional, adversarial system rather than a unique, truth-seeking, public institution.  
Furthermore, according to Witelson, “…the efficacy of a public inquiry hinges on its 
independence from the government”, however, “[n]otwithstanding this general expectation for 
independence, the extent of the independence of commissions of inquiry in Canada is not 
                                                          
153
Ibid.  at para. 14 (emphasis added). Also see Simon Ruel, “Creation of Public Inquiries” 1 in The Law of Public 
Inquiries in Canada (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2010) at 21-22 [Ruel, “Creation of Public Inquiries”] for a 
summary of the nature and scope of an inquiry’s investigative and advisory independence and at 25-46 for an 
examination of its broad powers.   
 54 
 
formally written down in statute nor clearly delineated in case law. Instead, reliance on a 
tradition of independence for public inquiries appears to have sufficed since Confederation…”154 
Thus, the use of traditional conceptions of independence as a measure of an inquiry’s success (or 
failure) is taken for granted and rarely questioned as to its suitability in an inquisitorial context.  
Moreover, although Witelson’s goal is to examine the limits placed on the independence of 
public inquiries, her definition of “independence” is yet another example of normalizing the use 
of judicial discourse as it pertains to commissions of inquiry. As Witelson stated:  
The term independence is a loaded word in the legal context. For judges, it has an 
individual, institutional, and ethical component. The Canadian Judicial Council, in its 
ethical guidelines for judges states, “[T]he judge’s duty is to apply the law as he or she 
understands it without fear or favour and without regard to whether the decision is popular 
or not . . . [judges] share a collective responsibility to promote high standards of conduct. . 
. . Public acceptance of and support for court decisions depends upon public confidence in 
the integrity and independence of the bench.”155 
Given the widespread acceptance of and reliance on the adversarial paradigm as a benchmark for 
all legal/judicial conduct, it is not surprizing that Witelson adopted the Canadian Judicial 
Council’s definition of “independence”, thereby further perpetuating the perception than an 
inquiry is merely a version of an adversarial trial. Witelson also admitted that “[j]udicial and 
constitutional definitions of independence have, nevertheless, influenced the standards of 
independence applied to the variety of boards and tribunals within the administrative realm, 
including government-created commissions of inquiry.”156 Accordingly, the efficacy of an 
inquiry is assessed and dependant on the extent to which it conforms to this “tradition of 
independence” imported from the adversarial system and imbued with the norms and values 
prevalent within the judicial culture.  
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While the necessity of upholding independence and impartiality of an inquiry is not 
disputed, it is important to highlight that the language used (and how it is used) to discuss their 
roles within the Public Inquiry setting imports judicial norms and virtues that are at the risk of 
becoming the standard for conduct during an inquiry. It is equally important to note that it is 
more than just the adversarial conceptions of independence and impartiality that are utilized. 
Transplanted with these conceptions are the culture and tradition from whence they originated. 
Even Witelson stated that “independence” is a loaded term with an “individual, institutional, and 
ethical component”.157 However, she did not hesitate to apply this term (and its individual 
components) to inquiries, thereby likening their conduct and practices to those of the bench.  
This is disconcerting for the future survival of the Public Inquiry as an institution where 
independence and impartiality do not necessarily carry the same connotations nor impose the 
same obligations on the presiding commissioner. Generally speaking, whereas independence and 
impartiality in their traditional sense are contingent upon a strict separation of powers and 
members of the judiciary maintaining high standards of conduct in accordance with the 
requirements of their office, within the context of an inquiry they (should) mean more than a 
blatant conformity to adjudicative standards and norms. According to Dodek,  
[w]hen judges are engaged in activities outside of adjudication (“extra-judicial activities”), 
the premise for their independence – impartiality in dispute adjudication – is removed. 
While new arguments for the independence of judges engaged in extra-judicial activities 
may exist, they need to be constructed and proffered as they cannot be based on the 
adjudicatory functions.”158 
 
In other words, impartiality is reinforced by observance of adjudicative procedure. Thus, if the 
concept of adjudicative independence is imported into the inquiry context without a properly 
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“constructed and proffered” argument for its applicability, not only will the judge-commissioner 
be at risk of having his/her impartiality questioned,
159
 but the credibility of the Public Inquiry 
itself will suffer.
160
 For example, given the unique relationship between the Executive and the 
Public Inquiry – appointed by and responsive to the executive government - an inquiry may not 
be even considered “independent” in the traditional sense of the word. This does not necessarily 
mean that the commissioner is therefore biased or that the institution is unreliable.
161
 As pointed 
out by Marceau J. above, although an inquiry owes its existence to the Executive, this does not 
detract from their independence in the exercise of their powers.
162
 Similarly, MacKay & 
McQueen recognized that the unique context of an inquiry needs to be taken into account and 
that “the findings of a public inquiry, barring any other irregularities, can be considered reliable 
despite its lack of ‘pure’ independence from the executive branch of government.”163  
However, given that the public has been taught to equate adjudicative forms of 
independence with impartiality and thereby credibility, public perception of and expectation 
from the inquiry may be such as to threaten the underlying framework of the Public Inquiry 
institution itself. In fact, Henderson questioned the independence of commissions of inquiry and 
the ability of judicial commissioners to be impartial arguing that “[s]uch qualities are difficult to 
find since the commission is, institutionally, exposed to the control of its creators and almost 
always sensitive to public pressure on widely held opinions.”164As Schwartz noted, “[t]he 
dilatory, inconclusive or heavy-handed character of a number of recent public inquiries and 
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Royal Commissions may produce a public backlash that leads to their not being used in some 
cases where they are genuinely required.”165 Moreover, “casting a commissioner in the role of a 
social reformer may undermine confidence in his or her role as an impartial judge of past 
conduct.”166 Accordingly, within an inquisitorial setting, administrative and investigative 
independence is more than mere freedom from influence of the Executive government. In order 
for an inquiry to function at its optimal capacity, it ought to be independent from the influence 
exerted by the adversarial normative framework and standards (including the notions of justice 
and independence themselves) via utilization of justice discourses (and the expectations that they 
impose) by the academic and legal authorities.  
 
(2) Discourses of Individual Rights and Procedural Fairness 
 
In addition to discursive judicialization of independence and impartiality, the academic 
discussion of individual rights and procedural fairness within the inquiry context manifests a 
similar preference for adversarial modes of justice and truth-seeking. In fact, this attachment to 
judicial notions of “justice” is most clearly encountered in the form of fair process and protection 
of individual rights, which are often pursued to the detriment of a thorough truth-seeking 
process.
167
 For instance, in his defence of public inquiries, Van Harten addressed a common 
criticism of inquiries, namely that the “…existing inquiry procedures are insufficient to protect 
individual rights…” by arguing that “[t]he exercise of coercive powers, in particular, is an 
integral part of an inquiry’s capacity for credible fact-finding and forceful recommendations.”168 
It is due to these coercive powers that revelations emerge that otherwise would not be 
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forthcoming.
169
 In fact, it is because of the need for such revelations that commissions of inquiry 
are created in the first place.  
However, the distrust for other modes of investigation and dispute resolution is so innate 
that much of the academic literature focuses on preventing or avoiding potential abuse of power 
in how the inquiry fulfills its truth-seeking functions. According to Henderson, it is the perpetual 
uncertainty of the procedures and standards that a commissioner may apply given his/her broad 
powers of discretion that generates this concern for abuse of power.
170
 Henderson argued that 
“[t]he problem of abuse of power arises because a Royal Commission in Canada is a unique, and 
in fact an anomalous, institution.”171 For instance,  
Unlike the courts, which are governed not only by statute but also by fairly detailed rules 
of court, commissions of inquiry do not have established procedures. Accordingly, persons 
subject to the inquiry and witnesses do not know in advance how to prepare for the inquiry, 
the method of establishing certain facts, the challenge that they have to meet and the 
conditions which must be observed, the role that they are expected to perform and the 
functions of persons whom they will encounter at the inquiry. The unlimited freedom of the 
commission to determine its own procedure and the ad hoc character of its actions 
preclude thorough preparation to any party and witness.
172
  
 
He further admitted that much of the attacks on inquiries are “…directed towards the 
investigatory techniques and powers given to the commission…” and that in order to avoid this 
potential for abuse of power, an inquiry “must be made protective of rights.”173 According to 
Ruel, “the loose nature of inquiry proceedings and their public nature pose a serious threat to the 
protection of rights and reputation.”174 In fact, in Consortium Developments (Clearwater) Ltd. v. 
Sarnia (City), the Supreme Court went as far as to suggest that any persons involved in an 
inquiry may become victims of “collateral damage”:  “[i]t is a tall order to ask any 
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Commissioner to orchestrate this process to further the public interest in getting at the truth 
without risking unnecessary, avoidable or wrongful collateral damage on the participants.”175 
These comments instill repulsion towards the unique nature and practices of an inquiry by 
pointing to its inadequate, “loose” qualities and potential for victimization.  
More importantly, this is exactly what Salter warned against if inquiries were to become 
more and more court-like:  
[t]o succeed, inquiries cannot become court-like in their approach, for if they do, and if 
they fail to protect the rights of the ‘accused’, they constitute a trial in which legal 
protections are absent. If they become court-like, they ‘fail to put the state on trial’ and to 
locate the structural or systemic aspects of such problems as corruption, pollution, 
industrial accident or the diffusion of toxic substances.
176
 
 
Not surprisingly, MacKay & McQueen argued that “[t]he fear of violation of fundamental rights 
arises from the ability of a public inquiry to make a finding of wrongdoing or misconduct against 
a person or corporation.”177 Although they pointed out that an inquiry has no power to make 
findings of guilt or impose sanctions, thus making it distinct from an adversarial process, 
MacKay & McQueen nevertheless explored the possible detrimental consequences (i.e., damage 
to reputation) to individuals and corporations subject to an inquiry investigation and offered 
examples of potential legislative protections for such rights violations.
178
 As such, right from the 
outset, they pit truth against fairness making it questionable whether truth could ever come 
before justice even in an institution where truth is the ultimate objective that also justifies the 
very existence of a Public Inquiry. It is this continuous comparison of the inquiry to adversarial 
practices and standards that undermines public’s confidence in the institution; it is this 
uncertainty regarding the standards to which the inquiry should be held accountable to, rather 
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than the uncertainty of how a commissioner would utilize his/her discretionary powers, that 
threatens the foundation of the Public Inquiry institution. Where uncertainty instills fear, the 
familiar and conventional adversarial paradigm serves as a guide post against which all other 
practices are scrutinized and evaluated.   
It does not matter that,  
…the courts have taken a generally deferential approach to commissions of inquiry and 
allowed them considerable leeway in determining their own procedures. So long as 
affected individuals are treated fairly in respect to presenting their sides of the case….The 
courts seem to be aware of the need not to strangle public inquiries with procedures that 
are more appropriate in an adversarial setting, such as a civil or criminal trial.”179 
 
As long as “fairness” continues to be defined by the standards of the adversarial system, the 
inquiry and its commissioner will have no choice but to limit the scope of their discretionary 
powers.  For instance, even in the statement above, MacKay & McQueen discuss “fairness” in 
relation to its adversarial characteristics as a protected right of an individual presenting his/her 
“side of the case” rather than being attached to the manner in which the inquiry conducts its 
truth-seeking functions. Accordingly, there is a continued contest between truth and justice in 
academic discourse on Public Inquiries. Even MacKay & McQueen recognized this contest by 
arguing that: 
Justice is clearly the goal of a criminal prosecution. In a public inquiry it may be 
that the individual being scrutinized will be required to give up some of the 
“justice” associated with complete protection from compelled testimony and other 
legal safeguards, but society also gives up some of the “justice” involved in being 
able to punish a wrongdoer.  
 
Public inquiries offer a different and less adversarial means to the truth than courts 
or highly judicialized administrative agencies. Because these inquiries do not 
directly affect rights, they can be more flexible in the conduct of their hearings, and 
less obsessed with the protection of individual rights. Of course, people must be 
treated fairly but that is a flexible concept and one that leaves room for creativity 
on the part of commissioners. In many settings, commissions of inquiry are 
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valuable mechanisms for striking the balance between truth and justice and they 
may provide a vehicle for doing it in the classic Canadian way.”180 
 
In other words, ideally truth should take precedence over adversarial notions of justice. In 
contrast to courtrooms, inquiries are structured to be less adversarial in their pursuit of truth and 
more flexible and creative in their conceptualization of justice. In the context of an inquiry, the 
expectation is that “justice” is to be sacrificed in order to attain the truth rather than vice versa. 
The difficulty, however, is whether this message is being accurately and effectively conveyed to 
the public; are the potential witnesses and the society at large prepared to relinquish some of the 
classical forms of “justice”. Given the current tendency to judicialize the discourse of justice and 
truth, it seems that the battle is being won by the adversarial notions of justice, which the public 
has been conditioned to expect.   
 Both MacKay & McQueen agree by stating that:  
In our traditional adversarial legal system, the determination of the truth is deemed to have 
three procedural prerequisites, namely, the exclusion of unreliable evidence, access to all 
available reliable evidence, and the impartiality of the fact finder….Because of the 
perceived parallels between a public inquiry that may make findings of misconduct against 
a person and a criminal trial, the absence of any one or more of these prerequisites in a 
public inquiry may be deemed sufficient to threaten the entire proceeding.
181
  
 
Similarly, in his summary of the governing principles of fairness during an inquiry, Ratushny 
pointed out that “the commissioners were expected to follow procedural rules similar to those 
applied by the courts when they adjudicate legal rights.”182 Furthermore, despite acknowledging 
that the unique circumstances of an inquiry justified a different approach to truth-seeking, 
O’Connor & Kristjanson continued to insist that inquiries observe high standards of due process 
akin to those present in the adversarial setting. For instance, they argued that: 
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…there remains a significant danger that those caught up in an inquiry process can have 
their reputations unfairly tarnished in a serious way….it is essential that commission 
counsel, in deciding what evidence to call and how to lead it, lean over backwards to be 
fair and balanced and alert to the potential for unfair damage to reputations. Equally, a 
commissioner crafting a report should be very careful in the use of language that may have 
this type of adverse effect. It is important to bear in mind throughout that the primary 
purpose of an inquiry is not to find fault but rather to find facts, and to report on what 
happened in order to make recommendations to ensure that there not be a repeat in the 
future.
 183
 
 
The implication is that the flexible standards of fairness accessible to an inquiry and susceptible 
to a commissioner’s discretion may not be sufficient or adequate enough to secure individual 
rights; that the potential infringement of individual rights may be too great of a price to pay for 
the pursuit of truth. Furthermore, O’Connor & Kristjanson insisted that due process or “justice” 
be given priority over the inquiry’s search for the truth. For instance, they encouraged exercise of 
restraint in decisions respecting which “evidence to call and how to lead it” and most 
importantly, how this “evidence” was to be conveyed in the commissioner’s final report 
suggesting that for the sake of safeguarding adversarial forms of “justice” an inquiry may be 
obliged to edit the truth and limit what gets out to the public.  
Similarly, Ratushny emphasized adversarial notions of justice and fairness when 
discussing the adequacy of a commissioner’s reasons while saying nothing about the importance 
of the nature and quality of truth that is ultimately expressed in the final report.
184
 According to 
Ratushny, “[t]he effectiveness of a commission of inquiry will often depend on the strength of 
the commissioner’s reasoning and that will be judged by how it is expressed in the final 
report.”185 Given that the degree of conformity with adversarial standards of due process seems 
to be determinative of the strength of a commissioner’s reasoning, Ratushny thereby implied that 
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the effectiveness of an inquiry is to be perceived through the adjudicative lens rather than the 
truth-seeking, public functions of an inquiry. In this manner, the pursuit of truth is made to 
compete against the adversarial notions of justice/fairness; the pursuit of truth taking a second 
seat to justice. Consequently perpetuating a common misconception that inquiries are prone to 
rights infringements and abuse of power and thereby solidifying the perception that for an 
inquiry to function properly and fairly it must resemble the adversarial process and its standards.  
This is not to suggest that the inquiry and its commissioner ought to disregard due 
process during the proceedings and deliberations. After all, the federal Inquiries Act as well as 
the individual provincial acts pertaining to the appointment and conduct of inquiries set out 
specific provisions to ensure that the inquiry carries out its investigation in a fair manner. 
Moreover, Cory J. made it clear that “[i]t is the commissioner who must be responsible for 
ensuring that the hearings are as public as possible yet still maintain the essential rights of the 
individual witnesses.”186   
However, this duty does not mean that a commissioner is to pursue fairness at the 
expense of an inquiry’s own public functions. Although the procedural protection afforded 
during court processes offer affected individuals significant guarantees of fairness and 
transparency, they come at the high price of public access and inquisitorial pursuit of truth. As 
Carver pointed out, “[t]he fact is, though, that many of the most important things that happen in 
the justice system take place out of sight of the public, and often under the protection of various 
immunities and presumptions of good faith that remove them from the scrutiny of the courts 
themselves.”187 As an important adjunct to the proper administration of justice, it is essential that 
the inquiry safeguard its public virtues and functions. To that affect, the Supreme Court of 
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Canada has indicated that “the public interest value of investigative inquiries outweighs concerns 
about their potential harm to individual interests of witnesses and subjects of investigation.”188 
Moreover, it is also important to emphasize, as O’Connor & Kristjanson did above, that 
“the primary purpose of an inquiry is not to find fault but rather to find facts”.189 As such, the 
standards of due process, essential for the proper functioning of an institution tasked primarily 
with the finding of fault, should not be transferred onto and deemed normative in a truth-seeking 
context. According to Ruel, “the existence of a duty of fairness does not determine the 
requirements of fairness that will be applicable in a given set of circumstances. The concept of 
fairness is variable and its content has to be determined considering the specific context of each 
case.”190 Accordingly, it is imperative to allow the commissioner “freedom to report her findings 
on the basis of whatever standard she considers most appropriate” and “take the initiative to go 
where the evidence leads and pursue new lines of investigation.”191   
Alas, as seen above, despite judicial commissioners being equipped with wide powers of 
discretion concerning the standards of due process, they are continuously held up to the 
procedural and substantive commitments that ordinarily characterize their work as judges. The 
consequences of over-judicializing the inquiry process were summarized by Carver in the 
following terms: 
[t]he need to respect individual rights is the principal explanation for the takeover of public 
inquiries by lawyers and judges, and the expenditure of time and money follows from the 
use of trial-like procedures. If public inquiries are intended in part to provide greater public 
access to government, it must nevertheless be recognized that this access is now largely 
filtered through the language and habits of judges and lawyers.
192
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Thus, this preoccupation with individual rights and due process, has not only led to the 
judicialization of inquiry functions and practices, but also to the judicialization of inquiry 
discourses that ultimately affect how “truth” is filtered and accessed by the general public, 
thereby undermining the very essence and purpose of an inquiry.  
 
(3) Discourses of Accountability  
 
Another example of how discourses of justice penetrate into the discussion of an 
inquiry’s role and function is the concept of accountability. As mentioned previously, one of the 
most essential functions of an inquiry is to get to the truth and relay it to the public with the 
ultimate goal of providing closure. This closure is to come in the form of accountability and 
answers to questions such as why the matter under investigation occurred and how it can be 
avoided in the future.
193
 As Salter stated, “[i]n most of the inquiries about ‘wrongdoing’, the 
factors that encourage ‘wrongdoing’ are as important as the conduct of the individuals 
involved.”194 Moreover, an inquiry is not oriented towards discovering the individual, 
organization or event(s) responsible for the matter under review or answering “who did what to 
whom”. These findings are merely a by-product of an inquiry’s quest to answer the bigger 
questions of why and how of accountability.
195
  
Specifically, Carver argued that “[a]ccountability means many different things. One 
meaning is that persons who have harmed others by their actions be found responsible and made 
to ‘pay for’ the harm they caused, through punishment or paying compensation.”196 Carver called 
this “legal accountability”, which the justice system was designed to achieve; it is “coercive in 
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nature” and “involves a retrospective inquiry into past events.”197 In contrast, the Public Inquiry 
was designed to pursue “accountability in the sense of ‘getting the story out,’ of finding out who 
did what and when and why, and how similar events should be handles in the future.”198  
The difference between these two modes for achieving accountability was described by 
Cory J. in the following terms:  
A commission of inquiry is neither a criminal trial nor a civil action for the determination 
of liability.  It cannot establish either criminal culpability or civil responsibility for 
damages.  Rather, an inquiry is an investigation into an issue, event or series of 
events.  The findings of a commissioner relating to that investigation are simply findings of 
fact and statements of opinion reached by the commissioner at the end of the inquiry.  They 
are unconnected to normal legal criteria.  They are based upon and flow from a procedure 
which is not bound by the evidentiary or procedural rules of a courtroom.  There are no 
legal consequences attached to the determinations of a commissioner.  They are not 
enforceable and do not bind courts considering the same subject matter.
199
  
 
As such, an inquiry should properly be engaged with the “getting the story out” accountability or 
that of “naming” as Jamisch, MacDonald, and Centa & Macklem conceptualized it.200 Concepts 
such as liability, retribution, blame or punishment should not enter into the discourse of 
accountability during an inquiry given that an inquiry is not a proper mechanism for determining 
the issues of guilt or individual wrongdoing. To label an inquiry’s version of accountability as 
something other than what it should be is to risk public’s apprehension towards its effectiveness 
and efficiency as a unique public institution. More importantly, the way in which accountability 
is conceptualized, influences how the public perceives an inquiry’s function and evaluates its 
success.  
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 Consider for instance MacDonald’s observations made during an academic conference on 
commissions of inquiry:  
The overall tenor of discussion about the use of this kind of instrument focused on 
concern about their potential not just to investigate, but to attribute blame. Indeed, 
some even went so far as to say that, notwithstanding the apparently investigatory 
mandate of such inquiries, their real purpose is to fix blame — at least by implication. 
All of us, understandably, fear being blamed for something we did not do. This fear of 
blame is a subset of an even larger apprehension. None of us wants to be wrongly 
considered responsible; Western socio-religious culture sees responsibility as a 
voluntaristic act — as a confession. For this reason, it is almost as damaging to our 
sense of self to be “named” as it is to be “blamed.” Hence, the concern reflected in the 
obligation to give a section 13 notice. With inquiries, it is preferable that a situation, 
not a person be “named” and that “blame” be left to another process.201 
 
Thus, MacDonald highlights how crucial it is that concepts such as “blame” not enter the 
discourse of accountability during inquiry proceedings. The consequences of perceiving an 
inquiry as an instrument for assigning blame are detrimental to the stability of the institution. Not 
only does the Public Inquiry become a mere conduit for adversarial dispute resolution, but the 
public perceives it as such thereby fearing and suspecting those essential public functions that 
make the inquiry unique. Hence the current pattern of over-judicializing inquiry proceedings and 
the consequent shift in the Public Inquiry image. 
Yet, despite this cautionary tale, discourses of blame seem to be the trend. For instance, 
MacKay & McQueen conceptualized accountability as a process of assigning blame. According 
to them, the public is no longer satisfied with mere facts.202 They argue that there is now a growing 
demand for accountability - an integral part of which is the concept of blaming - and the need to know 
“what really happened” in terms of “who should be accountable to whom” and the appropriate degree of 
responsibility to be assigned.
203 By equating accountability with “blame”, MacKay & McQueen 
tread into the adversarial waters, implying that the search for truth is really about the search for a 
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culprit who would bear responsibility and consequences for the events under inquiry 
investigation. Similarly, Shugarman subscribed to the discourse of blame. Although he insisted 
on avoiding legalization of the inquiry process and went out of the way to distinguish “blame” 
from “liability”, he nevertheless argued that the inquiry is a proper forum for “[e]stablishing who 
is accountable to whom, and responsible for what” and most importantly, the “quasi-policing 
aims of ‘gotcha’ and attaching blame to individuals, understanding and locating the 
responsibility of particular persons in authority.”204 In other words, Shugarman utilized the 
concept of “personal responsibility” as a foundation for his view of an inquiry’s primary function 
as a “fault-finding” institution.  
Given this preference for the language of “blame”, it is not surprising that the public is 
increasingly interested in the “fault-finding” function of commissions rather than a commission’s 
role in addressing systemic issues.
205
 As MacDonald argued,   
…the attribution of personal blame fits nicely into a model of individual ascription of 
responsibility. Seeking to allocate blame in situations of wrongful systems is a much 
riskier and much more difficult endeavour. Yet the desire to turn an investigation of a 
system failure into a quest for individual wrongdoers is often what lies behind calls for 
“who did what to whom” inquiries: find the political actor who sinned; blame him or 
her; and make him or her take the fall. Acting in such a manner is to waste the 
opportunity presented by “who did what to whom” investigations. Public inquiries, like 
ombudsman offices, furnish us the opportunity to find aggregations and commonalities. 
Using the methods of epidemiology and social sciences we can attempt to root out 
wrongful system issues.
206
 
 
Essentially, there is a common desire to turn inquiries into adjudicative trials as the language of 
blame and individual accountability is one that those within the legal community – judges in 
particular - feel comfortable with. As Jamisch pointed out, “assigning blame is like a trial; if 
judges are appointed to inquiries, they will instinctively encourage a ‘who did what’ 
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approach.”207 However, this does not encourage the best use of an inquiry’s functions and 
powers. In fact, the language of blame contributes to the reconceptualization of an inquiry’s true 
purpose and promotes a misleading image of the Public Inquiry institution. 
Moreover, used in this sense, accountability is about more than just “getting the story 
out” and a means for proposing prospective solutions. Viewed from the liability-based 
perspective, the discussion of accountability brings concerns for individual rights front and 
center thereby encouraging apprehension from those engaged with and potentially affected by an 
inquiry. More importantly, the overuse of such justice-centered discourses
  
creates uncertainty 
and scepticism amongst the public with respect to the utility and efficacy of the Pubic Inquiry. 
According to Jamisch, “[i]f the focus is placed on blame, it is understandable that significant 
procedural protections will be insisted upon (and the issue of potential criminal sanctions made 
even more acute), and this, in turn, may well limit the effectiveness of the inquiry process 
itself.”208 Even MacKay & McQueen recognized this side effect by stating that “[t]he contrast 
between those who say public inquiries go too far and those who say they do not go far enough 
highlights the opposing viewpoints on the purpose, effectiveness, and fairness of commissions of 
inquiry as tools of public accountability in Canadian society.”209 Essentially, the 
conceptualization of accountability goes a long way in structuring the Public Inquiry image and 
how the society perceives its functions and thus, success or failure.  
Given the prevalence of over-judicialized discourses of accountability, independence and 
impartiality, as well as fairness, it is not surprising that there is this great divide and uncertainty 
among the public as to the Public Inquiry’s role and its efficacy. The inquiry and its 
commissioner are increasingly faced with the need to balance and justify their search for truth 
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against the adjudicative standards of justice. The real challenge, however, is to preserve the 
essence of the Public Inquiry by engaging in discourses of truth and utilizing them to substantiate 
the inquisitorial model within the inquiry setting. 
B. The Discourses of Truth 
 
Having identified the discourses of justice most commonly used to analyze the purpose 
and efficiency of an inquiry, it is necessary to examine the discourses of truth, their nature, how 
they are transmitted, and more importantly, the message they send about the social value of an 
inquiry’s public function. But first, what is “truth”, how is it conceptualized and what purpose 
does it serve? It is relatively simple to identify justice discourses, after all the North American 
society has been taught to accept adjudicative forms of justice as the norm and utilize their 
paradigm, standards, concepts and language to analyze and evaluate all other modes of justice. In 
contrast, truth discourses are often illusive as they are influenced by the context and their source 
and may therefore be confused with discourses of justice.  
For instance, according to Jackson, “[t]ruth is a function not of discourse, but of the 
enunciation of discourse.”210 In other words, “truth” is largely a matter of presentation and an 
activity of persuasion.
211
 It is a product of judgment that people make with respect to the 
plausibility and sincerity of claims-making processes such as a trial or an inquiry. More 
importantly, “[t]ruth itself is to be comprehended as the attribution of social value to specific 
discourses and meanings.”212 Thus, truth is a process whereby values and norms dictate the 
discourses and concepts to be accepted as truths. As Foucault stated:  
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Each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth: that is, the types of 
discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances 
which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is 
sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the 
status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true.
213
  
 
Consequently, there may be different versions and discourses of truth (e.g., organic versus legal 
truth), different mechanisms for analyzing it (e.g., inquisitorial versus adversarial paradigm) and 
different procedures for acquiring it (e.g., inquiry versus trial).  
For instance, Hughes described the process of truth-construction within the adversarial 
setting as follows:  
Of the possible universe of truths, only those parts that pass the filters of relevance, 
materiality and admissibility become potential components of the constructed 
truth….The truth as constructed in adversarial justice is what is left over after we 
remove from the universe of possible truths all those things that the parties choose not 
to adduce, all things that are unavailable, all things that are rendered inadmissible at 
the objection of a party, all things that are found to be unpersuasive, all things that are 
found to be untrue and all things that, though potentially true, are fundamentally 
unfair. What remains may appropriately be described as ‘nothing but the truth’, but 
not as ‘the whole truth.’214 
 
Accordingly, the construction of truth (and the truth-seeking process itself) is governed by the 
norms and principles of the procedural setting that is in place. More importantly, however, it is 
highly dependent on the arbiter of truth; the person responsible for the determination and the 
final conceptualization of truth. As Hughes stated,“[i]nstitutionally, a legal fact-finding is 
ultimately true because the judge determined it to be so. It should be noted that does not release 
the judge from his or her obligation to seek the truth.”215 In other words, it is up to the arbiter of 
truth (in most cases, the judge) to decide what facts are relevant, credible, admissible and fair. 
                                                          
213
 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, ed. by Colin Gordon, 
trans. by Colin Gordon et al. (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1980) at 131 (emphasis added). 
214
 Jula Hughes, supra note 82 at 281 (emphasis added). 
215
 Ibid. at 276. 
 72 
 
Therefore, “truth” is a product of the norms and values of the decision-maker. It is independent 
of the “truth” available and amenable to be discovered during the process. 
In addition, it is important to note that the core elements required for something to be 
accepted as “truth” are very simple: a story does not have to be the “real” truth as long as it is 
believed or accepted to be true; it becomes accepted as truth when it is generated by an arbiter of 
truth who has legitimacy and is well trusted by the society.
216
 As such, the basic requirement is 
an independent and impartial arbiter in whom the public has confidence and trust – a member of 
the judiciary. In turn, a judge is given the power to construct facts according to the dictates of 
his/her professional tradition and governing paradigms; these facts are then presented to be 
accepted as “truths” by the public that holds judiciary in high regard. Consequently, the accepted 
“truth” may not be the whole truth or even the real truth, but it will be the legal truth that passes 
the test of judicial scrutiny. 
What is important to take away from this brief analysis of the adversarial truth-seeking 
process is that it is also applicable to the public inquiry setting, especially where the inquiry is 
headed by a member of the judiciary. Given the dual obligations of the judge-commissioner as 
well as the ongoing conditioning by his/her professional commitments and social expectations, it 
is not surprising that many, if not most, inquiries will adopt some of the adversarial truth-
generating practices described above. However, some inquiries may resort to this legalistic and 
highly judicialized conceptualization of truth more often than others. This is especially so in 
cases where there are parallel civil and/or criminal proceedings and more specifically, when the 
commissioner places protection of individual rights above his/her truth-seeking obligations. In 
such inquiries, the product is a “truth” that may be the most compatible with judicial notions of 
“justice” governing the adversarial setting. However, the risk is that the public may not accept 
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this as the “truth”, or accept it merely as a partial truth, thereby undermining the judge-
commissioner’s credibility and reliability and ultimately the public’s notion of justice.  
To summarize, there is a “truths” spectrum that ranges anywhere from organic truth, 
unencumbered by the dictates of the truth-seeking process (i.e., the processing of facts into 
truths) or judicial decision-making to legal truth, one that is perpetuated by justice discourses. 
Moreover, it is a matter of the virtues and public functions of an institution to which social value 
is attached that ultimately determine which version of truth will become publicly affirmed, 
legitimated, and sanctioned. In this sense, truth discourses are socially and institutionally 
authorized. As McMullan put it, “[t]ruth is thus a consequence of the way that different claims 
are given credibility.”217 In other words, “truth” is what the inquiry process delivers after 
information is processed into “facts” whereby certain sources of information are selected over 
others according to a standard of relevance and credibility – which is itself informed by a 
commissioner’s perceptions and value preferences. The remaining “facts” are further molded 
into particular truths that go through a further process of selection and categorization according 
to the character and dictates of a particular inquiry. 
Although a discussion of the different versions of truth that an inquiry is capable of 
pursuing is beyond the scope of this paper, an analysis of truth discourses (concepts and ideas) 
most commonly utilized to legitimize the social function of the Public Inquiry, will facilitate a 
better understanding of the effect that discourses of justice have on its public image.  After all, 
the discourses of truth are a foundation for all forms of truth-telling. As such, there are key 
concepts and ideas that all inquiry-produced “truths” rely upon to be socially and institutionally 
accepted as such. The presence of these concepts and ideas in discussions about Public Inquiries 
highlights the public functions and virtues of an inquiry that are (or should be) of social value. 
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Most importantly, the use of truth discourses is telling of the distribution of value among the 
multiple functions of an inquiry or rather of what the society should value most in an inquiry. As 
such, it is now important to examine the language and concepts used to describe an inquiry’s 
public functions and the image that they reinforce about the nature of the inquiry process and 
commissioner’s role. 
 
(1) Discourses of Inquiry Functions – Public, Openness, Transparency & Access  
 
Although some of these concepts and ideas have already been explored in Section 1.1 of 
Part II above, it is important to illuminate their use as discursive tools of legitimation of an 
inquiry’s social utility. One such tool is the concept of “social function” and its main constituents 
as they pertain to commissions of inquiry, of which Ruel provides an excellent summary:  
To achieve its true purpose, an inquiry should be accessible, open, transparent and public 
in the fullest sense. Accessibility and openness not only means ensuring media access to 
inquiry proceedings. It also means facilitating public attendance at inquiry premises, 
making available to the media a spokesperson for the commission, demystifying the inquiry 
process through public statements made by commissioners or commission counsel, or 
generally using plain language that the public will understand.
218
 
 
The discourses of inquiry functions – public accessibility, openness and transparency – are 
frequently utilized in academic discussions in order to idealize the inquiry process; almost as an 
afterthought about what the inquiry should be rather than what it is. For instance, Kalajdzic 
summarized the essence of an inquiry into three functions - information and education; 
restorative justice; and socio-democratic – which she then used in order to evaluate the 
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effectiveness of an inquiry.
219
 Nevertheless, what is important to take away from her analysis is 
the language used to describe each of the unique functions. For instance, Kalajdzic identified the 
information and education function as essential to the public’s acceptance of inquiry’s findings 
“as an authoritative, impartial account” (rather than as being subservient to individual rights and 
due process);
220
 the restorative justice function as providing the public with closure or “a type of 
healing therapy” by acknowledging harms done to victims (rather than by punishing the 
perpetrators);
221
 and the socio-democratic function as inspiring public confidence by revealing 
the truth (rather than censoring or editing evidence based on protection of rights concerns).
222
 
Similar language was used by Manson & Mullan to describe Justice O’Connor’s four key 
principles of an inquiry – thoroughness, expedition, openness and fairness – all of which they 
related back to the public aspect of the process.
223
 Accordingly, these social or “public” functions 
when utilized form component parts of the truth discourses that the Public Inquiry relies upon in 
order to be socially accepted as a valid institution.  
 Note that the discourse of functions places particular emphasis on the “public” nature of 
the processes that the inquiry should engage in. After all, Carver indicated that “[i]t is through 
the public nature of inquiry proceedings that the inquiry achieves one of its most important 
purposes: to assure members of the public that the “full story” is finally coming out, that actions 
and decisions that were taken behind closed doors will be exposed to the light of day.”224 
Essentially, to be “public” is to relay “the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth”. Thus, 
the “public” concept plays a key role in any truth discourse pertaining to the Public Inquiry. 
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When discussing the “public” aspects of an inquiry, the general focus is on restoring 
public confidence by “bring[ing] evidence to light in a very public domain,”225 educating the 
public and making the process accessible to participation in the truth-seeking process of an 
inquiry.
 226
 For instance, Grange described the public’s role in truth-seeking as a right: “[t]he 
public has a special interest, a right to know and a right to form its opinion as it goes along.”227 
Similarly, according to Manson & Mullan, “…there is a public need not only to find answers, but 
also to participate in the process of developing those answers.”228 Clearly, for an inquiry to 
function at its optimum, the public has to play an active role in the development of “truth”. Thus, 
the presence of the “public” in truth-seeking processes and discourses is a given, it is a right.  
 The role of “public” and its significance in structuring the truth discourses engaged in by 
an inquiry has been thoroughly examined by Salter. Once again, specific attention was given to 
the social functions of an inquiry that facilitate unfettered discussion inclusive of all the public 
(and not just a few privileged members given the “party” status) on issues of public importance 
(rather than merely legal, private and/or restricted to a certain category of the “public”).229 As 
such, commissions have an effect on public perceptions, attitudes, and behaviour by engaging in 
a social process of action and interaction; a process that is itself influenced by the 
conceptualization of an inquiry’s “public” functions.230 The conceptualization of the “public”, on 
the other hand, is structured by the push and pull of a commissioner’s perceptions of “truth” and 
“justice”. For instance, a commissioner may justify a particular truth by linking it to certain 
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“public” processes and/or stories that he/she deems legitimate according to the standards he/she 
prescribes to (i.e., discourses of justice). 
Because different inquiries may have different notions of the “public”, the truth-seeking 
process will also take different form and certain truths will receive more attention from a 
commissioner than others. This means that not everyone’s story will be accepted as truth by an 
inquiry; not all participants will be even given a chance to be heard. But the inquiry will claim to 
be engaged in a public process as it is usually mandated to, generating public truths for the 
general public despite the fact that some of these truths will be constructed predominantly by the 
experts to the disregard of the layperson, or by the interest groups to the disregard of the 
disaffected, and so forth. It is a delicate act to find a balance between all the appropriate public 
interests, governed no less by a judge-commissioner’s dual obligations to truth and justice. It is 
this attempt to balance different truths and interests that is very telling of a commissioner’s 
inclinations, values, and assumptions about the validity of inquiry’s processes. Therefore, in 
order to understand the significance that the commissioner attaches to certain truth discourses, it 
is essential to examine whether and how he/she utilizes such discourses during an inquiry.  
Bennett et al. addressed these questions in their evaluation of the Missing Women 
Commission of Inquiry.
231
 Specifically, they illustrated that although certain measures were 
implemented to provide access and ensure openness to public participation – thus, creating the 
perception of the inquiry performing its social function – there was a lack of meaningful 
opportunity and protection of participatory rights (via thorough consultation and collaboration, 
standing and funding, limitations in the terms of reference, failure to utilize procedural 
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flexibility, etc.) which ultimately undermined those initial measures.
232
 For instance, Bennett et 
al. observed that “the voices of marginalized women were shoved aside while the ‘professional’ 
opinions of police and government officials took centre stage. The focus of the Inquiry was 
directed away from systemic issues, targeting instead individual participants in the system who 
may not have fulfilled their job requirements as expected.”233 Clearly, the discourses of justice 
were prioritized, limiting the quality of an inquiry’s truth-seeking processes and undermining its 
ability to adequately fulfil its social functions. More importantly, it compromised the legitimacy 
(and thus, the image) of the Public Inquiry as an accessible and transparent, public institution.
234
  
As such, the presence or absence of certain truth discourses when examined in relation to 
a commissioner’s actual application of inquiry functions and processes is informative of the 
value placed by the commissioner on those social functions. For instance, the social functions of 
an inquiry assume the existence of a forum for exchange of ideas and “…the capacity of the 
inquiry commissioners and staff to keep an open mind, to be reflective, to be accessible and to 
permit the reciprocal exchange of views among people (and groups) treated as equals.”235 Of 
course, compromise of interests may need to be negotiated. Nevertheless, in an ideal setting, one 
where an inquiry’s social function is operating at full and unabridged capacity, the only limit to 
truth would be the public’s imagination. Where truth discourses show gaps or inconsistencies, it 
is as a consequence of an inquiry’s prioritizations and a commissioner’s imagination.  
More importantly, the ultimate public image of an inquiry (and its social function) is 
affected by how the commissioner conceptualizes his role in facilitating access, openness and 
transparency. In other words, it is a question of a commissioner’s attitude which, as Ruel 
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indicated, requires that “commissioners and commission staff should keep an open mind 
throughout the investigative and hearing phases of an inquiry…. Inquiry proceedings should be 
transparent and consistent with the inquisitorial role of public inquiries, commissioners and 
commission counsel should put to rest traditional legal reflexes for an approach favouring 
cooperation and consultation.”236 It follows that the attitude of the commissioner or rather, 
his/her commitment to the virtues of the Public Inquiry will translate through the way in which 
he/she utilizes (if at all) the discourses of truth, simultaneously dictating the public image of an 
inquiry, which may not necessarily be embracive of its social functions.  
 
(2) Discourses of Inquiry Processes – Credibility & Accountability 
 
Another key contribution to the discourses of truth is the discussion of inquiry processes 
and specifically, the concepts of credibility and accountability. Although these concepts were 
addressed above as part of the analysis of justice discourses, they have a vastly different 
connotation when utilized for the purposes of legitimizing the public virtues of an inquiry 
process (rather than its similarities to the adjudicative proceedings). When applied with the intent 
of fostering the unique nature of the Public Inquiry, these discourses reinforce an inquiry’s social 
functions and public utility.  
Specifically, the truth discourses, expressly or by implication, demonstrate that an inquiry 
attains credibility and accountability through different measures and processes. Unlike when 
used as part of the judicial discourses, credibility does not hinge upon the qualities and virtues of 
the judicial office or the judge-commissioner. An inquiry attains true credibility when it 
adequately performs its social function of being open, accessible and transparent during its truth-
seeking proceedings. For instance, Bennett et al., conceptualized credibility as an inquiry’s 
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attainment of its truth-seeking potential by fostering reconciliation and credible fact finding that 
encompasses collaboration and open dialogue.
237
 According to Bennett et al., “a public inquiry is 
both capable of, and essential to, the goals of truth and reconciliation”, which are governed by 
the procedural structure of an inquiry.
238
 Thus, to be credible, the inquiry process must be geared 
towards truth-seeking (rather than justice-seeking) and reconciliation rather than adjudication.  
In particular, the inquiry process must offer meaningful opportunities for public 
participation, consultation and collaboration and most importantly, be structured towards 
addressing systemic failures and preventing recurrences.
239
 When the process is overburdened by 
legal discourses that impose adversarial practices, the inquiry loses its public image and sight of 
its true purpose, and therefore, its credibility as a public truth-finding institution. For instance, 
Ruel showed concern over the judicialization of the inquiry process by suggesting that “[t]he real 
or perceived inefficiency, length and costs of public inquiries, attributed in part to a legalistic 
process with legal overtones, including public hearings, examination and cross-examination of 
witnesses, and adversarial positions taken by participants, is a cause of concern and should be 
addressed so that public inquiries can be maintained as a credible instrument of public policy.”240 
From a practical point of view, Bennett et al. associated the public’s general disappointment with 
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the process and results of the Missing Women Commission of Inquiry with the inquiry being 
likened to and set up in the image of the adversarial legal system:  
The manner in which the Inquiry was set up led to its adversarial nature. Without immunity 
(which may or may not have been appropriate depending on the witness and community 
sentiment, which was never canvassed), police officers sought representation by counsel. 
Without counsel and appropriate supports, witnesses and impacted community members 
felt betrayed and angry about the process. The goals of community healing and 
reconciliation appeared nowhere in the terms of reference or procedural set up. A high 
level of conflict combined with an unmitigated focus on a court-like fact finding process 
led to the development of more formal rules of evidence than may have otherwise been 
necessary.
241
 
 
Thus, the discourses of inquiry processes are those that normalize and orient themselves towards 
the social functions of an inquiry; embracing an inquiry’s open and inquisitorial nature and 
avoiding getting bogged down by legalistic and judicialized language and terminology.  
 For example, a large part of an inquiry’s truth discourses geared towards promoting and 
preserving its public essence, is the concept of “accountability”. According to Kalajdzic, an 
inquiry offers “accountability of a different sort: it can answer questions about individual and 
institutional wrongdoing, and it can make recommendations for the future.”242 In other words, 
the Public Inquiry engenders “social accountability”.243 The key word here is “social” and when 
utilized as part of the truth discourse, it signifies a search for truth rather than facts, prevention 
rather than detention, and dialogue rather than confrontation. The social nature of accountability 
was captured by the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission in the following terms:  
Courts are concerned with accountability in a narrow individualized sense. They deal 
essentially with punishment and compensation. Due process of law relates not so much to 
truth, as to proof. Before you send someone to jail there has to be proof of responsibility 
for the wicked details charged. When the penalties and consequences are grave and 
personalized, you need this constraining mode of proceeding. The nation wishing to 
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understand and deal with its past, however, is asking much larger questions: How could it 
happen, what was it like for all concerned, how can you spot the warning signs, and how 
can it be prevented from occurring again? If you are dealing with large episodes, the main 
concern is not punishment or compensation after due process of law, but to achieve an 
understanding and acknowledgement by society of what happened so that the healing 
process can really start. Dialogue is the foundation of repair. The dignity that goes with 
dialogue is the basis for achieving common citizenship. It is the equality of voice that 
marks a decisive start, the beginning of a sense of shared morality and responsibility.
244
 
 
Note that the language used to describe the adversarial and inquisitorial process models is very 
much distinct. While the adversarial model is framed in highly individualized terms, the inquiry 
model is conceptualized as a holistic social process with the goal of achieving broad spectrum 
accountability in the form of open dialogue and reconciliation.  
The social nature of accountability is also highlighted by the concepts of “naming” and 
“closure”. For instance, according to MacDonald “closure for victims demands above all else, 
that the evil be ‘named’”, both closure and naming (or truth) being the goals of a Public 
Inquiry.
245
 However, “[c]losure for perpetrators, conversely, does require blame — preferably 
self-acknowledged blame — prior to absolution. Where blame is externally attributed but not 
voluntarily assumed, neither the person wronged, nor the wrongdoer achieves real closure.”246 In 
other words, unlike under the adversarial process model, the process of determining truth and 
achieving closure does not require blame. In fact, commissions of inquiry should serve the 
purpose of “divert[ing] people from ‘a desire to assign blame and exact retribution’ into the 
‘constructive’ role of participating in an exercise which can lead to both reform and avoiding the 
recurrence of the event that gave rise to the setting up of the Commission.”247 Consequently, the 
discourses of inquiry process should be forward-looking and prospective in nature; focusing not 
on “who did what to whom, but rather on what happened and how can a repetition be 
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avoided.”248 Essentially, the inquiry process is about addressing systemic wrongs rather than a 
quest for individuals to blame. 
As such, the discourses of blame should not enter into an inquiry’s narrative or its truth 
seeking processes. Doing so would create confusion as to the true nature and function of the 
inquiry and ultimately the legitimacy of the process used to fulfill them. Consequently, it is 
important to understand the implications of language use when referring to accountability in an 
inquiry setting as it can potentially restructure the inquiry process affecting its perception by the 
public. As MacDonald puts it: 
Because “blaming” is what we believe our adversarial processes of criminal justice are 
designed to do, we transpose the idea to “who did what to whom” inquiries. Indeed, 
even characterizing these investigations “who did what to whom” inquiries commits us 
to a certain manner of conceiving their mandate. By contrast, if that mandate were to 
be cast in the language of “naming,” the inquiries themselves would be understood 
more as “what factors lead to events like this happening” investigations. Our 
expectations of the outcomes needed to achieve closure would then be much 
different.
249
 
 
Thus, different conceptualizations of “accountability” have a particular impact on the type of 
questions asked, the process used to investigate them, and ultimately the findings made by an 
inquiry. As such, in order for the Public Inquiry to fully perform its social functions and maintain 
its public essence, it is imperative that preference is accorded to the truth discourses given that 
the acceptance of truth-seeking processes hinges on the ability of inquiry discourses to normalize 
and utilize these unique conceptions of accountability and credibility.  
The reluctance to acknowledge the legitimacy of truth discourses is responsible for the 
growing concern regarding individual rights, which not only steers the inquiry towards the 
adversarial process model but more importantly forces the institution to choose between the 
search for truth and a quest for justice. According to Mackay & McQueen:  
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“Our legal system has reached a point where an adversarial encounter between parties 
with equal ability to put forward evidence is considered indispensable to the discovery 
of truth. A public inquiry defies this model by denying that there are adversaries, and 
yet providing the commissioners with the power to control the flow of information, 
placing all the other parties at a noticeable disadvantage. Rights claimants are reluctant 
to admit that the different circumstances of a public inquiry might justify a different 
approach to truth-seeking.”250 
 
When the language is utilized in a way that suggests a competition between individual rights 
(justice) and the pursuit of truth, the public has a hard time believing and accepting that both 
justice and truth go hand in hand during an inquiry; that truth is a path to justice rather than vice 
versa. Constantly groomed to define justice as the only legitimate process used to determine 
truth, the society learns to compromise truth by making it a question of balance rather than the 
ultimate goal of the Public Inquiry. 
(3) Discourses of Balance – Truth as a Question of Balance  
 
This brings us to the discourses of balance and how they are utilized during an inquiry to 
justify either the institution’s search for the truth or a unilateral defence of the due process. 
According to MacDonald, “The field of ‘alternative dispute resolution’ teaches us that how we 
conceive and label situations largely predetermines both how we approach them and the range of 
outcomes we are prepared to accept.”251 So it is with the question of balance. The public 
acceptance of an inquiry’s own unique functions and processes depends on how the question of 
balance is framed and discussed.  
For instance, Mackay & McQueen conceptualize it as a “challenge”. Specifically, they 
argue that “[t]he challenge is to strike the proper balance between the flexible pursuit of the 
truth, one that is less impeded by technical rules of evidence and procedural challenges than the 
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courts, and the fair treatment of those who get caught up in these public inquiries.”252  Mackay & 
McQueen’s conceptualization recognizes the significance of an inquiry’s flexible approach to the 
process of truth-seeking. Moreover, although the question remains as to where they would draw 
the line on proper balance, by framing “balance” as a “challenge”, they suggest that the truth-
seeking process of an inquiry is valid and attainable if only challenging. More importantly, they 
specifically state that some “justice” will need to be sacrificed in an inquiry’s search for the 
truth.
253
 In contrast, right off the bat, Ruel skews the question of balance in favour of “strong 
procedural protection[s]” arguing that “while there are public benefits to conducting a public 
inquiry, it should not be achieved at the expense of the rights and interests of affected 
individuals, organizations or corporations, including privacy and reputational interests. This is a 
question of balance.”254 Thus, he seems to prioritize individual rights protections over the pursuit 
of truth, suggesting that truth is not worth the sacrifice of justice. In other words, despite the fact 
that the search for truth is the defining characteristic and essence of the Public Inquiry, an 
inquiry’s flexible and unconstrained process model (the very thing that allows for it to get to the 
truth) is not justified in light of the potential damage to reputations that it may cause.
255
  
The concern then becomes whether it is a question of balance at all; whether truth can 
ever be worth the weight of justice; whether all this talk of an inquiry’s public benefit is mere 
window dressing used to trick the public into believing that the inquiry is a unique solution to 
social problems rather than just another arm of adjudication. Ruel’s conceptualization of balance 
seems to suggest just that. For instance, he defended the Public Inquiry as a “credible instrument 
of public policy” and argued that “[t]his balancing exercise should also consider more broadly 
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the guiding principles that should apply to the conduct of public inquiries – thoroughness, rigor, 
expedition, timeliness, efficiency, proportionality, cost-effectiveness, accessibility and openness 
to the public and fairness.”256 However, under the same breath Ruel also urged that for Public 
Inquiries “to remain relevant and vibrant, they shall need to stay abreast of the evolving legal 
framework” such as the increasing preoccupation with due process and individual rights 
protections.
257
 What Ruel was essentially suggesting is that the inquiry model and its pursuit of 
truth are outdated and incongruent with current trends and expectations, which seem to lean in 
favour of justice. To be sure, the public functions of an inquiry are to be held in high regard, but 
they are not to define the ultimate structure and process of a Public Inquiry. Accordingly, framed 
in a way that prioritizes justice to the detriment of truth, the discourse of balance suggests a 
paradox as there is no actual balancing taking place.  
Nevertheless, all hope is not lost. After all, as MacDonald suggested, legitimacy of the 
inquiry model and its search for the truth is predetermined by how they are conceptualized and 
labelled.
258
 As such, the power lies in the ability of truth discourses to formulate the notion of 
“balance” in terms of an inquiry’s social functions and processes where eventually truth-seeking 
would not need to undergo through a game of balance in order to justify itself. As MacKay & 
McQueen would put it, it is a “challenge” but one that is achievable. For instance, a step towards 
this direction has been taken by Bennett et al., who conceptualized the process of balance as one 
where “meaningful” procedural protections encompass provisions for accessibility and witness 
participation rather than truth-hindering procedural and evidentiary exclusions.
259
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Similarly, Van Harten argued that there can be “an appropriate and workable balance 
between the search for the truth and the protection of individual right.”260 According to Van 
Harten, when faced with a “divide between institutional effectiveness and individual rights, 
between principles of efficiency and fairness”, under appropriate circumstances the public 
interest in conducting an inquiry outweighs any potential jeopardy to individual rights.
261
 
Specifically, he referred to Cory J.’s reasons in Phillips v. Nova Scotia when describing the 
“appropriate balance” as: “…an inquiry of sufficient public importance could proceed, in spite of 
the prospect of a key witness facing a future criminal trial, as long as the witness enjoyed 
derivative use immunity for any evidence given at the inquiry, and as long as inquiry-related 
publicity did not prejudice the witness’s ability to receive a fair trial.”262 Nowhere does he 
mention that the inquiry must sacrifice its search for the truth by instituting court-like procedures 
that favour protection of individual rights. In fact, Van Harten implied that those protections are 
to be implemented and observed within the adversarial context (i.e. the criminal trial). 
Moreover, although referring specifically to the “inquiries that have coercive powers to 
compel testimony and production of documents, as opposed to broad policy inquiries”,263 Van 
Harten provided a great example of how truth discourses could be utilized to legitimize the social 
functions and public processes of as inquiry. For example, in defence of an inquiry’s exercise of 
coercive powers and in spite of the potential compromise to the rights of those affected Van 
Harten argued that:  
Coercive powers are necessary to an inquiry because of the need to provoke revelations 
that people would otherwise rather not make. The inquiry must shine light into dark 
corners where the public interest in uncovering the truth is more important than preserving 
private secrets. Without coercive powers, it may be impossible for an inquiry to respond to 
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public demands for an independent and thorough investigation. Because of the serious 
potential impact on people’s lives, though, the guiding principle of an inquiry must be to 
intrude only as far as is essential to effectively carry out its mandate.
264
 
 
Note that the language used is one that highlights an inquiry’s public virtues – its search for the 
truth, its dedication to the public interest and commitment to public demands. Moreover, Van 
Harten does not question an inquiry’s need to intrude on individual rights. In fact, he was explicit 
that “[t]he exercise of coercive investigative powers necessarily intrudes on people’s lives.”265 
Despite this negative impact, he justified the intrusion by arguing that “coercive powers are 
essential to an inquiry’s ability to make a useful contribution to the public process”; that they are 
“an integral part of an inquiry’s capacity for credible fact-finding and forceful 
recommendations”; and more importantly, “[w]here the use of coercive powers is warranted, 
failure to use them can undermine the inquiry’s credibility. 266 Essentially, the very credibility of 
an inquiry hinges on its ability to utilize the powers granted to it, be they informal, extensive, and 
coercive in nature.  Thus, Van Harten legitimized the search for the truth and even went as far as 
to suggest that the question of balance is redundant given that under appropriate circumstances 
truth should not be compromised by rigid adherence and observance of legal protections.
267
 
 Ultimately, however, Van Harten left the protection of an inquiry’s credibility in the 
hands of the commissioner arguing that:  
The duty of the commissioner is to get to the truth. There is a legitimate expectation that 
the commissioner will use his or her powers to ensure that an inquiry is both thorough 
and independent. This means seeking out those with relevant information, compelling 
them to testify, securing relevant documents, and allowing an opportunity for those 
affected to participate in the process. A tenacious sense of independence is essential to 
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the value of an inquiry, especially where the mandate involves the state itself or its 
representatives. Like nothing else, independence reflects raison d’être of inquiries. 
Excessive restraint in the exercise of investigative authority would expose a 
commissioner to the criticism that he or she abridged the mandate, gave someone the 
‘soft shoe’, or endorsed a cover-up.268  
As such, it is important to analyze the language used by the commissioner in the final report and 
recommendations in order to understand how (and whether) the importance of an inquiry’s social 
function is relayed to the public and where on the balance are the principles of efficiency in 
comparison to those of fairness. Will the commissioner’s dialogue and exercise of extra-judicial 
functions foster public confidence in and bolster credibility of the inquiry as a unique public 
institution?; or will it demonstrate “excessive constraint in the exercise of investigative 
authority”, a reluctance to accept the necessity of an inquiry’s intrusion on individual rights, and 
a general preference for court-like discourses and practices?  These are the questions to consider 
when examining the impact of judicial discourses on the public image of an inquiry.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
268
 Ibid. at 246-247 (emphasis added). 
 90 
 
PART IV: CASE STUDIES – JUDISIAL DISCOURSES IN PRACTICE 
 
Having analyzed the discourses of justice and truth and their most common use in an 
inquiry setting, it is now only fitting to address the role that judge-commissioners have in 
proliferating these discourses. After all, it is the choice of words and actions assumed by the 
commissioner when faced with decisions respecting an inquiry’s mandate and objectives, 
functions, and procedures that reflect to the outside the fundamental values and  principles that 
the institution upholds. The commissioner is the face of an inquiry and ultimately dictates the 
image that the inquiry assumes before and for the public.  
Accordingly, the goal of Part IV of this paper will be to zoom in on the judicial 
discourses by examining and analyzing two judicial inquiries: the Arar Commission
269
 and the 
Iacobucci Inquiry.
270
 The reason for choosing these particular inquiries as the focal point for 
discourse analysis is based on several factors. For one, both of the inquiries were created by the 
federal government and intended to inform and advise the national public; thus, making it highly 
likely that a broad spectrum of society was exposed to and influenced by the decisions and 
findings of the inquiry. In addition, all two of the inquiries occurred relatively recent in time and 
were highly publicised, meaning that there is a slew of data available and accessible for study 
and analysis. More importantly for the purposes of this paper, a judge was appointed to the 
position of a commissioner in all two of the inquiries and in all two, the judge-commissioner was 
presented with a complex set of circumstances (i.e., national security confidentiality issues) that 
forced him to make vital decisions respecting an inquiry’s social functions, principles and values 
balanced against the presence of conflicting adversarial notions of independence and fairness and 
restrictive conceptions of “truth”. 
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Given that the focus is on “judicial” discourses and the role of the judge commissioner in 
shaping the public image of an inquiry, the discussion and analysis will be limited to those parts 
of the inquiry that directly reflect a commissioner’s opinions, decisions, and judgement. In other 
words, the intention here is not to describe the process of each inquiry or narrate all of the 
actions and decisions taken by the commissioner – that would require almost as much time as 
each of the inquiries took to fulfill their mandates and would be completely unnecessary given 
the scope of this paper. Rather, the objective is to provide succinct examples of judicial discourse 
use and its effect on the inquiry.  
As such, the discussion of each of the two inquiries will draw on excerpts from: the 
inquiry’s terms of reference, opening remarks and statements made by the commissioner, 
commission reports, recommendations, and any rulings made by the commissioner during the 
inquiry that specifically address the inquiry’s mandate, goals and objectives, and procedural 
structure.  These documents are a glimpse into the commissioner’s thought process and analysis; 
they are outlets through which the commissioner expresses his/her views, opinions and 
interpretations of the “true” functions of an inquiry. Thus, the analysis of these documents will 
facilitate an unravelling of a commissioner’s priorities and preferences for specific narratives, 
ideas, issues and assumptions; all of which are complicit in shaping the ultimate identity and 
image of the Public Inquiry.  
 
A. Arar Commission271  
 
As discussed throughout the paper, openness and transparency are among some of the 
fundamental principles necessary for the proper functioning and survival of the Public Inquiry as 
a legitimate “public” institution. These principles are not always easy to uphold, especially 
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where the circumstances pertain to national security confidentiality (hereinafter, NSC) and 
require adherence to high standards of confidentiality and secrecy as in the case of the Arar 
Commission and the Iacobucci Inquiry. Such circumstances are counterintuitive to the whole 
purpose of a Public Inquiry. Nevertheless, they must be dealt with and the way in which the 
judge-commissioner chooses to approach issues of confidentiality and secrecy during an inquiry 
is telling of his/her perception about the role and function of the said institution, which in turn, 
affects the public image of the inquiry.  
(1) The “Challenge” 
  
The Arar Commission is one such example where the investigation dealt with highly 
sensitive information, often requiring the commissioner to balance the needs for public access 
and transparency against NSC considerations. Undertaken by Justice O’Connor, the inquiry was 
established on February 5
th
, 2004 under Part I of the Inquiries Act in order to “investigate and 
report on the actions of Canadian officials in relation to Maher Arar (Factual Inquiry)” and his 
“extraordinary rendition” from a New York airport to a Syrian prison and  “recommend an arm's 
length review mechanism for the activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police with respect to 
national security (Policy Review).”272 According to Whitaker, who served on the advisory panel 
to O’Connor J. for the second part of the inquiry, “ [s]ince the subject matter of the inquiry was 
largely considered a matter of national security confidentiality, the issue of public disclosure of 
findings presented serious difficulties from the start….O’Connor has said that the Arar inquiry 
was the most difficult and complex task he has ever faced in his professional life, and most of 
these difficulties stemmed from the requirements of official secrecy imposed upon a ‘public’ 
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inquiry.”273 Thus, although the Commission had access to all relevant documents, regardless of 
their security classification, the real challenge was to ensure that the inquiry was publicly 
perceived as a credible fact finding institution. 
According to O’Connor J.,“[n]umerous procedural challenges arose from the tension 
among three different, sometimes competing requirements: making as much information as 
possible public, protecting legitimate claims of NSC, and ensuring procedural fairness to 
institutions and individuals who might be affected by the proceedings.”274 These are indeed 
competing interests that ideally should not have been imposed on an institution geared towards 
“public” goals (which O’Connor J. later summarized and referd to through his report). But their 
presence and center stage during the Arar Commission brings us back to the discussion about the 
discourses of “balance”, which O’Connor J. often utilized in order to justify his course of action. 
For instance, even the simple act of conceptualizing the investigative process of the inquiry as a 
“challenge”, pit truth against other values and implied the need for compromises, which 
O’Connor J. was obliged to do on several occasions – going as far as “direct[ing] major changes 
in the way the Inquiry would proceed - for the sake of the inquiry’s efficiency and survival.275 
And all this, despite having broad discretionary powers under the Commission’s “Terms of 
Reference” giving O’Connor J. full charge of the conduct and procedure of the Arar 
Commission.
276
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Granted, it may be argued that it is the particular nature of the inquiry that brought these 
challenges to the fore (i.e., the NSC claims); that the commissioner was indeed obliged to engage 
in the discourses of balance thereby placing the search for truth at risk of becoming a sham; that 
it was the government to blame for calling a “public” inquiry into events that could not be 
publicly aired due to legitimate legal constraints. Even accepting that the inquiry was a creation 
of the government’s desperate attempt to shield itself from criticism by calling into effect an 
institution allegedly responsive to the public, the abundance of judicialized discourse in the 
Commission’s Report and Rulings must not be ignored.  In fact, the Commission itself was a 
conglomeration of discourses of truth and justice vying for public attention.  
This was the real “challenge” for the commissioner – the unavoidability of judicializing a 
process that may not have been the most appropriate for addressing NSC claims. Even O’Connor 
J. recognized as much. Specifically, referring to the related matters of Messrs. Almalki, El Maati 
and Nureddin brought before him by intervenors - and that would later become the subject matter 
of the Iacobucci Inquiry - O’Connor J. stated that: 
[m]y experience in this Inquiry indicates that conducting a public inquiry in cases such as 
these can be a tortuous, time-consuming and expensive exercise. Quite properly, the public 
inquiry process brings with it many procedural requirements for openness and fairness. …I 
will simply say that there are more appropriate ways than a full-scale public inquiry to 
investigate and report on cases where national security confidentiality must play such a 
prominent role. These types of cases are likely to occur from time to time, and it is not 
practical or realistic to respond by calling a public inquiry each time…Whatever process is 
adopted, it should be one that is able to investigate the matters fully and, in the end, inspire 
public confidence in the outcome.
277
 
 
The implication here is that perhaps the highly judicialized and adjudicative nature of the inquiry 
process did not achieve what it was meant to do; that the search for truth was hampered by the 
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uncompromising restrictions imposed by the NSC requirements on “openness” and “fairness” 
that may have done little to encourage public confidence in the process. 
 
(2) The Guiding Principles 
 
Despite these challenges and the continuous need to balance the quest for truth against 
NSC claims, O’Connor J. tried to compensate by giving his mandate a broad interpretation to 
ensure a thorough investigation and avoid “overly technical and legalistic approach to the 
Inquiry.”278 As mentioned previously, his mandate encompassed both a Factual Inquiry into the 
actions of Canadian officials in relation to Mr. Arar and a Policy Review with the goal of 
providing recommendations concerning review mechanisms for RCMP’s activities with respect 
to NSC.
279
 Despite O’Connor J.’s aversion to the application of the “legalistic approach” during 
the Commission, he nevertheless assumed the normalcy of the adjudicative process model for 
part of the mandate.
280
 For instance, he summarized that “[t]he two parts of the mandate are very 
different. As the name suggests, the Factual Inquiry involves adjudicative fact-finding – 
determining what Canadian officials did with respect to Mr. Arar.”281 Specifically, O’Connor J. 
stated that “[t]he Factual Inquiry was conducted by way of evidentiary hearings, some held in 
camera and others, in public. The proceedings had many trial-like features. For example, lawyers 
played an important role, and witnesses were examined and cross-examined under oath or 
affirmation. In contrast, the Policy Review process was a research-based consultative study…”282  
Perhaps O’Connor J. had no alternative but to cede to the norms of the adjudicative 
process model given the demands imposed by NSC claims. However, it is important to note the 
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ease with which he accepted that the Fact Finding process will be adjudicative in nature rather 
than inquisitorial. O’Connor J. provided no rationale or justification for the approach. In fact, it 
was stated as a given that the investigation would assume an adjudicative course - it is what the 
public is used to; what is perhaps expected from those involved; and what the judge-
commissioner himself felt at ease and comfortable with given his professional upbringing in 
adjudicative culture. This observation is not meant as a criticism of how O’Connor J. conducted 
his Commission, but rather to point out how discourses of justice are often taken for granted 
even within an institution geared towards “truth-seeking” rather than the court-like collection of 
“evidence”. Nevertheless, despite having his work cut out for him, O’Connor J. still managed to 
make important observations regarding the purpose of the Commission as a public institution as 
well as its guiding principles – if only existing and enforceable in the abstract.  
Although in theory the mandate gave O’Connor J. broad powers of discretion, his control 
over the process was limited by the same mandate’s direction to protect NSC and the resulting 
concerns for fairness.
283
 Despite these limitations, O’Connor J. found it pertinent to emphasize 
the importance of “the public” to the validity of the commission as a public institution. He 
insisted that:  
[t]he government chose to call a public inquiry, not a private investigation. Implicit in the 
Terms of Reference is a direction that I maximize the disclosure of information to the 
public, not just in my report, but during the course of the hearings. The reason for that 
direction is consistent with what are now broadly accepted as two of the main purposes of 
public inquiries: to hear the evidence relating to the events in public so that the public can 
be informed directly about those events, and to provide those who are affected by the 
events an opportunity to participate in the inquiry process.  
 
It has often been said that this is not a normal public inquiry, where it is possible to hear 
virtually all of the evidence in public. On the contrary, because of the NSC claims, only 
part of the evidence can be heard in public, only part of the story can be told. That is the 
reality. However, that reality does not mean that I should readily abandon the concept of 
public hearings for all or even part of the evidence that is not subject to NSC claims. I 
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think it behooves me as Commissioner in a public inquiry to take reasonable steps to 
attempt to maximize, during the hearing stage of the Inquiry, the disclosure of information 
to the public.
284
 
 
Accordingly, O’Connor J. read into the Terms of Reference (hereinafter, the Terms) the public 
aspects of the inquiry and the importance of the “public” concept to the stability and survival of 
the Commission. In other words, despite the NSC claims, the Commission must still pay 
allegiance to its “public” roots even if “only part of the story can be told” – and even then with 
the chance of it being misleading - because otherwise what is the point. As such, O’Connor J. 
made public disclosure one of his primary responsibilities as a commissioner and tied it directly 
to the guiding principles of the Commission: thoroughness, expeditiousness, openness to the 
public, and fairness.  
 O’Connor J.’s discussion of the guiding principles upholds the structural and component 
nature of the discourses of truth. For instance, he argued that:  
To realize this duty of independence and impartiality, an inquiry must be thorough and 
examine all relevant issues with care and exactitude, to leave no doubt that all questions 
raised by its mandate were answered and explored. In order to be effective, a public inquiry 
must also be expeditious. Expeditiousness in the conduct of a public inquiry makes it more 
likely that members of the public will be engaged by the process and will feel confident 
that the issues are being appropriately addressed.  
 
This is a public inquiry. It was therefore essential that the proceedings be transparent, 
accessible and open to the public as possible. The principles discussed above all stem from 
the public’s interest in an inquiry. It is important to remember, however, that inquiries can 
have a serious impact on those implicated in the process. Thus, an inquiry must balance the 
interests of the public in finding out what happened with the rights of those involved to be 
treated with fairness.
285
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Specifically, O’Connor J. identified independence and impartiality with thoroughness or the 
pursuit of truth – which is one of the virtues of a Public Inquiry - rather than with the legalistic 
notions of justice underpinning judicial qualities that the government commodifies in the process 
of appointing a judicial figure to head a commission of inquiry. In other words, O’Connor J. did 
not hold up independence and impartiality as the goals or primary virtues of a Public Inquiry, but 
rather as stepping stones to the search for truth; they are qualities that inform the higher virtue of 
an inquiry – to instill public confidence (or as O’Connor J. put it, “leave no doubt”)  via truth.  
Thus, O’Connor J. reinforced the discourses of truth by suggesting that to be credible the inquiry 
process must be geared towards truth-seeking (rather than justice-seeking).  
 Similarly, O’Connor J. conceptualized expeditiousness as a likelihood of a meaningful 
public participation and utilized it as a measure of an inquiry’s effectiveness.  For instance, an 
inquiry process “bogged down in procedural wrangling”286 is unlikely to be effective in the sense 
that it will inhibit public interest, engagement, participation and thereby confidence in the truth-
seeking process. Once again, O’Connor J. emphasized that the credibility of an inquiry stems 
from its public virtues; an inquiry’s capacity for truth-seeking is meaningless without public 
engagement. In other words, public confidence (and the inquiry’s credibility as a valid public 
institution) originates from realizing its socio-democratic functions
287
 – remaining public, open, 
transparent and accessible - rather than merely reiterating its capacity for truth-seeking as 
implied by the Terms and the governing legislation. O’Connor J. realized as much when he 
accepted transparency, accessibility, and openness as the inquiry’s guiding principles.  
 However, when referring to the final guiding principle – fairness – O’Connor J. 
differentiated it from the rest by suggesting that it has no grounding in the public interest and 
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brought the conversation back to the discourses of balance and the challenges that it presents to 
the search for the truth. In other words, the interests of the public and the truth-seeking functions 
of an inquiry were portrayed as obstacles to fairness and as such, must be bound by principles of 
justice if only to ensure that the inquiry is fair. This is not to suggest that the principle of fairness 
should be absent from any considerations regarding inquiry proceedings. Rather, this is a point 
about the role of legal discourse during the inquiry and the impressions that it creates with 
respect to inquiry function and utility.  
For instance, although in the above comment O’Connor J. separated the principle of 
fairness from the other guiding principles - that are unquestionably tied to the public nature of an 
inquiry - in his discussion of the Policy Review Process, O’Connor J. depicted the same principle 
in a completely different light. Specifically, he stated that “[t]he the principle of fairness is 
inextricably linked to the principle of openness and accessibility.”288 Meaning that in order to 
satisfy the principle of fairness, O’Connor J. saw that as a commissioner it was his duty to 
provide “meaningful opportunity” for public contribution to the inquiry as well as 
“endeavour[ed] to keep the public informed of the material information and issues that I was 
considering, not only to solicit comments, but also in the interest of fairness to the public.”289 
Accordingly, O’Connor J. conceptualized “fairness” as an extension of the public nature and 
function of the inquiry rather than as an oppositional interest likely to restrict the quest for truth. 
In other words, “fairness” was framed as being part and parcel of the “public” in the Public 
Inquiry. In this way, the language use emphasized “truth” as a way to “justice” rather than vice 
versa (as in O’Conner J.’s first definition of the fairness principle). 
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Of course, the quest for truth would be already bound by the applicable legislation (be it 
the federal Inquiries Act or the individual provincial legislation pertaining to the conduct of 
inquiries). As such, there should be no further need to bind the judicial principle of fairness to 
the already entrenched standards of inquiry procedure that encompass protections for individual 
rights. The inquiry discourse should not be overwhelmed with discussions of how to prevent 
adverse risks to reputations, how to avoid the risk to any potential criminal proceedings, or even 
the need to expose available information to rigorous evidentiary processes that are the domain of 
the trial courts in order to displace those risks. Even O’Connor J. recognized that those risks are 
the price to pay in the search for truth as he cited Justice Cory stating in the Blood Inquiry case 
that “…it is clear that commissioners must have the authority to make those findings of fact 
which are relevant to explain and support the recommendations even though they reflect 
adversely upon individuals.”290 An inquiry is not the place for sorting out personal rights and 
interests; it is about delivering justice to the public through a fair process. 
Simply put, the discourse of justice should not consume the true nature and qualities of an 
inquiry. Unlike in the adversarial context, justice and the related legalistic discourses should not 
define the course to truth. Rather, the quest to truth shall reveal justice to the public. After all, 
that is why the inquiry was created in the first place. At its optimal, the institution is meant to 
restore public confidence in the government and the society in general and thereby, the belief 
that justice does exist. As O’Connor J. put it, “I believe that the public credibility of this inquiry, 
and the government who called it, will be enhanced if we work together to make public as much 
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information as possible during the public hearings.”291 Thus, truth equals confidence; the more 
information made available to the public, the more justice is served.  
Perhaps, O’Connor J. attempted to instill some of that confidence with his Report by 
continuously referring back to the guiding principles of his Inquiry so as to assure the public that 
he is dedicated to addressing their concerns and needs. For example, in one of his rulings on the 
RCMP witness testimony, O’Connor J. insisted on the witnesses’ participation during the public 
hearing as a ground for securing credibility of the Inquiry before the public.
292
 Specifically, 
O’Connor J. argued that providing the involved parties with “the opportunity to hear the 
evidence” and thus, with meaningful participation in the process, “maximizes the chance of a 
fuller picture emerging from this Inquiry” and ensures, at the very least, “a useful and 
informative story for the public”.293 In this way, O’Connor J. utilized the principles of openness 
and thoroughness as a means for procuring public’s trust in the process - after all the truth will 
get out however limited it may be. He even underscored that procedural fairness cannot be 
stretched so far as to preclude all of the RCMP testimony from the public hearing despite the 
potential risk of prejudice.
294
  
Moreover, O’Connor J. went as far as to connect these guiding principles to the general 
justice system in order to justify the Commission’s truth-seeking objectives as well as his 
attempts as a commissioner to make public as much information as possible even in light of the 
NSC claims. Specifically, in order to justify his decision to call RCMP witnesses during the 
public hearings of the Inquiry, O’Connor J. argued that: 
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[o]penness and transparency are hallmarks of legal proceedings in our system of justice. 
Exposure to public scrutiny is unquestionably the most effective tool in achieving 
accountability for those whose actions are being examined and in building public 
confidence in the process and resulting decision. As Fish J. aptly put it in the Toronto Star 
case, ‘In any constitutional climate, the administration of justice thrives on exposure to 
light – and withers under a cloud of secrecy.295 
 
Aside from the significance that O’Connor J. attached to the public principles of an inquiry, it is 
interesting to note that he found it necessary to validate the inquiry’s quest for truth - to 
substantiate its public functions. By arguing that “exposure” is a hallmark of the administration 
of justice, O’Connor J. suggest that it can therefore be legitimately pursued by the inquiry. In 
other words, O’Connor J. conceptualized the principles of openness and transparency in terms of 
the discourses of justice. In fact, the above statement is primarily about the administration of 
justice; the pursuit of truth being merely a subsidiary to. Not to suggest that justice is not one of 
the goals of an inquiry – in fact, truth is justice within the inquiry context. However, this 
noticeable desire to bring in to the discussion the “system of justice” says something about the 
current discursive trends in relation to the inquiry. Namely, such conceptualizations of the 
relationship between justice and truth suggest that the inquiry process is an extension of the 
traditional system of justice rather than a separate institution with truth as its form of justice.  
 The overbearing presence of such discourses of justice during the decision-making 
processes of the Arar Commission is but the tip of the iceberg of their real impact on the unique 
identity of the inquiry as an inquisitorial, truth-seeking process as well as the inquiry’s 
effectiveness in the eyes of the public. Namely, in order to stay true to its public nature, the 
inquiry must epitomize it not only in its functions (and the declarations of such) but also in the 
implementation of its processes. In fact, this was the real challenge encountered by O’Connor J. 
and one that seemed to inhibit the Commission’s quest for truth. 
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(3) Practice & Procedure – The Struggle between Truth & Justice 
Take for instance the incongruous nature of O’Connor J.’s formulation of and his 
ultimate approach to the Commission’s “Rules of Procedure and Practice”. Specifically, while 
O’Connor J. emphasized that “[i]n formulating the Rules I have been guided to the extent 
possible by four principles: thoroughness, expedition, openness to the public, and fairness,”296 he 
nevertheless admitted that putting the principles of openness and fairness to practice will not 
only present a challenge but will likely be impossible on occasions where NSC claims are 
made.
297
 Although O’Connor accepted the Commission’s public principles as foundational, the 
Commission’s Terms were such as to inhibit a “public” search for the truth. According to 
O’Connor J., “[p]aragraph k of those Terms directs that I take steps to prevent public disclosure 
of information that would be injurious to international relations, national defence or national 
security (national security confidentiality). As a result, it is inevitable that some of the evidence 
will have to be heard in camera and in the absence of parties and their counsel.”298 Thus, right 
from the get go, limits were set to how the Commission pursued truth and which truth it would 
make available to the public; right from the start truth was in competition with justice. 
Nevertheless, despite being circumscribed by legitimate NSC claims, O’Connor J. was 
ultimately in charge of determining the legitimacy of those claims and selecting the information 
heard in camera that could properly be disclosed to the public. Most importantly, he designed the 
Rules of Practice and Procedure (hereinafter, the Rules) and it is their application that ultimately 
speaks volumes about the true state and nature of the Commission’s function. According to 
O’Connor J., “[i]n designing the Rules I have attempted to minimize, to the extent possible, the 
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impact of the in camera hearings on the principles of openness and fairness.”299 Thus, even 
O’Connor J. recognized the importance of putting these functions to practice. In fact, given the 
confidential nature of much of the information reviewed by the Commission, it is likely that 
O’Connor J. considered it his duty as a commissioner to safeguard these public principles by 
entrenching their substance in the Rules.  
Specifically, in his ruling on NSC, O’Connor J. made sure to address the ever more 
essential goal of engaging the “public” aspects of the inquiry, especially in a context adverse to 
the principles of openness and transparency. According to O’Connor J.: 
[i]n itself, the calling of a public inquiry is a significant event in a parliamentary 
democracy. Public inquiries are often called in the wake of a tragedy or a scandal. When 
the public’s confidence in public officials or institutions has been shaken, the public’s 
demand to know all of the details about what has occurred is often the catalyst for the 
calling of a public inquiry. Because a public inquiry is established to be independent of the 
government, it has the advantage of bringing to light, in an impartial and independent way, 
those facts that are necessary to assess the situation that triggered public concern. One of 
the great advantages of a public inquiry is that it can expose all of the facts, many of which 
might not be revealed in normal public discourse.  
 
As important as the Commissioner’s report, at the end of an inquiry, is the process of 
public exposure of the facts that allows the public to make its own evaluation over time. I 
agree with Justice Samuel Grange, who conducted two public inquiries, when he said in 
“How should lawyers and the legal profession adapt?” (1999) 12 Dalhousie Law Journal 
151 at 154-55:  
I remember once thinking egotistically that all the evidence, all the antics, had only 
one aim: to convince the commissioner who, after all, eventually wrote the report. 
But I soon discovered my error. They are not just inquiries; they are public 
inquires….300 
 
Given the above, it is clear that O’Connor J. deemed the unique public nature and the truth-
seeking capacity of the inquiry as a basis for its very existence and utility. He cited the “process 
of public exposure of facts” as the ultimate indicator of an inquiry’s effectiveness and legitimacy 
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as a public institution. In other words, it is all about the “process” of putting the inquisitorial and 
truth seeking functions of an inquiry to practice.  
 Accordingly, O’Connor J.’s interpretation of the Terms that dealt directly with the public 
disclosure of information over which the government claimed NSC was informed by the public 
aspects of the inquiry process and thus, embraced a generous and flexible approach to disclosure. 
For instance, O’Connor J. argued that, 
I recognize that this Inquiry is different from others in that it is concerned with many 
matters that, for reasons of NSC, cannot be publicly disclosed. Even so, I think it important 
that I bear in mind, under section (k)(iii), the fundamental point that the government 
established a public inquiry, rather than a private investigation, in the case of Mr. Arar.  
 
Moreover, the government specifically directed me to opine on what constitutes sufficient 
public disclosure. In forming that opinion, it is important to consider the public nature of 
the Inquiry and the importance of providing as much information as possible to the public. 
Consistent with this approach, section (k)(ii) of the Terms of Reference, speaks of 
maximizing disclosure. It reads:  
In order to maximize disclosure to the public of relevant information, the 
Commissioner may release a part or a summary of the information received in 
camera and shall provide the Attorney General of Canada with an opportunity to 
comment prior to its release… [emphasis added]. 
 
Thus, I am satisfied that I should consider as one of the factors in the balancing exercise, 
under section (k)(iii), the fact that the sufficiency of public disclosure is being determined 
in the context of a public inquiry.
301
 
 
As such, O’Connor J. framed his approach to NSC claims in a more liberal manner – inclining 
towards public disclosure - than he would have otherwise outside of the inquiry context. 
Essentially, he conceptualized his role as well as the Commission’s mandate according to the 
discourse of truth. Despite being aware that much of the information received by the 
Commission would be heard behind closed doors, O’Connor. J. nevertheless attempted to 
salvage whatever he could of the essence of the Public Inquiry process by at the very least 
providing as much “truth” as he could via public summaries. However, as will be shown below, 
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even these attempts proved futile against the constant habitual recourse to judicialized 
discourses, practices and procedures.  
For instance, according to O’Connor J., “my role in deciding what could be made public 
was limited, and my decisions were always subject to review and challenge by the Government. 
Indeed, as I describe below, that reality led me to significantly alter the process for the Inquiry 
after the Government instituted a court challenge to my ruling about the disclosure of 
information in a summary of in camera evidence.”302 The mere fact that O’Connor J. found it 
necessary to justify his limited powers and the rigidity of the Commission’s practices in relation 
to public disclosure and participation confirms that the Commission’s public functions were 
deemed subservient to the requirements of justice – it was justice before the truth; truth was 
whatever justice would dictate it to be.  
More importantly, by pointing to the unavoidability of judicialization (i.e., the continuous 
subjection to rigorous scrutiny of NSC claims and the constant challenges to the disclosure from 
the government), O’Connor J. ultimately gave into the discourses of justice and went as far as to 
“significantly alter the process for the Inquiry” in an attempt to make it more conducive to such 
discourses and thereby less likely open to procedural challenges. Accordingly, despite the 
significance accorded to the public principles of an inquiry, when it came to practice and 
procedure, efficiency (and at the basic level, possibly the survival of the Commission) won over 
the principles of openness and fairness. As Ratushny summarized, “[t]he commissioner decided 
not to risk aborting the inquiry through ongoing legal challenges but to hear most of the evidence 
in camera. He then wrote a confidential report with reference to all of the evidence for the 
benefit of the government. Finally, he edited this report to remove portions he though would be 
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subject to NSC so that the edited report could be made public.”303 Thus, for the sake of avoiding 
continuous legal interruptions to his Commission proceedings, O’Connor J. had to suspend the 
most vital public functions of the inquiry.  
To be fair, the nature of the issues and hence, the information investigated by the Arar 
Commission was adverse to the Commission’s public functions right from the start.  Perhaps the 
Government was aware of this but called the Commission anyway in the hopes of appeasing 
public’s thirst for truth and justice.304 It is conceivable that by relying on the inquiry’s public 
functions and the respect they get from the general public, the Government assumed that it would 
gain back some of the credibility and confidence in its institutions. If that was the case, such 
assumption was misguided. Without the context allowing for their proper application, the public 
principles and virtues that are so emblematic of the Public Inquiry are virtually useless as a 
means for instilling public confidence in both the Government and the commission. Most 
importantly, if the Public Inquiry is continuously utilized in such a way as to devalue its public 
nature and aspects, it will lose its unique qualities and purpose, and become a mere extension of 
the adversarial system.  
O’Connor J. was aware of just how important it was to put the public guiding principles 
to practice if only to maintain public confidence in the inquiry. To that effect, he devised the 
Rules in such a way as to provide for the preparation of public summaries of information heard 
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in camera, in an attempt to secure some form of public accessibility and transparency.
305
 
Specifically, O’Connor J. hoped that his summaries of the in camera evidence would “keep the 
public informed, to the extent possible, of the evidence being heard in camera; and [to] provide 
the parties with as much information as possible about the in camera evidence before the public 
hearings took place.”306 Although in theory this may seem like a compelling solution to 
maintaining some semblance of openness and transparency, especially given the confidential 
nature of much of the information available to the Commission, in actuality it merely 
underscored the severity of the limits placed on public access to truth. Most importantly, the very 
process of generating a public summary illustrates just how adversarial the search for the truth 
had become.  
Namely, according to O’Connor J.: 
[f]inally, the summary in many instances does not fully reflect the probing of witnesses, by 
Commission counsel, particularly where relevant information in the testimony is being 
disclosed at the present time. Information has been excluded or synthesized in the summary 
in order to present a logical account of evidence that is deemed to be both relevant and 
significant. The summary also excludes information that is subject to valid NSC claim and 
where, in the Commissioner’s opinion, the public interest in non-disclosure is not 
outweighed by the public interest in disclosure. Further, some information has been 
excluded for reasons of fairness, including consideration of the inability of individuals to 
cross-examine witnesses whose testimony affects those individuals, the need to account for 
conflicts in the evidence, and the need not to mislead the public. In particular, to avoid 
unfairness, information has been excluded where it involves speculation or where it may be 
contradicted by other evidence. The unusual nature of publishing information by summary 
has led the Commission to exercise caution in avoiding undue emphasis on evidence that 
may yet be called into question.
307
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It is not hard to see from the above that whatever the limited “truth” that the summary can 
provide to the public is a product of extensive and elaborate adjudicative procedures that process 
available information into “facts” whereby certain types and sources of information are selected 
over others according to a standard of relevance, credibility and fairness – which is itself 
informed by the commissioner’s perceptions and value preferences. The remaining “facts” are 
further molded into particular truths that go through a further process of selection and 
categorization according to the character and dictates of a particular inquiry. In this case, the 
compartmentalization of relevant and non-NSC compromising truths would proceed according to 
its “significance” and capacity to “present a logical account” without misleading the public.  
Alas, even the public disclosure of such summaries was eventually abandoned during the 
course of the investigation. According to O’Connor J.:  
…the discussions with the government about the contents of the summary and what parts 
of it could be disclosed publicly were extremely time-consuming. In the end, no agreement 
was reached and the government filed an application in the Federal Court challenging the 
disclosure of some parts of the summary. 
 
In light of that experience, it became obvious to me that, from a practical standpoint, the 
summary process is unworkable. Were that process to be continued, discussions with the 
government about the contents of summaries and what parts may be disclosed publicly 
would be both complex and time-consuming….The summary process, if continued, could 
lead to a series of potentially lengthy court applications, with ensuing delays of the work of 
the Commission and a substantial increase in the cost of the Inquiry.
308
 
 
Note that the Commissioner is concerned here first and foremost with the efficiency of the 
inquiry rather than its effectiveness, which would suffer even more due to such constrains on 
public truth. This suggests that perhaps the complex and time-consuming nature of generating 
public truths in the context of NSC claims is not worth the delays and costs that the process 
would impose on the Commission. Thus, for the sake of efficiency and to avoid bringing the 
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Commission’s work to a “complete halt”,309 O’Connor J. decided to implement a new procedure 
“designed to develop a more efficient, expeditious and workable process for the Inquiry.”310 
According to him, “[t]his new approach meant that the public hearings would proceed on the 
basis that there would be no public disclosure of any information over which the Government 
claimed NSC, even when I disagreed with the claims.”311 Thus, in the hopes of avoiding “a series 
of protracted and costly interlocutory proceedings”, O’Connor J. would defer making any 
decisions with respect to the disclosure of information heard in camera until issuing his report.
312
 
In other words, this meant that the implementation of the Commission’s public functions would 
be suspended for the sake of efficiency and in light of the adversarial impediments to public 
search for truth. 
 O’Connor J. did make it clear that “the fact that information received at the in camera 
hearings has not been disclosed in the final summary does not foreclose disclosure of such 
information in a future summary or other public release.”313 In fact, the Government’s tendency 
to “overclaim”314 NSC over much of the information during Commission’s proceedings was 
eventually pursued in Federal Court.
315
 Although the Federal Court “ruled largely in favour of 
the Commission, additional material from the report was released almost a year after the initial 
publication.”316 By then, however, the damage had already been done to the public image of the 
Commission and the principles for which it stood.  
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 The abandonment of procedural safeguards to the public quest for truth signalled 
adversarial takeover of Commission processes. More important than that, the Government’s 
over-assertions of NSC inhibited the inquisitorial process and undermined the general principles 
of openness, transparency and fairness. Even O’Connor J. admitted that the “public hearing 
process suffered” given that the Commission was prevented from addressing several important 
areas of its investigation during the public hearings.
317
 He also found it necessary “to highlight 
the fact that overclaiming exacerbates the transparency and procedural fairness of the problems 
that inevitably accompany any proceedings that can not be fully open because of NSC concerns. 
It also promotes public suspicion and cynicism about legitimate claims by the Government of 
national security confidentiality.”318 Thus, the adversarial mentality that the Commission was 
eventually forced to assume as a consequence of avoiding “a complete and final halt”319 of its 
proceedings only served to frustrate the public principles and foundation on which it stood. In 
other words, in order to ensure its “physical” survival, the Commission had to abandon its public 
spirit.  
Perhaps the irony was not lost on O’Connor J. and in an attempt to remedy (or at the very 
least, compensate for) the circumstances he made a structural decision to proceed with the Policy 
Review process simultaneous to the Factual Inquiry.
320
 According to O’Connor J., “[s]ince it 
seemed possible that the public release of the Factual Inquiry report would be delayed because of 
NSC issues, I decided it was best to proceed with the Policy Review process, so as not to delay 
the delivery of that report.”321 Thus, O’Connor J. wanted to ensure that the delays and 
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impediments to public disclosure that were inhibiting the Factual Inquiry would not compromise 
the public utility of the remaining portion of the Mandate, especially when it operated under the 
same guiding principles. In other words, he attempted to salvage the public search for truth 
however limited it may be if only to maintain public confidence in the viability of the general 
functions of the inquiry process. 
 
(4) Accountability via Public Access to Truth 
 
Furthermore, despite the prevalent recourse to the discourses of justice and adversarial 
practices during Commission proceedings, O’Connor J.’s effort to preserve the fundamental, 
public nature of the inquiry could also be glimpsed in the way that he conceptualized 
“accountability”. Being one of the essential goals of the inquiry, accountability is an important 
aspect of the truth discourses. To that effect, O’Connor J. confirmed that unlike the adversarial 
process, “a public inquiry should not be turned into a fault-finding exercise.”322 Instead, he 
focused on identifying the “shortcomings, as I viewed them, in what Canadian officials did or 
did not do in relation to Mr. Arar…”323 Essentially, according to O’Connor J., “accountability” 
was not a matter of determining guilt or innocence but rather a process of identifying and 
addressing unjust practices and systemic failings (i.e., lack of communication among the 
agencies, deficient screening practices, and inadequate training and experience, etc.).
324
  
More important, however, is how O’Connor J. described the path to achieving 
accountability in the context of an inquiry. Specifically, during proceedings before the Federal 
Court regarding public disclosure of information over which the Government was claiming NSC, 
the Commission made the following submissions:  
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The Commission submits that disclosure is necessary to promote the “open court” 
principle. Public inquiries play an important role in democracy by ensuring that 
Government officials are accountable. A commission’s ability to reveal the truth to 
the public about a particular controversy may allow the public to regain its confidence 
in governing institutions. The Commission also submits that only through maximum 
disclosure will the Government be exposed to public scrutiny, which is, according to 
the Commission “unquestionably the most effective tool in achieving accountability 
for those whose action [sic] are being examined.”325 
 
Accordingly, the public search for truth – a quality for which Public Inquiries are generally held 
in high regards – is the best method for achieving accountability and possibly encouraging public 
confidence in the government. Note that the principles of openness and transparency play an 
essential role in procuring such accountability. In other words, when these principles are 
impaired, the Public Inquiry’s capacity for securing accountability is also undermined given its 
limited ability to reveal truth to the public. Thus, “accountability” within the context of an 
inquiry should be defined and pursued in accordance with the institution’s public principles, 
especially in order to preserve the efficacy and utility of the inquiry. 
 Moreover, in addition to the principles of openness and transparency, O’Connor J. also 
refered to the principle of fairness as comprising an important element in the discourse of truth 
and accountability during inquiry proceedings. According to the Commissioner, “…the single 
most important factor in trying to ensure public accountability and fairness is for the Government 
to limit, from the outset, the breath of those claims to what is truly necessary. Litigating 
questionable NSC claims is in nobody’s interest.”326 Essentially, public truth delivers 
accountability and ensures fairness when it comes to Public Inquiries. For instance, in terms of 
“fairness”, O’Connor J. emphasized that the Commission owed Mr. Arar a common law duty of 
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procedural fairness.
327
 To that effect, it was essential that Mr. Arar (and by extension, the public) 
was provided with maximum disclosure of the Government’s information especially in order to 
ensure that the search for truth – which, after all, was at the core of the Commission’s Mandate – 
would be based on the full view of the facts.
328
  
Accordingly, conceptualized in terms of the discourses of truth, as was largely done by 
O’Connor J. above, both fairness and accountability are the products of truth. Being the 
foundation for fairness and “social accountability” (as opposed to “legal” accountability),329 the 
public search for truth is the essence of the Public Inquiry image. Not surprisingly, O’Connor J. 
argued that “[i]f it is possible to hold a public hearing, this should always be the first option.”330 
In fact, it should be the only option in the context of a Public Inquiry. To do otherwise is to 
compromise the inquiry’s public image and open the floodgates to the judicialization of truth.  
 
(5) Conceptualizing Truth 
 
This brings us to the final topic of analysis pertaining to the Arar Commission – namely, 
what is “truth” or rather, how was it conceptualized during the course of Commission 
proceedings (particularly the Factual Inquiry)? It should not come as a surprise that given the 
subject matter of the Commission, “truth” became a product of an elaborate process. Not only 
was the Government’s “evidence” subject to extensive and vigorous cross-examination - the 
hallmark of adversarial approach to collecting relevant and credible evidence
331
 - but it was 
further circumscribed when it came to its public disclosure. In fact, O’Connor J. indicated that he 
“relied on a variety of factors in deciding what information could be disclosed publicly” in the 
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report.
332
 In addition to these factors (most of which are dedicated to addressing Government’s 
grounds for NSC claims), O’Connor J. relied on multiple in camera hearings, submissions of the 
amici curiae, and the assistance of an expert advisor on NSC issues.
333
 Even the process of 
generating a mere public “summary” of the information heard in camera consisted of a balance 
of interests, considerations of relevance and significance, and exclusions for reasons of 
fairness.
334
  
Notwithstanding the NSC claims, the resemblance of such procedures to the adversarial 
means for admitting evidence is striking. In fact, the final product was “evidence” - and it was 
called as such throughout the inquiry - rather than “truth” or even just a collection of “facts”. In 
other words, “truth” was conceptualized according to the highly structured and rigid adjudicative 
standards. After all, within the context of an inquiry, truth should be much simpler, closer to its 
organic state, and require less processing; it should be as simple as the “truth”.  Nevertheless, 
contrary to the nature of a Public Inquiry, the Arar Commission processed, dissected, and 
compartmentalized truth. Even O’Connor J. revealed that “[t]here are two versions of the factual 
background. One, which may not be disclosed publicly, is a summary of all of the evidence, 
including that which is subject to national security confidentiality. The other is a public version, 
from which I have removed those parts of the evidence that, in my opinion, may not be disclosed 
publicly for reasons of national security confidentiality.”335 
Moreover, the Commission’s report was “based primarily on the evidence of Canadian 
officials” and neither version of the truth included Mr. Arar’s testimony.336 According to 
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O’Connor J. “[f]or reasons of fairness, it was not deemed appropriate for Mr. Arar to testify 
before the release of the Report, the idea being that the Report would provide the maximum 
amount of disclosure of information to him about what had occurred.”337 Note that the principle 
of fairness was being utilized here as a means for processing facts or truths rather than as public 
principle directed at maximizing disclosure. Essentially, fairness was weighted against truth and 
in turn, truth became part and parcel of a balancing equation.  
Most importantly, however, the absence of Mr. Arar’s testimony created a huge gap in 
the “truth” that the Commission was ultimately able to publicly release. After all, the mandate 
for the Commission was “to investigate and report on the actions of Canadian officials in relation 
to Maher Arar…”338 However, that mandate was fulfilled by relying primarily on the facts as 
told by the Government officials. Mr. Arar’s story and his version of the truth were heard 
through a fact-finder
339
 appointed by the Commissioner as well as third party statements.
340
 In 
fact, O’Connor J. made it clear that it was not necessary for him to hear Mr. Arar’s testimony in 
order to fulfill his mandate.
341
 He insisted that, “I do occasionally point out in the Report that Mr. 
Arar’s evidence might shed additional light on a particular event or conclusion. In the main, 
however, I do not think that I was limited in any significant way by not hearing Mr. Arar’s 
evidence.”342 The question remains, however, if this is sufficient? Does such thinking uphold the 
guiding principles of accessibility, transparency, and openness? Should the inquiry settle for 
half-truths as a result of the demands placed on it by the discourses of justice? Will this do it any 
justice? 
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The answer is in how “truth” is conceptualized. For instance, if viewed in terms of the 
discourses of justice, a one-sided tale may be satisfactory if there is even a possibility that the 
whole story will jeopardize the principles of adversarial justice. On the other hand, if viewed 
from the perspective of the truth discourses, “truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth” 
are a means to achieving public justice even if that means sacrificing some of the individual 
“justice” along the way. After all, a Public Inquiry is not a trial. Its main objective is to discover 
truth and deliver it to the public while bound solely by the flexible notions of procedural fairness. 
A Public Inquiry is not an Inquiry if its essential objective – the quest for truth – is jeopardized in 
the name of adjudicative justice.  
Where concerns for justice define the nature and scope of truth, as in the case of the Arar 
Commission, it begs the question of whether an inquiry was the best approach for addressing 
these particular concerns. In other words, what is the use of an institution established as a means 
for instilling public confidence and trust when it cannot even deliver what it was meant to? In the 
end, it really comes down to the ability of a particular institution such as an inquiry to uphold its 
public image, its relevance and utility. An Inquiry (and its Commissioner) should not have to 
fight in order to justify and uphold its public essence like O’Connor J. did during the Arar 
Commission. An inquiry overrun by the discourses of justice is set up for failure and “truth” 
loses all meaning in defining the essence of the Public Inquiry. 
 
B. Iacobucci Inquiry343 
 
Nevertheless, the Arar Commission did the best it could in light of the confidential nature 
of much of the information that it processed. The attempts made by O’Connor J. to preserve even 
an inkling of the Public Inquiry essence despite the limits placed on the Commission’s capacity 
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for public disclosure are striking especially in light of the highly secretive proceedings of the 
Iacobucci Inquiry that followed in the wake of the Arar Commission. On December 11, 2006, 
Justice Iacobucci was “appointed under Part I of the Inquiries Act to conduct an internal inquiry 
into the actions of Canadian officials in relation to Abdullah Almalki, Ahmad Abou-Elmaati and 
Muayyed Nureddin (the ‘Inquiry’).”344 Right from the start, the Terms of Reference (hereinafter, 
the Terms) highlighted the “internal” nature of the Inquiry which Iacobucci J. took to heart and 
utilized to define his role as a Commissioner, conceptualize the guiding principles of his Inquiry, 
and to generally justify his preference for and recourse to the discourses of justice. 
Aside from this critical distinction in the Terms that the Inquiry be “conducted in 
private”,345 both the Arar Commission and the Iacobucci Inquiry were similar in terms of their 
mandates and the content of their investigations. In fact, “[b]ecause the Iacobucci Inquiry was 
very much a product of Justice O’Connor’s recommendations, many may have perceived it as an 
extension of the Arar Commission.”346 However, unlike the Arar Commission and despite being 
established under Part I of the Inquiries Act - and thus falling within the general category of 
“Public Inquiries”347 - the Iacobucci Inquiry was framed as an “internal” process in every sense 
of the word. According to Kalajdzic, who appeared as counsel for Abdullah Almalki before the 
Iacobucci Inquiry, 
[t]he resulting Inquiry looked quite unlike the hundreds of other inquiries that have been 
called under Part I of the Inquiries Act. It was conducted almost entirely in secret. No 
documents, redacted or otherwise, were released to the public or to the non-government 
parties, including documents not protected by national security confidentiality claims. Only 
one and a half days of public hearings were held on substantive matters. While 
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Commission counsel interviewed over forty witnesses, none were examined in public or by 
counsel for the three men. No summaries of evidence or redacted transcripts were 
provided, and consultations with Commission counsel were infrequent.
348
 
 
In other words, the most important distinction between the two inquiries was in their approach to 
NSC. While O’Connor J. defined his practices and Commission procedures in terms of the 
inquiry’s public nature despite the privacy and confidentiality concerns, Iacobucci J. utilized the 
terms “internal” and “private” in a manner that disassociated the body of the Public Inquiry from 
its essential qualities, especially the “public” search for truth. To do so, Iacobucci J. relied on the 
discourses of justice and, as will be argued bellow, went to redefine the purpose and image of the 
Public Inquiry. 
 
(1) Private is the New Public 
 
As mentioned above, contrary to its very nature, the Iacobucci Inquiry was framed as an 
“internal” and “private” investigation. One may even say that the mere idea of an “internal”, 
Public Inquiry is an oxymoron in its right and as such, required a great deal of discursive 
maneuvering on the part of  Commissioner Iacobucci in order to justify this new “private” take 
on an essentially “public” institution. In fact, Iacobucci J. argued that:  
[t]he requirement that the Inquiry be conducted in private originated in the comments of 
Justice O’Connor in the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian 
Officials in Relation to Maher Arar. Justice O’Connor recommended that the cases of Mr. 
Almalki, Mr. Elmaati and Mr. Nureddin be reviewed, but in a manner more appropriate 
than a full scale public inquiry, which, when national security issues are involved, can be 
complicated, unduly protracted and expensive.
349
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He went even further and claimed that “Justice O’Connor did not recommend that the review 
take the form of a traditional public inquiry”,350 thereby suggesting that there is a spectrum of 
public inquiries, ranging from the “traditional” to the “internal” or rather, that the current private 
investigation is the new and improved Public Inquiry process applicable especially where the 
subject matter under review is complicated by NSC concerns. What is troubling here, however, 
is that Iacobucci J. cited O’Connor J. as the source for this original idea of an internal, public 
inquiry despite the lack of evidence.  
 Namely, in order to justify his personal take on the Public Inquiry and thus, his 
interpretation of the Inquiry’s Terms, Iacobucci J. referred to the following statement by 
O’Connor J.,  
My experience in this Inquiry indicates that conducting a public inquiry in cases such as 
these can be a tortuous, time-consuming and expensive exercise. Quite properly, the public 
inquiry process brings with it many procedural requirements for openness and 
fairness….[T]here are more appropriate ways than a full-scale public inquiry to investigate 
and report on cases where national security confidentiality must play such a prominent 
role.
351
 
 
However, choosing to end on this note was misleading. Not only did Iacobucci J. omit from the 
above reference the underscored statement, which clearly indicates O’Connor J.’s conception of 
the Public Inquiry as a predominantly “open” process, but he also left out the fact that O’Connor 
J. gave specific examples of the type of approaches that would be more appropriate for dealing 
with matters concerning NSC and none of them were a variant of a Public Inquiry, not to 
mention an “internal” inquiry. Specifically, O’Connor J. offered that,  
The process that will result from my Policy Review recommendations, if implemented, is 
one approach that, in my view, would be acceptable. However, there may be delays. 
Another possibility would be the type of process recommended by Bob Rae, Independent 
Advisor to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness on questions 
relating to the bombing of Air India Flight 182, for reviewing the investigations in the Air 
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India case. Whatever process is adopted, it should be one that is able to investigate the 
matters fully and, in the end, inspire public confidence in the outcome.
352
 
 
 In other words, both of the approaches approved of by O’Connor J. were more akin to 
departmental reviews rather than public inquiries. Thus, contrary to Iacobucci J.’s suggestion, 
O’Connor J. did not recommend or even foresee a new form of Public Inquiry.  After all, a 
Public Inquiry is a “public” inquiry. Introducing concepts such as “private” and “internal” into 
the principal framework of the institution will necessarily change the essential character and 
nature of the process. Implementing such process is unlikely to “inspire public confidence in the 
outcome” especially when this new private identity of the institution does not correspond to the 
public functions it was originally entailed to perform.  
 Nonetheless, this did not stop Iacobucci J. from engaging the discourse of justice to 
further promote his vision of an “internal” Public Inquiry process while simultaneously 
distancing his Inquiry from any notions of the “traditional” public search for truth. One of the 
best examples of this instance is Iacobucci J.’s interpretation of the Inquiry’s Terms. 
Specifically, Iacobucci J. relied on the following provisions to support his definition of the 
“internal” inquiry mandated by the Terms:  
(d) authorize the Commissioner to adopt any procedures and methods that he considers 
expedient for the proper conduct of the inquiry, while taking all steps necessary to ensure 
that the Inquiry is conducted in private; and  
 
(k) direct the Commissioner, in conducting the Inquiry, to take all steps necessary to 
prevent the disclosure of information to persons or bodies other than the Government of 
Canada that, if it were disclosed to those persons or bodies, would be injurious to 
international relations, national defense, national security, or the conduct of any 
investigation or proceeding….353 
 
Although Iacobucci J. admitted that he had extensive powers as a Commissioner to “adopt any 
procedures and methods that he considers expedient for the proper conduct of the inquiry” and 
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that under paragraph (e) of the Terms, he could “conduct specific portions of the Inquiry in 
public if he is satisfied that it is essential to ensure the effective conduct of the inquiry”,354 
throughout the Inquiry, he nevertheless continued to emphasize as definitive of the Inquiry’s 
structure and process that “[t]he Inquiry was required to be internal and presumptively private. 
The Terms of Reference were very specific in describing the Inquiry as an “internal inquiry” and 
in requiring that I take all steps necessary to ensure that the Inquiry was conducted in 
private….”355 In other words, as evidenced by his report, Iacobucci J. gave little thought to the 
“public” essence of his Inquiry despite being mandated to under paragraph (e) of the Terms. 
Instead, his interpretation of the Terms deemed the matter of public proceedings as being 
subservient to the dictates of the “private” aspects of the process rather than vice versa.  
For instance, the very few times that Iacobucci J. did mention something about public 
hearings it was only to emphasize that they were the exception rather than a norm. He could not 
be much clearer on this point than in his opening remarks at the first public hearing in the Inquiry 
when he stated that “it is fair to say that the thrust of this Inquiry will, because of national 
security concerns, be conducted generally in private and exceptionally in public.”356 Moreover, 
Iacobucci J. argued elsewhere that: 
it is preferable that both adversarial and inquisitorial proceedings be open and public. I do 
not resile from that comment but I do note that it reflected a general preference that was 
subject to the specific terms of reference of the inquiry in question and the context that 
surrounds the inquiry. Here there is no doubt the Terms of Reference emphasize the 
internal or private nature of the Inquiry and that national security confidentiality is a very 
important consideration.”357  
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Note here, how Iacobucci J. made the “public” essence of the inquiry subservient to his 
interpretation of the Terms. According to him, the public aspects of an inquiry are merely a 
“preference” rather than the defining feature of the institution subject to the dictates of the Terms 
(and their interpretation) as well as the context. Given his narrow view of the “public’s” role in 
the Public Inquiry, it is not surprising that Iacobucci J. missed the true power and meaning of his 
authority to “conduct specific portions of the Inquiry in public if he is satisfied that it is essential 
to ensure the effective conduct of the inquiry”. In other words, Iacobucci J. had a chance to 
define his mandate in accordance with the public nature of the inquiry. Instead, he chose to 
redefine the image of the Public Inquiry in light of his narrow interpretation of “justice” – one 
that prioritized the process of getting to the truth over its quality and contribution to the 
fulfilment of inquiry’s social functions. After all, the public search for truth is the “essential” 
character of the institution and therefore, ought to be a prerequisite for the effective conduct of 
an inquiry.  
Nevertheless, Iacobucci J. embraced a narrow conception of truth, one defined by the 
boundaries of “justice” which, given his adjudicative interpretation of the Terms, was achievable 
only by means of a private process rather than a public search for truth. For instance, according 
to him: 
I intend to interpret the words, ‘essential to the effective conduct of the Inquiry’, as not 
being totally restrictive, since they reflect an intention that holding some aspects of this 
Inquiry can contribute to the effective conduct of the Inquiry. In other words, it is my 
opinion that ‘to ensure the effective conduct of the Inquiry’ means holding portions of the 
Inquiry in public to ensure the goal as circumstances may warrant. This will be ultimately 
a discretionary decision, to be made on a case-by-case basis, influenced by the need for 
blending of efficiency and transparency dictated by the circumstances and context.
358
 
 
Clearly, the public search for truth was never even considered to be the goal of the Inquiry; truth 
was not a measure of justice. Rather, Iacobucci J. assumed justice as the basis for truth and 
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implemented a process that was most convenient and practical for satisfying any justiciability 
concerns or capable of being defined according to the elements of justiciability.
359
 As such, the 
Inquiry’s public utility was defined as merely an element in the justice equation and its public 
functions “dictated by the circumstances and context” and subject to the discretion of the 
Commissioner, rather than informing how that discretion was to be utilized in the first place. 
Consequently, the Inquiry’s “effectiveness” was conceptualized according to the discourses of 
justice. To do otherwise would have meant going against the grain of the traditional legalistic 
notions of justice and accepting the public quest for truth as the defining objective of the Public 
Inquiry, one that does not easily land itself to the justiciability concepts and processes as it 
operates outside the adjudicative justice paradigm. Consequently, Iacobucci J. deemed the 
“private” and “internal” process as more “workable”360 and readily amenable to the demands of 
adjudicative justice without giving further thought to how the effectiveness of a Public Inquiry 
conducted almost entirely in private could properly be evaluated. 
Moreover, in support of his broad conception of the Term’s provisions for a “private” 
inquiry, Iacobucci J. once again cited paragraph (k) as “expressly directing” him to limit public 
disclosure of information before the Inquiry in light of the NSC claims.
361
  He forgot, however, 
that the Terms of the Arar Commission had a very similar provision, which, as was demonstrated 
above, did not prevent O’Connor J. from giving credence to the public nature of the Commission 
and even going so far as to grant them the status of the proceedings’ “guiding principles”.362 To 
be fair, the Terms of the Arar Commission gave consideration for the “maximum disclosure to 
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the public of relevant information” and perhaps most importantly, did not define the Commission 
as an “internal” process.363 Nevertheless, it was O’Connor J. who ultimately highlighted the 
significance of public proceedings, transparency and openness. There were no provisions in the 
Terms for the implementation of these principles. The fact stands that O’Connor J. utilized his 
broad powers of discretion and authority to “adopt any procedures and methods that he may 
consider expedient for the proper conduct of the inquiry”364 in a way that prioritized the public 
principles for which the inquiry institution stands for despite his dual obligation to safeguard any 
information subject to valid NSC claims. Thus, as previously shown, O’Connor J. relied on the 
discourses of truth when considering the type of “procedures and methods” essential for the 
“expedient” and “proper” conduct of an inquiry and to a large extent, those “procedures and 
methods” emphasized the Commission’s public qualities.  
In contrast, Iacobucci J. got fixated on the words “internal” and “private”, letting them 
dictate his powers as a Commissioner and the nature of his Inquiry. Unlike O’Connor J.’s 
attempts to limit the impact of NSC claims on the proper conduct of the inquiry, Iacobucci J. 
seemed to embrace the highly legalistic and judicialized language of the Term’s NSC provisions. 
As such, he assigned minimal significance to his authority under the Terms to “conduct specific 
portions of the Inquiry in public”, deciding instead to nominate the private aspects of the NSC 
provisions as the defining principles of his Inquiry. According to Iacobucci J., “[a]lthough the 
Terms of Reference admit of a public hearing they emphasize the presumptively private nature of 
the hearings, among other things to respect national security confidentiality”365 Clearly, 
Iacobucci J.’s first allegiance was not to the guiding principles of a Public Inquiry. He focused 
on the technical requirements of his mandate – such as ensuring that information subject to valid 
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NSC claims was protected - without stepping back and recognizing the unique nature of the 
system in which his mandate must be accomplished.  
In other words, Iacobucci J.’s interpretation of his role as the Commissioner and the role 
of the Inquiry – as well as the actions that he consequently assumed - were informed by the 
traditional discourses of justice that lend themselves easier to the privacy demands of the NSC 
context. Under such framework of thought, little room exists for the unique social processes of 
the inquiry where “justice” is more than respecting the letter of the law or protecting legal rights 
on the path to truth; where “justice” is the enabling of public participation in the pursuit of truth, 
and the extent to which this “justice” is realized is the real measure of a Public Inquiry’s ultimate 
success. Such “public” justice was conceptualized by the persons in whose name the inquiry was 
created in the first place as one that includes “a much more public process, one that entails a 
much more robust role for the participants, the intervenors and their counsel. They argue that the 
Commission must conduct as much of its business as possible in public.”366 If this was the 
leading discourse, the Iacobucci Inquiry process would look similar to that conducted by 
O’Connor J. Namely, it would comply with the following terms: “the Inquiry’s hearings should 
only be conducted in private where national security confidentiality claims are made, and then 
only after and to the extent that evidence might engage national security confidentiality is tested 
and it is determined that the evidence does indeed engage national security confidentiality.”367 
Alas, Iacobucci J. was unmoved by the force of the discourse of truth, arguing instead that “there 
is nothing in the Act to prevent a public inquiry being held in part or all in private”368 without 
addressing the fact that a private inquiry is something completely different and could not be 
equated with a Public Inquiry. 
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Nevertheless, Iacobucci J. drafted the General Rules of Procedure and Practice 
(hereinafter, the Rules) in accordance with this justice-centered interpretation of the Public 
Inquiry’s role. For instance, under Rule 2, he specified that “[t]he Commissioner may amend or 
dispense with compliance with these Rules as he considers necessary to ensure that the Inquiry is 
thorough, expeditious and fair.”369 Clearly, the defining principles of the Iacobucci Inquiry were 
far from epitomizing the essential social functions of a Public Inquiry such as “openness” and 
“transparency” that were continuously reiterated throughout the Arar Commission. The Inquiry’s 
public functions and with them the uniqueness of its very identity were traded for procedural 
efficiency instead.  
Iacobucci J. did not stop here. In Rule 6, he further emphasised that “[t]hese Rules shall 
be interpreted and applied in a manner that ensures the protection of National Security 
Confidentiality,”370 thus making it clear that his thought process was influenced by the 
adjudicative definition of justice. Lastly, in Rule 11, Iacobucci J. solidified his dedication to the 
discourse of justice when he reiterated that “[i]n accordance with the Terms of Reference, the 
Inquiry, including the review of documents and the taking of oral evidence, shall be conducted in 
private…”371 Thus, the privacy of the Inquiry was not an exception but the rule and it would 
dictate not only the type of justice pursued by the process or the truth that would result but also 
and most importantly the nature and identity of the Inquiry that would be aired to the public.  
Not surprisingly, Iacobucci J. saw little value in holding public hearings. In fact, he 
denied the main parties’ motion requesting a public hearing to receive final submissions deeming 
the oral submissions of no further “significance”. Without addressing the value of the public 
hearing itself – especially to satisfying the Inquiry’s mandate of “inspir[ing] public confidence in 
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the outcome”372 – Iacobucci J. argued instead that “I considered it in the best interests of the 
Inquiry and all those affected by it to pursue its completion without taking the additional time 
that hearing oral submissions would inevitably entail, given that such submissions would not add 
very much value to what I had already read and heard.”373 Note here how he focused on the 
added value of the submissions to his individual interests rather than the interests of the public to 
hear these submissions and thereby participate in the process. In other words, he once again 
focused on the Inquiry’s efficiency in satisfying the mandate rather than the quality of the 
Inquiry process measured by its ability to “inspire” public confidence. However, this did not 
deter Iacobucci J. from redefining the Public Inquiry according to his valuation of its “public” 
nature and its relationship to justice and truth. 
 
(2) Redefining the Public Inquiry through the Lens of Justice 
 
According to Iacobucci J., “[t]here was no template for pursuing an inquiry of this kind. 
Within the framework of the Terms of Reference, I sought to adopt a process that would enable 
me to carry out a private but thorough investigation…”374 thereby admitting that such “internal” 
inquiry was the first of its kind; the kind that would require a paradigm shift, a unique “private 
but thorough” process and ultimately a new objective and identity. The process that Iacobucci J. 
ultimately adopted was more in tune with the standards of the adversarial justice model than the 
justice conceived by the public pursuit of truth. The irony of all this was that while Iacobucci J. 
attempted to distinguish his Inquiry from the adversarial process he was simultaneously 
explaining away the essential elements of a Public Inquiry as those belonging to the adversarial 
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context. In this way Iacobucci J. was able to justify his recourse to the discourse of justice by 
redefining the Inquiry through its value system and standards.  
Specifically, Iacobucci J. defined the nature and purpose of his Inquiry in the following 
terms: “[t]he Inquiry was an investigative and inquisitorial proceeding and not a judicial or 
adversarial one. Many of the features of an adversarial proceeding therefore did not apply. My 
counsel and I have nonetheless attempted to be as fair and as respectful as possible to all those 
involved.”375 Note here that he attempted to define the Inquiry process as separate and unique in 
the sense of not having as elaborate of a system for the protection of individual rights as that 
available in an adversarial setting. In the same breath he confirmed that he would instill 
“fairness” into the process thus suggesting that his conception of “fairness” was grounded in the 
adversarial notions of justice. For instance, Iacobucci J. further indicated that despite it being an 
inquisitorial process, “[t]his is not to say the Inquiry has taken place without safeguards or 
protections for those affected by it….In accordance with the dictum of Chief Justice McLachlin 
in Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), I ‘took charge of the gathering of 
evidence in an independent and impartial way.’”376 Thus, he imported the very concepts that 
define the adversarial system and what it stands for into his Inquiry in an attempt to validate the 
“inquisitorial” process. Namely, Iacobucci J. utilized the discourses of judicial independence and 
impartiality as a means for keeping the inquiry process in check with the adjudicative norms and 
practices as if to reassure himself and those involved that “justice” – as it was traditionally 
known - will be served despite the unique nature of the mechanism used to obtain it. 
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To that effect, Iacobucci J. emphasized that above all, the Inquiry’s Terms must be dealt 
with “effectively, comprehensively and independently” rather than openly and transparently.377 
Moreover, he used Chief Justice McLachlin’s decision in Charkaoui in such a way as to define 
the concepts “public” and “openness” as those belonging to the adversarial context thereby 
justifying his new “private” version of a Public Inquiry. Specifically, in order to describe the 
difference between inquisitorial and adversarial systems, Iacobucci J. cited the following:  
There are two types of judicial systems, and they ensure that the full case is placed before 
the judge in two different ways. In inquisitorial systems, as in Continental Europe, the 
judge takes charge of the gathering of evidence in an independent and impartial way. By 
contrast, an adversarial system, which is the norm in Canada, relies on the parties – who 
are entitled to disclosure of the case to meet, and to full participation in open proceedings 
– to produce the relevant evidence…378 
 
Essentially, he utilized the above passage as a means for disassociating the Public Inquiry from 
its fundamentally open and transparent nature. Importantly, he did not address the fact that 
McLachlin C.J. made this statement primarily with regards to the process under the Immigration 
and Refugee Protection Act
379
 which is not the same as that under the Public Inquiries Act as it 
relies much less on the public functions of the inquiry for its credibility. Nevertheless, Iacobucci 
J. deemed “open proceedings” as a hallmark of the adversarial “open court” process380 while 
simultaneously importing judicial values of “independence” and “impartiality” in an attempt to 
justify his role as a Commissioner and his vision of the Inquiry. 
For instance, according to Iacobucci J., “the Commissioner is appointed as an 
independent investigator who is obliged to pursue the terms of his mandate to the best of his 
ability and to ensure that the process is fair, effective and expeditious. And most importantly, the 
Commissioner, through his or her role as an independent investigator, represents the public 
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interest.”381 Nowhere in this definition was any mention of the public search for truth that the 
Public Inquiry is generally known and valued for by the very public in whose interest Iacobucci 
J. claimed to exercise his functions. Instead, Iacobucci J. referred to his experience as a judge in 
order to impart on his audience the qualities he deemed most important to his role as a 
commissioner. Specifically, he indicated that “[h]aving been a judge for some 17 years, I have a 
profound respect for the principles of independence and acting in the public interest and will be 
as vigilant as I can to ensure that the Inquiry is as independent, thorough and fair as it can 
possibly be under the circumstances.”382 Thus, Iacobucci J. utilized the discourse of justice when 
describing his role more in line with that of the arbiter of justice rather than a facilitator of 
public truth and justice.  
The consequences of Iacobucci J.’s reliance on the discourses of justice should not be 
overlooked. Seemingly harmless – after all, who could argue with having a “just” process – his 
choice of discourse suggests that a Public Inquiry is something less than an adjudicative trial as it 
does not offer same level of protection. In other words, rather than describing the Public Inquiry 
as an entirely different mechanism in pursuit of truth and justice defined according to its own 
institutional values and norms, Iacobucci J. adopted the adjudicative standard as a measuring rod 
for the conduct of his Inquiry. Consequently, he also set the standard for how the public should 
receive and perceive the Inquiry.   
For instance, unlike the Arar Commission, the Iacobucci Inquiry defined “procedural 
fairness” in a limiting manner such that restricted public disclosure of non-privileged documents 
and thereby public access and meaningful participation of those involved.
383
 As such, the process 
quickly became a matter of satisfying the requirements of adversarial justice rather than ensuring 
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that truth and justice were publicly pursued so as to instill public confidence in the utility of the 
Public Inquiry itself. After all, one of the goals of an inquiry is to serve as a healing process via 
public participation and disclosure.
384
 Stripped of such potential, an inquiry becomes nothing 
more than a glorified trial subject to strict rules of evidence and procedure, and a narrow 
conception of justice that risks undermining its very essence. 
Iacobucci J. accepted that risk by redefining the Inquiry according to the discourses of 
justice. He allowed the NSC concerns to define the purpose and nature of his Inquiry rather than 
enforcing the Inquiry’s vital social functions and testing the legitimacy of those NSC claims as 
was done by O’Connor J. under similar provisions of the Terms during the Arar Commission. 
Specifically, Iacobucci J. indicated that his primary objective was to “take all steps necessary to 
prevent the disclosure of information subject to national security confidentiality…”385 Although, 
he also stated that “I engaged in the national security review process with a view to providing the 
public with as complete as possible an account of the actions of Canadian officials and my 
findings in respect of those actions,”386 that account or narrative was created entirely in private 
and no matter how complete it may have bin it could not replace the true value of holding a 
public hearing – namely, having the public participate in creating the “account”. Nevertheless, 
this mentality guided how Iacobucci J. interpreted the rest of his mandate and justified holding 
merely three public hearings during the almost two-year term of the Inquiry.  
For instance, giving this mentality, Iacobucci J. redefined the concept of “meaningful 
participation” as it related to Public Inquiries. Specifically, he relied on the commission counsel 
to substitute for the parties, intervenors, and the general public during the in camera hearings. In 
other words, meaningful participation consisted of a series of interviews and meetings with 
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parties and intervenors “to discuss questions to be asked of witnesses and to share testimony 
provided by witnesses that could be disclosed without jeopardizing national security 
confidentiality.”387 In fact, quoting Justice Major, Iacobucci J. went as far as allowing his 
commission counsel to “depart somewhat from his or her normal role and to engage in pointed 
cross-examination where necessary, so as to ensure that evidence heard in camera is thoroughly 
tested…”388 Moreover, according to Iacobucci J., “given the mandate of Inquiry counsel to 
vigorously test the evidence of all witnesses that will be interviewed or examined in private, I do 
not see how the presence of a security-cleared counsel for Messrs. Almalki, Elmaati and 
Nureddin will as a practical matter assist the Inquiry or these individuals.”389 Thus, Iacobucci J. 
was more willing to compromise the neutral, non-adversarial role of the commission counsel
390
 
than allow the parties/public to directly participate in the truth-seeking process of the inquiry as 
was originally intended by the creation of the Public Inquiry institution.  
As Iacobucci J. saw it, “In my view, a far more practical and effective way for counsel 
for Messrs. Almalki, Elmaati and Nureddin to have a genuine input into this Inquiry is for them 
to consult with Inquiry counsel….”391 Again, Iacobucci J. deemed this as “effective input”, 
placing emphasis on the practicality rather than quality of “participation” via commission 
counsel. The participants’ perspective was to be entrusted to commission counsel as well. To that 
effect, Iacobucci J. “instructed Inquiry counsel to maintain regular contact with counsel for the 
participants…so that Inquiry counsel are appraised of information that is relevant and helpful 
from the participants’ perspective.”392 Of course, what was “relevant and helpful” was judged 
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according to the Commissioner’s and commission counsel’s perspectives and those were guided 
by the discourse of justice. Thus, by conceptualizing the nature of Public Inquiry in terms of the 
principles of adversarial justice, Iacobucci J. was able to redefine not only his role and that of the 
commission counsel but more importantly, justify a new, not-so “public” version of the Public 
Inquiry itself.   
 
(3) New Guiding Principles – Workability & Practicality 
  
Furthermore, although Iacobucci J. engaged the discourse of inquiry functions he did so 
by flipping it on its head. As mentioned previously, the principles that Iacobucci J. relied on in 
order to validate his recourse to this new, private version of a Public Inquiry were grounded 
more in the efficiency rather than the effectiveness of the inquiry process such as this one. Those 
principles were “workability” and “practicality”, which Iacobucci J. explicitly invoked in his 
ruling on the Terms of Reference and Procedure. As will be shown below, they are a far cry from 
the “openness”, “transparency” and “accessibility” principles endorsed by the Arar Commission 
as fundamental to the nature of the Public Inquiry. According to Iacobucci J.: 
…the appropriate process for this Inquiry is one that should not only reflect its 
inquisitorial nature and the sensitive context in which the questions that I must determine 
arise, but also respect the workability and practicality principles that have been endorsed 
judicially and sensibly so in my view. It would serve no one’s interest if the process of the 
Inquiry impeded it from an expeditious determination of the questions that I have been 
mandated to pursue.
393
 
 
Clearly, his main concern was “efficient” and “timely” collection of information.394 He had a 
mandate to pursue and it did not seem crucial that it was to be pursued within the confines of a 
fundamentally “public” institution as long as the process was practical and expeditious. In other 
words, Iacobucci J. saw the tree and approached it without considering the forest he was trudging 
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through. In fact, he was not sensitive to the nature of the context in which he operated and 
thereby continued to apply the discourse that he was accustomed to as a judge.  
For instance, the principles of “workability” and “practicality” are gouged in the 
discourse of justice that permeates the adjudicative setting. For one, they do not lend themselves 
easily to the public pursuit of truth that is often more complex and less practical than an internal, 
formal and highly structured process envisioned by Iacobucci J. After all, there are a lot more 
variables (parties and interests) at play making it difficult to regulate how truth is pursued, 
transmitted, and appreciated.  
More importantly, as Iacobucci J. seemed to suggest, these principles are more in tune 
with the proper administration of justice and thereby amenable to the judicial discourse. 
According to Iacobucci J., “[e]ven where the ‘open court’ principle is applicable, ‘workability’ 
has been cited as a factor that may militate against public access.”395 He went on to quote Justice 
La Forest in Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General) who argued 
that,  
…this Court has noted on previous occasions that public access to certain judicial processes 
would render the administration of justice unworkable….The importance of ensuring that the 
administration of justice is not rendered unworkable provides a palpable reason for 
prohibiting public access….  Indeed, as we have seen in this case, the open court principle 
itself must yield to circumstances that would render the proper administration of justice 
unworkable.
396
 
 
Not only did Iacobucci J. utilize the standard of administration of justice as a benchmark for the 
proper conduct of his Inquiry rather than adhering to the social functions of the institution, but he 
also equated the “open court” principle, which is another adversarial concept, with the public 
principles of the Inquiry.  Although at first glance the “open court” principle may resemble the 
principles of “openness” and “transparency”, it does not quite capture the central role of the public 
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search for truth, its significance to the proper functioning of the Public Inquiry and ultimately, its 
capacity to uphold the institution’s public image.  
 Aside from conceptualizing justice in terms of the judicial discourse and then utilizing the 
concept to justify conducting a “private” Inquiry and applying new guiding principles to do so, 
Iacobucci J. forgot to mention that the grounds for his argument – namely, La Forest J.’s judgment 
above – were originally made pursuant to the proper conduct of a criminal trial where the 
administration of justice does take the front stage. Nevertheless, Iacobucci J. insisted that in carrying 
out his work as the Commissioner, he “must consider the most practical means to accomplish the 
Inquiry’s objectives.”397 Remember also that those very “objectives” were defined by the 
adversarial conception of justice. Moreover, Iacobucci J. made sure to mention that he was “not 
elevating the workability principle to a unjustifiable degree, but simply recognizing that, for 
example, to encourage arguments over material that would be presented and whether it would be 
cleared for release or for redaction purposes and the like would, as experience in the Arar Inquiry 
demonstrated, cause significant delay and complexity.” 398 However, Iacobucci J.’s emphasis on “an 
information-gathering and fact-finding process that was practical, efficient and fair”399 made it very 
clear that he was in fact elevating the workability principle to the Inquiry’s new guiding principle. 
Thus, without once suggesting that a public inquiry was impossible or unworkable, Iacobucci J. 
represented his judicialized conception of the inquiry process as the new face of the Public Inquiry.  
The search for truth, which should have been at the core of the Inquiry’s mandate, was 
traded in for efficiency and on the basis of the workability and practicality principles the Inquiry 
was conducted almost entirely in camera and ex parte. However, no matter what the Inquiry may 
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have achieved in term of its efficiency,
400
 it ultimately lost in terms of its effectiveness and thereby 
legitimacy as a genuinely public institution due to its new “internal” or “invisible” process.401 
According to Kalajdzic, the internal inquiry made it  
…virtually impossible for members of the public to form an opinion of the accuracy of the 
Commissioner’s finding on the role of Canadian officials in the men’s detention and torture, 
and therefore to be confident in the thoroughness of the Report and in what it says about the 
functioning of the relevant government institutions. Because the Inquiry falls short with 
respect to both its investigative and democratic functions, it cannot be said to be fully 
effective.
402
 
 
Thus, although the new guiding principles, “workability” and “practicality” may have made the 
Inquiry more efficient, they robbed the Inquiry of its public function, utility and image. In other 
words, Iacobucci J.’s recourse to the discourse of justice jeopardized public’s confidence in the 
process and findings of his Inquiry despite setting out on the path to a “just” truth. More 
importantly, the lack of openness, transparency, and accessibility threatened the very foundation of 
the Public Inquiry, namely its capacity for public truth-seeking. It did not help that in addition to 
privately pursuing truth, Iacobucci J. was not authorized to publicly disclose all of his findings and 
was thus forced to create separate versions of the “truth”, an act that goes against the very rubric of 
the Public Inquiry institution.  
 
(4) Truth Versions 
 
In an ideal world, there would be only one truth. If that was so, there would be no need 
for an adjudicative process geared towards sorting out through versions of truth according to the 
standards of adversarial justice. Nevertheless, this pursuit of the ideal was precisely why the 
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Public Inquiry was originally set up to do and what the public generally expects it to do. 
However, the Iacobucci Inquiry was never meant to even behold the mere possibility of that 
ideal. In fact, the Inquiry’s Terms of Reference directed the Commissioner to submit “both a 
confidential report and a separate report that is suitable for disclosure to the public…”403 The two 
versions of Iacobucci J.’s report were in turn products of an elaborate processing of the truth 
whereby Iacobucci J.,  
…directed Inquiry counsel to prepare draft factual narratives for my review, based on 
documents, interviews and other information. I also directed that Inquiry counsel make 
these draft narratives available for review by counsel for Inquiry Participants and 
Intervenors on a confidential basis. Counsel for Inquiry Participants and Intervenors 
provided detailed comments and suggestions concerning the draft factual narratives both 
orally, in discussion with Inquiry counsel, and in writing. Inquiry counsel took these 
comments and suggestions into account in finalizing the narratives for my consideration.
404
 
 
The irony is that the Public Inquiry was created precisely in order to avoid a process such as this 
and to engage the public as much as possible in the pursuit of truth in its most organic form and 
shape. However, Iacobucci J. did not seem too concerned about redefining the truth-seeking 
process or circumscribing the potential of his Inquiry. In fact, he stated that “[w]hile I benefited 
from guidance provided by the national security review process in Arar Inquiry, I undertook my 
own, independent national security review and was not limited by any prior decisions.”405 As 
such, he embraced the new approach to reviewing NSC claims and therefore, deciding what 
should and should not constitute public truth, despite the fact that the Arar Commission faced 
similar claims, under similar Terms of Reference without discounting the role of public truth-
seeking in maintain credibility of the inquiry process.  
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In addition to pursuing and processing truth according to the adjudicative standards of 
justice, the Iacobucci Inquiry went even further and excluded from the truth generating process 
the very parties in whose names the Inquiry was created. Specifically, only the Attorney General 
was provided with both the confidential and the public versions of the factual narratives while 
the actual parties could not even review the public version prior to its release.
406
 Moreover, 
according to Iacobucci J.: 
[i]n preparing the public version of my report, I chose not to use the technique of indicating 
where information has been omitted through blackouts or ellipsis marks. In my view, doing 
so would have impaired the intelligibility and coherence of the public reports, particularly 
since, in many instances, the best solution to a national security confidentiality concern 
was to summarize the information or convey its essence in a different way, rather than omit 
specific words or phrases. The text of the public report includes approximately 20% fewer 
words than the text of the confidential report (excluding footnoted).
407
 
 
Once again, Iacobucci J. seemed to forget that the very purpose of a Public Inquiry was to 
present truth as close to its organic state as possible rather than to simply summarize its essence. 
What would be the point of a Public Inquiry if a mere summary of the evidence would suffice to 
instill public confidence in the government institution under investigation?  After all, an inquiry 
is about truth-seeking rather than truth stories, which Iacobucci J. attempted to normalize. No 
matter the intent behind the truth versions, the internal inquiry model adopted by Iacobucci J., 
did less to informing the public than to isolate it from the process altogether. According to 
Amnesty International, “[f]or these men, for the Intervenors, and for the public, this process has 
been unacceptable, and, no matter what the outcome, has fostered a culture of impunity. As 
Commissioner Iacobucci has said himself, [since] ‘it is essential to the administration of justice 
that justice is done and is seen to be done, such public scrutiny is fundamental.’”408 Alas, this 
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essential public scrutiny has been excluded from the Iacobucci Inquiry, impacting not only the 
effectiveness of the process but also its traditional objectives and image. 
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CONCLUSION – THE SIGNS OF AN INQUIRY’S DEMISE 
 
According to Salter, an inquiry is fully capable of incorporating radical alternatives and 
debate and more importantly, encouraging “genuinely democratic participation.”409 Despite its 
radical nature and capacity for public truth-seeking and justice, the analysis above leaves no 
doubt as to the impending demise of the Public Inquiry as a truly unique and public institution if 
the discourses of justice continue to dominate the academic and professional discussion of the 
inquiry’s principal framework, functions, and practices that define its public image. For one, the 
tendency has been to pit the adversarial notions of truth and justice against those expected to 
guide the inquiry, consequently “judicializing” the process, preventing full public participation, 
precluding thorough truth-seeking and foreclosing justice in an inquisitorial setting such as that 
of a Public Inquiry. In other words, the trend is to convert the inquiry into yet another form of 
adversarial apparatus thus leading to the gradual demise of an inquiry as a unique public process. 
Moreover, as argued above, the commissioner has ultimate power – as an insider and 
leader of the process - to influence how the public perceives and receives an inquiry. In other 
words, the judge-commissioner is the persona of an inquiry and plays a primary role in building 
and depicting the values, essence, virtue and identity of an inquiry. However, between the 
influence of a judge-commissioner’s professional upbringing on his/her decision-making and the 
real/perceived (both externally and internally applied) pressure to adhere to the traditional 
adjudicative standards of justice and truth-seeking, the judge-commissioner is not in any better 
position to fight against the current of judicialized discourses. In fact, both O’Connor J. in the 
Arar Commission and Iacobucci J. in the Iacobucci Inquiry, were continuously referencing 
adjudicative norms and standards in order to rationalize their decision-making process and the 
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conclusions they had reached either to uphold the legitimacy of their “judicial” status (i.e., 
independence and impartiality, as well as the judicial obligation to protect individual rights) or to 
ensure their inquiry’s survival (or efficiency). Iacobucci J. went even as far as justifying a new 
“private” version of the Public Inquiry. As Robardet argued:  
Such attitudes are part and parcel of the ideology of law and as such are inculcated in 
lawyers as they partake of legal education, read legal scholarship and practice law. Even 
where serious efforts are made to escape the bounds of inherited legal thought, a persistent 
suspicion of public administration and consequently a general preference of ‘private’ 
rather than ‘public’ ordering lingers in the juristic mind.410 
 
As argued throughout the paper, to a greater extent the same can be said with respect to the 
attitude of a judge-commissioner whether he/she is conscious of it or not. It is this attitude and 
the constant preference for and recourse to the discourses of justice that is gradually leading to 
the demise of the Public Inquiry as a unique public institution separate and independent from the 
adjudicative/adversarial system.  
What is more alarming, however, is that most of the judge-commissioners as well as the 
academics writing on the subject of public inquiries, are not aware of the extent to which this 
particular attitude – one that treats as normative the adjudicative forms of truth and justice – 
shapes and molds the Public Inquiry image to fit within this adversarial/adjudicative paradigm. 
The consequences are ever direr. As the Public Inquiry assumes the image that is prescribed by 
the standards of judicial discourse, it abandons its true public nature and essence, neglects its 
social functions, and ultimately fails to achieve its most important institutional goal and 
objective, namely to encourage and secure public confidence in the government that created it, 
the public institutions that are under its investigation, and most importantly, its own institutional 
utility and credibility.  
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The significance of this impact should not be ignored or underestimated. As a unique 
institution, the Public Inquiry has the capacity and potential to add meaningful and enlightening 
contribution to social thought and development. According to Berger: 
The work of commissions of inquiry, both through their hearings and in their reports, 
has brought new thinking into the public consciousness; expanded the vocabulary of 
politics, education, and social science; and added to the furniture that we now expect to 
find in Canada’s storefront of ideas. Contrary to popular mythology, commissions of 
inquiry have always had real importance in providing considered advice to 
governments. They supplement the traditional machinery of government, by bringing 
to bear the resources of time, objectivity, expertise, and by offering a forum for the 
expression of public opinion.
411
 
 
In order to ensure that the Public Inquiry continues its unique contribution to social development, 
both the academia and the legal professionals need to be conscious at all times of the discourses 
that they utilize as well as their impact within the inquiry context. As the creator of the public 
inquiry image, the commissioner, more than ever, needs to be conscious of the discourses 
underpinning his/her decision-making so as to avoid presenting the inquiry as something other 
than it is and thereby undermining public trust when the institutional values conflict with the 
outcome and vice versa. All that is needed is an awareness of the social functions essential to an 
inquiry’s survival as a separate and unique public institution and that means a conscious refrain 
from defining the inquiry according to discourses that pit “justice” against truth.  
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